Caron v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 22 June 1998
• Docket Number: 976270
• Citation: 141 L.Ed.2d 303,524 U.S. 308,118 S.Ct. 2007
• Parties: Gerald R. CARON, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

524 U.S. 308

118 S.Ct. 2007

141 L.Ed.2d 303

Gerald R. CARON, Petitioner,

v UNITED STATES.

No. 97-6270.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued April 21, 1998.

Decided June 22, 1998.

Syllabus^*

Federal law forbids a person convicted of a serious offense to possess any firearm, 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1), and requires that a three-time violent felon who violates §922(g) receive an enhanced sentence, §924(e). However, a previous conviction is not a predicate for the substantive offense or the enhanced sentence if the offender's civil rights have been restored, "unless such . . . restoration . . . expressly provides that the person may not . . . possess . . . firearms.'' §921(a)(20). Petitioner, who has an extensive criminal record, was convicted of possessing, inter alia, six rifles and shotguns in violation of §922(g). The District Court enhanced his sentence based on one California conviction and three Massachusetts convictions, but the First Circuit vacated the sentence, concluding that his civil rights had been restored by operation of a Massachusetts law that permitted him to possess rifles but restricted his right to carry handguns. On remand, the District Court disregarded the Massachusetts convictions, finding that, because Massachusetts law allowed petitioner to possess rifles, §921(a)(20)'s "unless clause'' was not activated, and that the handgun restriction was irrelevant because the case involved rifles and shotguns. The First Circuit reversed, counting the convictions because petitioner remained subject to significant firearms restrictions.

Held: The handgun restriction activates the unless clause, making the Massachusetts convictions count under federal law. The phrase "may not . . . possess . . . firearms'' must be interpreted under either of two "all-or-nothing'' approaches: either it applies when the State forbids one or more types of firearms, as the Government contends; or it does not apply if the State permits one or more types of firearms, regardless of the one possessed in the particular case. This Court agrees with the Government's approach, under which a state weapons limitation activates the uniform federal ban on possessing any firearms at all. Even if a State permitted an offender to have the guns he possessed, federal law uses the State's determination that the offender is more dangerous than law-abiding citizens to impose its own broader stricture. Under petitioner's approach, if he had possessed a handgun in violation of state law, the unless clause would not apply because he could have possessed a rifle. This approach contradicts a likely, and rational, congressional intent. Congress, believing that existing state laws provided less than positive assurance that a repeat violent offender no longer poses an unacceptable risk of dangerousness, intended to keep guns away from all offenders who might cause harm, even if they were not deemed dangerous by the States. Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 119, 120, 103 S.Ct. 986, 995-996, 74 L.Ed.2d 845. To provide the missing assurance, federal law must reach primary conduct not covered by state law. The fact that state law determines the restoration of civil rights does not mean that state law also controls the unless clause: As to weapons possession, the Federal Government has an interest in a single, national, protective policy, broader than required by state law. The rule of lenity does not apply here, since petitioner relies on an implausible reading of the congressional purpose. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17, 115 S.Ct. 382, 386, 130 L.Ed.2d 225. Pp. ____-____.

Affirmed.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and STEVENS, O'CONNOR, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined.

THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA and SOUTER, JJ., joined.

Owen S. Walker, Boston, MA, for petitioner.

Jonathan Nuechterlein, Washington, DC, for respondent.

Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under federal law, a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison may not possess any firearm. 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1). If he has three violent felony convictions and violates the statute, he must receive an enhanced sentence. §924(e). A previous conviction is a predicate for neither the substantive offense nor the sentence enhancement if the offender has had his civil rights restored, "unless such . . . restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not . . . possess . . . firearms.'' §921(a)(20). This is the so-called "unless clause'' we now must interpret. As the ellipses suggest, the statute is more complex, but the phrase as quoted presents the issue for our decision.

The parties, reflecting a similar division among various Courts of Appeals, disagree over the interpretation of the unless clause in the following circumstance. What if the State restoring the offender's rights forbids possession of some firearms, say pistols, but not others, say rifles? In one sense, he "may not . . . possess . . . firearms'' under the unless clause because the ban on specified weapons is a ban on "firearms.'' In another sense, he can possess firearms under the unless clause because the state ban is not absolute. Compare, e.g., United States v. Estrella, 104 F.3d 3, 8 (C.A.1) (adopting former reading), cert. denied, 521 U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 2494, 138 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1997) and United States v. Driscoll, 970 F.2d 1472, 1480-1481 (C.A.6 1992) (same), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1083, 113 S.Ct. 1056, 122 L.Ed.2d 362 (1993), with United States v. Qualls, 140 F.3d 824, 826-827 (C.A.9 1998) (en banc) (intermediate position), and United States v. Shoemaker, 2 F.3d 53, 55-56 (C.A.4 1993) (same), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1047, 114 S.Ct. 698, 126 L.Ed.2d 665 (1994).

The Government contends the class of criminals who "may not . . . possess . . . firearms'' includes those forbidden to have some guns but not others. On this reading, the restoration of rights is of no effect here, the previous offenses are chargeable, and petitioner's sentence must be enhanced. On appeal, the Government's position prevailed in the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and we now affirm its judgment.

I

Petitioner Gerald Caron has an extensive criminal record, including felonies. In Massachusetts state court, he was convicted in 1958 of attempted breaking and entering at night and, in 1959 and 1963, of breaking and entering at night. In California state court, he was convicted in 1970 of assault with intent to commit murder and attempted murder.

In July 1993, petitioner walked into the home of Walter Miller, carrying a semiautomatic rifle. He threatened Miller, brandished the rifle in his face, and pointed it at his wife, his daughters, and his 3-year-old grandson. Police officers disarmed and arrested petitioner.

In September 1993, a federal agent called on petitioner at home to determine if he had other unlawful firearms. Petitioner said he had only flintlock or other antique weapons (not forbidden by law) and owned no conventional firearms. Federal law, the agent told him, forbade his possession of firearms and was not superseded by state law. In December 1993, agents executed a search warrant at petitioner's house, seizing six rifles and shotguns and 6,823 rounds of ammunition.

A federal jury convicted petitioner of four counts of possessing a firearm or ammunition after having been convicted of a serious offense. See 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1). The District Court enhanced his sentence because he was at least a three-time violent felon, based on his one California and three Massachusetts convictions. See §924(e). Petitioner claimed the Court should not have counted his Massachusetts convictions because his civil rights had been restored by operation of Massachusetts law. Massachusetts law allowed petitioner to possess rifles or shotguns, as he had the necessary firearm permit and his felony convictions were more than five years old. Mass. Gen. Laws §§140:123, 140:129B, 140:129C (1996). The law forbade him to possess handguns outside his home or business. See §§140:121, 140:131, 269:10.

At first, the District Court rejected the claim that Massachusetts had restored petitioner's civil rights. It held civil rights had to be restored by an offender-specific action rather than by operation of law. The First Circuit disagreed, vacating the sentence and remanding the case. United States v. Caron, 77 F.3d 1, 2, 6 (1996) (en banc). We denied certiorari. 518 U.S. 1027, 116 S.Ct. 2569, 135 L.Ed.2d 1085 (1996). On remand, the District Court, interpreting the unless clause of the federal statute, disregarded the Massachusetts convictions. It ruled Massachusetts law did not forbid petitioner's possession of firearms because he could possess rifles. 941 F.Supp. 238, 251-254 (D.Mass.1996). Though Massachusetts restricted petitioner's right to carry a handgun, the District Court considered the restriction irrelevant because his case involved rifles and shotguns. See ibid. The First Circuit reversed, counting the convictions because petitioner remained subject to significant firearms restrictions. We granted certiorari. 522 U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 680, 139 L.Ed.2d 628 (1998).

II

A federal statute forbids possession of firearms by those convicted of serious offenses. An abbreviated version of the statute is as follows:

"It shall be unlawful for any person-

" (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;

.....

"to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.'' 18 U.S.C. §922(g).

Three-time violent felons who violate §922(g) face enhanced sentences of at least 15 years' imprisonment. §924(e)(1). "Violent felony'' is defined to include burglary and...