Carona v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R. Co.

• Decision Date: 18 September 1990
• Docket Number: No. 5-89-0147,5-89-0147
• Citation: 203 Ill.App.3d 947,561 N.E.2d 239
• Parties: , 148 Ill.Dec. 933 Donald P. CARONA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL GULF RAILROAD COMPANY, a Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 239

561 N.E.2d 239

203 Ill.App.3d 947, 148 Ill.Dec. 933

Donald P. CARONA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL GULF RAILROAD COMPANY, a Corporation Defendant-Appellee.

No. 5-89-0147.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fifth District.

Sept. 18, 1990.

Robert Wm. Bosslet, Jr., Morris B. Chapman & Associates, Ltd., Granite City, for plaintiff-appellant.

David C. Bohrer, Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly, Chicago, Paul M. Brown, Coburn, Croft & Putzell, Belleville, for defendant-appellee.

Presiding Justice LEWIS delivered the opinion of the court:

The circuit court of Madison County entered a summary judgment for the defendant, Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company, in a Federal Employer's Liability Act (F.E.L.A.) action (45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (1982)) brought against the defendant by the plaintiff, Donald P. Carona, for injuries he allegedly sustained in a work-related accident on February 22, 1986. The basis of the court's order granting the motion for summary judgment was a document entitled "Final Settlement and Release" signed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff appeals the circuit court's order, contending that the circuit court erred when it granted the defendant's motion (1) because there were genuine issues of material fact which were disputed, and (2) because his suit was not barred by the written release as (a) the release was limited to his injuries sustained at work on July 29, 1983, and this suit was for injuries incurred in a work-related accident on February 22, 1986, (b) the written portions take precedence over the printed form of the release, (c) any ambiguity in the release will be construed most strongly against the party drawing the document, and (d) a mutual mistake of fact will vitiate the release.

Before considering the issues raised on appeal, it is necessary to an understanding of this case to set forth the facts as revealed from the limited record presented. On January 5, 1984, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant in which he alleged a cause of action under F.E.L.A. for injuries to the rotator cuff of his left shoulder which he incurred in a work-related accident on July 29, 1983. On August 14, 1986, the plaintiff signed a document entitled "Full Settlement and Release" for this claim. Subsequently, on December 19, 1986, the plaintiff filed a second complaint against the defendant in which he alleged a second and separate cause of action under F.E.L.A. for injuries sustained to the "muscles, tendons, ligaments, nerves, bones, discs, and soft tissues of his neck and cervical spine," incurred in a work-related accident on February 22, 1986.

The defendant filed an answer to the plaintiff's second complaint, and in the answer, in addition to denying the plaintiff's allegation, the defendant also raised the defense that the plaintiff's cause of action was barred by the "doctrine of payment and release." Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. As part of the defendant's motion, the defendant filed an appendix in which the release, an affidavit of J. Randal Little, and excerpts of numerous discovery depositions were included. The plaintiff filed no documentation to counter the defendant's motion. On February 3, 1989, the circuit court heard the parties' arguments on the defendant's motion for summary judgment and took the matter under advisement, and on February 14, 1989, the court entered an order granting the defendant's motion. The plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider and a supplement to the motion which was subsequently denied, following a hearing, on March 1, 1989.

A summary judgment is an extraordinary measure and should only be employed where the right of the movant is clear and free from doubt, and any evidence in support of the motion must be construed strictly against the moving party and liberally in favor of the opponent. (W.H. Lyman Construction Co. v. Village of Gurnee (1985), 131 Ill.App.3d 87, 86 Ill.Dec. 276, 475 N.E.2d 273.) A summary judgment should only be granted where the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (W.H. Lyman Construction Co., 131 Ill.App.3d 87, 86 Ill.Dec. 276, 475 N.E.2d 273.) On review, all the grounds urged and the facts revealed in the record must be considered to determine if a genuine issue of material fact remained to be determined by a jury and that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. (Moore v. Hill (1987), 155 Ill.App.3d 1, 107 Ill.Dec. 945, 507 N.E.2d 1314.) With these principles in mind, we now address the case sub judice.

In the instant case, the court did not state the basis for his order granting the defendant's motion; therefore, our analysis of the propriety of the circuit court's order will encompass both of the grounds raised in the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The first ground raised in the defendant's motion was that the release signed by the plaintiff was a general release which barred the plaintiff's suit. If the court's decision for summary judgment was based upon the language of the release, then the court decided the case as a matter of law. Therefore, our first consideration must be the release itself. The terms of the release in question are in pertinent part as follows:

"I, (We), Donald P. Carona, of the City or Town of Alton, State of Illinois, for the sole consideration of One Hundred Eighty Thousand Dollars ($180,000 ), in hand paid to me (us) by Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby release, acquit, and forever discharge the said Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company, its lessors, lessees, licensors, licensees, and any and all lines or companies owned, operated or controlled by or allied with it, their respective successors and assigns, and all others covered from any and all claims, demands, suits, actions, causes of action, and damages whatsoever, which I (we) now have or may in the future have against them, or any of them, in consequence, directly or indirectly, of any matter or thing done or suffered to be done by any of them prior to and including the date hereof, and more particularly on account of [a]n injury/accident/incident that occurred while in the employ of the Illinois Central Gulf Railroad at or near New Orleans, La. on or about the 29th day of July 1983.

* * * * * *

As a condition of this settlement the ICGRRCo will pay, upon presentation of supportive documentation any billing up to $3,500 for rehab services, to be completed within one year from this date. As a further condition of this settlement Donald P. Carona resigns from the service of the ICGFRRCo. and releases all labor claims.

* * * * * *

THIS IS NOT A RECEIPT FOR WAGES--IT IS A GENERAL RELEASE" (Emphasis added to indicate the portions of the document that were handwritten.)

The release was executed by the parties on August 14, 1986. The defendant urged in its motion for summary judgment that the phrase "any and all claims, demands, suits, actions, causes of action, and damages" prevented the plaintiff from bringing his current claim. The plaintiff contends that the reference to the specific accident of July 1983 in the release limited the general language contained therein.

A release is a contract wherein a party relinquishes a claim to a person against whom the claim exists, and a release is subject to the rules governing the construction of contracts. (Chubb v. Amax Coal Co. (1984), 125 Ill.App.3d 682, 80 Ill.Dec. 917, 466 N.E.2d 369.) It is well established that the intention of the parties controls the scope and effect of the release, and that this intent is discerned from the language used and the circumstances of the transaction. (Chubb, 125 Ill.App.3d 682, 80 Ill.Dec. 917, 466 N.E.2d 369; Whitehead v. Fleet Towing Co. (1982), 110 Ill.App.3d 759, 66 Ill.Dec. 449, 442 N.E.2d 1362.) A release cannot be construed to include claims not within the contemplation of the parties, and it will not be extended to cover claims that may arise in the future. (Chubb, 125 Ill.App.3d 682, 80 Ill.Dec. 917, 466 N.E.2d 369.) It is also the law in Illinois, that where a release contains words of general release in addition to recitals of specific claims, the words of general release are limited to the particular claim to which reference is made. Whitehead, 110 Ill.App.3d 759, 66 Ill.Dec. 449, 442 N.E.2d 1362.

Here, the release signed by the parties contained words of general release; however, the release also specifically referred to the incident of July 29, 1983. Under the law, this specific language reflects that the parties intended to release only those actions which would arise in the future from the July 1983 accident. In the action brought by the plaintiff in 1986, he alleged that his injuries were due to a separate and unrelated accident which occurred in February of 1986. Since this action was not a claim which arose out of the 1983 incident, the plaintiff's second complaint was not barred under the language of the release.

Further, the circumstances surrounding the signing of the release reinforce the conclusion that the parties only intended to bar those actions arising out of the July 1983 incident. In the plaintiff's discovery deposition, he stated he was aware of his injuries incurred in February, i.e., before the signing of the release; however, the only discussion between himself and the railroad's representative, J. Randal Little, at the time of the signing of the release, was about the plaintiff's injuries incurred in the 1983 accident. Likewise, J. Randal Little stated in his affidavit that at the time of the signing the release he had no knowledge of any injury to the plaintiff subsequent to the July 1983 incident. Since both of the parties limited their discussion to the July 1983 incident, it cannot be said that the parties intended to...