Caroselli v. Smith

• Decision Date: 09 October 2009
• Docket Number: No. 9:06-cv-01371 JKS.,9:06-cv-01371 JKS.
• Citation: 665 F.Supp.2d 104
• Parties: Dino CAROSELLI, Petitioner, v. Joseph SMITH,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> Superintendent, Shawangunk Correctional Facility, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

665 F.Supp.2d 104

Dino CAROSELLI, Petitioner, v. Joseph SMITH,¹ Superintendent, Shawangunk Correctional Facility, Respondent.

No. 9:06-cv-01371 JKS.

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

October 9, 2009.

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Dino Caroselli, Wallkill, NY, pro se.

Alyson J. Gill, Office of Attorney General, New York, NY, for Respondent.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

JAMES K. SINGLETON, JR., District Judge.

Petitioner Dino Caroselli, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Caroselli is currently in the custody of the New York Department of Correctional Services, incarcerated at the Shawangunk Correctional Facility. Respondent has answered the petition and Caroselli has replied.

I. BACKGROUND/PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Caroselli is currently serving concurrent indeterminate prison terms of 17 years to life arising out his 1993 conviction in the Kings County Supreme Court of Attempted Robbery in the First Degree (N.Y. Penal Law §§ 110.00/160.15(4)), two counts of Attempted Aggravated Assault of a Police Officer (N.Y. Penal Law §§ 110.00/120.11(2)), and two counts of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree (N.Y. Penal Law § 265.03). The validity of this conviction is not at issue in these proceedings.

In December 2002, while an inmate at the Auburn Correctional Facility, Caroselli, waiting to attend a disciplinary hearing, threatened to kill a correction officer, bit the officer above his left eye, and, during a struggle with the officer, punched him in the face. After a disciplinary hearing relating to this incident, Caroselli was found guilty of violent conduct, assault on staff and threats to staff, and he was punished with eight years in the Special Housing Unit ("SHU"), and loss of packages, commissary, and telephone privileges, for the same period. On administrative appeal, the punishment time period was reduced to 72 months.

Caroselli filed a petition under Article 78 of the N.Y. Civil Practice Law and Rules in the Albany County Supreme Court, which granted the petition and, in an unpublished decision, ordered a new hearing. No rehearing was held on that charge. Instead, Caroselli was served with a new misbehavior report informing him that he had been convicted in Cayuga County Court of two counts of Assault in the Second Degree for the December 2002 incident at Auburn Correction Facility. Following a disciplinary hearing, Caroselli was again found guilty and penalized with 72 months in SHU, and the loss of privileges. The hearing officer's determination was affirmed on administrative appeal. Caroselli then filed an Article 78 petition in the Supreme Court, Albany County, which dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the dismissal, and the Court of Appeals of New York denied leave to appeal on March 23, 2006.² Caroselli timely filed his petition for relief in this Court on November 13, 2006.

Caroselli was released from the SHU and returned to the general prison population on July 18, 2007.

II. GROUNDS RAISED/DEFENSES

Although it is not entirely clear from the petition, it appears that Caroselli is challenging the decision of the administrative officer, i.e., that he was denied due process of law. Like the Respondent, this Court assumes that Caroselli presents three of the same grounds in his petition to this Court as he presented to the Appellate Division: (1) the hearing officer erroneously refused to permit Caroselli to call the Cayuga County judge who presided at his criminal trial; (2) lack of adequate notice that a criminal conviction could subject him to disciplinary sanctions; and, (3) that double jeopardy bars the disciplinary proceeding.³ Respondent contends that the matter is now moot and this action is not properly brought as a habeas corpus action but must be brought as a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Respondent raises no other affirmative defenses.⁴

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, it is governed by the standard of review set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Consequently, this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" at the time the state court renders its decision or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."⁵ The Supreme Court has explained that "clearly established Federal law" in § 2254(d)(1) "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court] as of the time of the relevant state-court decision."⁶ The holding must also be binding upon the states; that is, the decision must be based upon constitutional grounds, not on the supervisory power of the Supreme Court over federal courts.⁷ Thus, where holdings of the Supreme Court regarding the issue presented on habeas review are lacking, "it cannot be said that the state court `unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.'"⁸ When a claim falls under the "unreasonable application" prong, a state court's application of the Supreme Court precedent must be objectively unreasonable, not just incorrect or erroneous.⁹ The Supreme Court has made clear that the objectively unreasonable standard is a substantially higher threshold than simply believing the state court determination was incorrect.¹⁰ In a federal habeas proceeding, the standard under which this Court must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial is whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.¹¹ Petitioner "bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his constitutional rights have been violated."¹²

In applying this standard, this Court reviews the last reasoned decision by the state court.¹³ In addition, the state court's findings of fact are presumed to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.¹⁴

To the extent that the petition raises issues of the proper application of state law, they are beyond the purview of this Court in a federal habeas proceeding. It is a fundamental precept of dual federalism that the States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.¹⁵ A federal court must accept that state courts correctly applied state laws.¹⁶ A petitioner may not transform a state-law issue into a federal one by simply asserting a violation of due process.¹⁷ A federal court may not issue a habeas writ based upon a perceived error of state law unless the error is sufficiently egregious to amount to a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.¹⁸

III. DISCUSSION

A. Mootness.

Respondent contends that by Caroselli's release from the SHU to the general prison population, his petition has been rendered moot. Unconditional release from custody does not render the matter moot if there are any significant collateral consequences as a consequence of the conviction.¹⁹ While the existence of serious collateral consequences are presumed to flow from a criminal conviction,²⁰ the issue is not quite so clear with respect to prison disciplinary actions where, as in this case, the discipline imposed has been consummated.

Respondent contends that Caroselli is not subject to collateral consequences as a result of the disciplinary action at issue in the case. Caroselli, on the other hand, contends that he is subject to continued collateral consequences as a result of his Tier III disciplinary action, providing as an example loss of his right to participate in the family reunion program.²¹ The Second Circuit has held, in the context of a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the loss of good time credits was a sufficient collateral consequence to prevent a prisoner's subsequent release from solitary confinement from rendering his complaint moot.²² Given the inadequacy of the record, the fact that the burden of establishing mootness is on the Respondent,²³ and the liberality with which this Court must construe pro se filings,²⁴ this Court declines to dismiss the petition as moot.

B. Applicability of § 2254.

Respondent also argues that this action must be brought under the Civil Rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Contrary to the arguments advanced by Respondent, Preiser v. Rodriguez²⁵ does not necessarily support his position. In Preiser, the Supreme Court, in upholding the dismissal by the district court of a civil rights action arising out of a prison disciplinary proceeding that resulted in the deprivation of good time credits brought under § 1983, held that § 2254 was the exclusive remedy for state prisoners attacking the validity of or length of their confinement.²⁶ It did not hold, and it is certainly not implicit in that decision, that habeas relief is not available to challenge prison disciplinary proceedings. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has significantly cabined civil rights actions where, as a predicate to recovery, the prisoner would necessarily have to demonstrate the invalidity of a criminal conviction.²⁷ Likewise, this case does not fit neatly within the scope of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Wilkinson v. Dotson.²⁸ In Dotson, the Supreme Court held that habeas relief was not the exclusive remedy where prisoners challenged the constitutionality of parole procedures per se, not, as in this case, due process violations in a particular proceeding. In Dotson, prisoners challenged the application of new parole guidelines enacted after their convictions, seeking a new parole hearing applying the guidelines that were in effect at the time of their respective...