Carpenter v. Ayers

• Decision Date: 05 March 2008
• Docket Number: No. C 98-2444 MJJ.,C 98-2444 MJJ.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: David J. CARPENTER, Petitioner, v. Robert L. AYERS, Jr., Acting Warden of California State Prison at San Quentin, Respondent.

548 F.Supp.2d 736

David J. CARPENTER, Petitioner, v. Robert L. AYERS, Jr., Acting Warden of California State Prison at San Quentin, Respondent.

No. C 98-2444 MJJ.

United States District Court, N.D. California.

March 5, 2008.

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ORDER

MARTIN J. JENKINS, District Judge.

Introduction

The instant case arises from petitioner's conviction and death sentence for the first degree murders of Ellen Hansen and Heather Scaggs, the attempted murder of Steven Haertle, the attempted rape of Hansen, and the rape of Scaggs. Sec People v. Carpenter, 15 Cal.4th 312, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708 (1997). The crimes were committed in Santa Cruz County, but following a change of venue, the case was tried in Los Angeles County.¹ The California Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence on direct appeal on April 28, 1997. Id. Petitioner's subsequent certiorari petition to the United States Supreme Court was denied on January 20, 1998. See Carpenter v. California, 522 U.S. 1078, 118 S.Ct. 858, 139 L.Ed.2d 757 (1998).

Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition on December 24, 1996; it was denied by the California Supreme Court on May 27, 1998. Prior to the denial of his state habeas petition, petitioner filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California a request for the appointment of federal habeas counsel and a motion for change of venue. Petitioners change of venue motion was granted on June 12, 1998, thereby transferring the instant habeas case to the Northern District.

Under the one-year limitation period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), petitioner's federal habeas petition was due by May 27, 1999. The Court, however, granted petitioner's motion to equitably toll the statute of limitations for five months, to and including October 27, 1999. See Order Denying Motion to Vacate and Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Equitable Tolling at 38.² On October 22, 1999, petitioner filed in this Court a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Original Petition")³, a Notice of Additional Claims, and a Motion to Hold Proceedings in Abeyance, and filed in state court his second state habeas petition. On December 1. 1999, the California Supreme Court denied petitioner's second state habeas petition. On December 6. 1999, petitioner filed his First Amended Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("First Amended Petition") and withdrew the Motion to Hold Proceedings in Abeyance.

Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss First Amended Petition and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof ("Motion"). In his motion, respondent asserts a variety of procedural grounds that he contends requires dismissal of at least certain portions of petitioner's First Amended Petition. Petitioner has opposed respondent's motion. In addition to the first round of briefing, the parties have filed several rounds of supplemental briefing as well.

Respondent argues that certain of petitioner's claims should be dismissed because they are procedurally defaulted, because they fail to state a federal claim, or because they improperly rely on incorporation by reference to other claims. For the following reasons, respondent's motion to dismiss on these grounds is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. This order resolves all of the procedural issues and outstanding motions that have been briefed by the parties.

Discussion

I. Cognizability and Incorporation by Reference

A. Failure to State a Federal Question

Respondent contends that federal habeas relief is only available for errors of federal law and that because a number of petitioner's claims allege a violation of state law only, they are not cognizable on federal habeas. Petitioner does not dispute that federal habeas relief is only available for errors of federal law but contends that all the claims cited by respondent do in fact involve a violation of federal law.

Certainly, it is true that "it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United Sates." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991); see Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 778, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990) ("federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law"); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir.1991) ("[o]n federal habeas we may only consider whether the petitioner's conviction violated constitutional norms"). In Jammal, where the petitioner on federal habeas asserted that certain evidence was improperly admitted against him at his state trial in violation of his right to a fair trial, the Ninth Circuit elaborated on the interplay between state law and federal habeas corpus:

[W]e note that failure to comply with state rules of evidence is neither a necessary nor sufficient basis for granting habeas relief. While adherence to state evidentiary rules suggests that the trial was conducted in a procedurally fair manner, it is certainly possible to have a fair trial even when state standards are violated; conversely, state procedural and evidentiary rules may countenance processes that do not comport with fundamental fairness. The issue for us, always, is whether the state proceedings satisfied due process; the presence or absence of a state law violation is largely beside the point.

Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919-20. Thus, the relevant question in the instant case is whether any of petitioner's claims for relief fail to assert a violation of federal law.

Respondent contends that Claims 2, 5, 10, 20, 22, 23, 24, 29, 32, 34, 36, 37, 38 and 44 allege violations of state law only. All of these claims, save Claim 2 (failure to instruct on diminished capacity defense) and Claim 32 (prosecutorial misconduct during rebuttal argument), involve challenges to the admissibility (or exclusion) of certain evidence at the guilt and/or penalty phases of petitioner's trial. Relying on Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, respondent maintains that federal habeas corpus may not be invoked to review a trial court's decision regarding the admission of evidence. Respondent is incorrect.

In McGuire, a California state prisoner filed a federal habeas petition challenging his second-degree murder conviction for killing his daughter on the ground that prior injury evidence was erroneously admitted to establish battered child syndrome. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 66, 112 S.Ct. 475. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding that the admission of this evidence denied McGuire due process. Id. at 67, 112 S.Ct. 475. It began its analysis by criticizing the court of appeals for basing its conclusion in part on the finding that the evidence was admitted in violation of California law, and reemphasized that "in conducting federal habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id. at 68, 112 S.Ct. 475. The Supreme Court then "turn[ed] to the question whether the admission of the evidence violated McGuire's federal constitutional rights." Id. Finding the evidence relevant to, and probative of, the issue of intent, the Supreme Court found that McGuire had not been denied due process. Id. at 69-70, 112 S.Ct. 475. The Supreme Court never called into question whether the admission of evidence at state trial can rise to the level of a federal due process violation. Indeed, a simple search of Ninth Circuit case law clearly establishes that the admission of evidence at a state trial can violate due process and is, therefore, a cognizable claim on federal habeas review. See Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919-21 (considering on federal habeas review whether admission of evidence at state trial rendered proceedings fundamentally unfair and in violation of due process); Kealohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463, 1465 (9th Cir.1986) ("Kealohapauole claims that the admission of the videotape recording deprived him of due process under the fourteenth amendment, which is a cognizable claim under [28 U.S.C] § 2254").

Respondent's related contentions regarding Claims 2 and 32, that alleged errors in the jury instructions at the state trial and prosecutorial misconduct during argument are not cognizable on federal habeas, are likewise devoid of merit. The Supreme Court has reviewed federal habeas petitions filed by state prisoners involving claims that the failure to give a particular instruction and the prosecutor's closing argument rendered the petitioner's state trial fundamentally unfair and violative of due process. See e.g. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154-55, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977) (noting that relevant inquiry on federal habeas to challenge to state court's failure to give a particular "causation" instruction is "whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process"); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 178-83, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) (analyzing whether prosecutor's comments during closing argument at state trial "so infected the trial with unfairness as to make resulting conviction a denial of due process," entitling Darden to federal habeas relief)-While both of these cases emphasize the limited role of federal habeas review in these contexts, see Henderson, 431 U.S. at 154, 97 S.Ct. 1730, Darden, 477 U.S. at 179-81, 106 S.Ct. 2464, neither of these cases, nor any other case cited by respondent, establish that federal due process challenges to alleged instructional errors or prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument are not cognizable on federal habeas.

The Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have recognized that the admission or exclusion of certain...