Carpenter v. Calco Chem. Div. Of American Cyanamid Co. Of Bound Brook.

• Citation: 55 A.2d 44
• Parties: CARPENTER v. CALCO CHEMICAL DIVISION OF AMERICAN CYANAMID CO. OF BOUND BROOK.
• Decision Date: 22 September 1947
• Court: New Jersey Court of Common Pleas

55 A.2d 44

CARPENTER

v.CALCO CHEMICAL DIVISION OF AMERICAN CYANAMID CO. OF BOUND BROOK.

Court of Common Pleas of New Jersey, Somerset County.

Sept. 22, 1947.

Appeal from Workmen's Compensation Bureau.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Jeannette Carpenter, claimant, opposed by Calco Chemical Division of the American Cyanamid Co. of Bound Brook, employer. From a determination and award of compensation by the Workmen's Compensation Bureau in favor of the claimant, the employer appeals.

Determination reversed and judgment entered in favor of the employer.

Wharton & Hall, of Somerville (Frederick W. Hall and William T. Stewart, Jr., both of Somerville, of counsel), for respondent-appellant.

Louis Steisel, of Jersey City (Elsie L. White, of Jersey City, of counsel), for petitioner-appellee.

SMITH, Judge.

This is an appeal from a determination and award of compensation by the Workmen's Compensation Bureau.

The decedent, Austin V. Carpenter, was employed by the respondent-appellant on Friday, July 10, 1942, and first reported for work on the following Monday, July 13, 1942. He continued to work until July 20, 1942, on which date, while walking to his car to return home, after he had completed his day's work and had taken a shower, he became suddenly ill. He was still on his employer's property and returned to the medical department maintained by his employer. He was attended immediately (about 4:30 p. m.) by the physician then in charge. He was put to bed and given medical attention, but died at 5:50 p. m.

On July 15, 1944, almost two years after the decedent's death, his widow, the petitioner herein, filed a claim for compensation on behalf of herself and her 15 year old daughter. In her claim petition she stated, as to the nature and happening of the alleged accident, that ‘while the petitioner's decedent was doing heavy, unusual and strenuous work he became sick, from which illness he died.’ The petition does not allege, except by inference, that the alleged sickness and subsequent death were either results of or contributed to by the claimed heavy, unusual and strenuous work; nor does it offer any enlightenment as to the nature of the alleged sickness or the cause of death. However, the death certificate which was admitted in evidence gives the cause of death as ‘coronary occlusion’. The record indicates that at the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner of Labor the parties proceeded on the theory that the petitioner claimed to be entitled to compensation on the ground that the alleged heavy, unusual and strenuous work done by the decedent in the discharge of the duties of his employment by the respondent-appellant either directly caused, or contributed to his heart failure and resulting death. This theory was vigorously disputed by the respondent-appellant.

The Deputy Commissioner of Labor by whom the case was heard, in the first instance of his conclusion, said: ‘It would seem that the only thing in issue is that of causal connection between the decedent's employment and his death from coronary occlusion.’ Although taking some pains to decline to reveal the mental processes by which he reached his conclusion (R.196), he concluded (R.200) ‘that the petitioner's decedent did, on the 20th day of July, 1942, sustain injuries by reason of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with the respondent * * * and that this injury consisted of a heart failure that the doctors described as coronary occlusion * * *.’ Based upon this conclusion he awarded compensation to the petitioner.

Did the petitioner in this case sustain the burden of proving that the coronary occlusion which resulted in her deceased husband's death was in consequence of an injury by accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment with the respondent company, within the intendment of R.S. 34:15-7 et seq., N.J.S.A.? The inquiry is whether the death is causally related to strain or exertion arising from the doing of the master's work. Lohndorf v. Peper Bros. Paint Co., 135 N.J.L. 352, 354, 52 A.2d 61. The rule, stated in Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N.J.L. 72, 86 A. 458, and running on down through the decisions, is that in workmen's compensation cases the burden of proving that the death was caused by an accident rests upon the claimant. Ten Eleven Corporation v. Burnner, 135 N.J.L. 558, 563, 53 A.2d 350. To justify an award of compensation there should be a clear preponderance of the proofs in favor of the claimant. Ten Eleven Corporation v. Burnner, 135 N.J.L. at page 560, 53 A.2d 350. A bare possibility of causal relationship between the effort attending the doing of the decedent's work and the coronary occlusion which caused his death does not meet the legal standard of proof and discharge the onus of proof which the law places upon a claimant. Lohndorf v. Peper Bros. Paint Co., 135 N.J.L. 352, 358, 52 A.2d 61. Our Court of Errors and Appeals, in Fusco v. Cambridge Piece Dyeing Corporation, 135 N.J.L. 160, 163, 50 A.2d 870, suggests that doubt, resulting from an absence of convincing testimony, requires a denial.

There is a presumption that any death from heart disease is the result of natural causes; the onus is on the claimant to establish that the asserted accident was at least a contributory cause without which the occlusion would not have occurred. Joseph Dixon Crucible Co. v. Law, 135 N.J.L. 528, 53 A.2d 215; Ten Eleven Corporation v. Brunner, supra; Lohndorf v. Peper Bros. Paint Co., 134 N.J.L. 156, 159, 46 A.2d 439, affirmed 135 N.J.L. 352, 52 A.2d 61.

It is a matter of common knowledge that heart disease is near the top, if not actually there, of the list of diseases arranged in numerical order of deaths produced. Many more sufferers from hypertension and arteriosclerosis die from heart failure than from hemorrhage; and of the deaths from cerebral hemorrhage, some are related to strain and some are not. So that industry may not be burdened with a loan not chargeable to it, we are under the duty to scrutinize the evidence carefully lest disability consequent upon disease alone be made the basis of an award. Ten Eleven Corporation v. Brunner, 135 N.J.L. 558, 564, 53 A.2d 350; Joseph Dixon Crucible Co. v. Law, supra; Schlegel v. H. Baron & Co., 130 N.J.L. 611, 34 A.2d 132.

Of course, there may be a compensable injury where there is an accidental strain of the heart, even though the heart was previously weakened by disease, if the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment. Bernstein Furniture Co. v. Kelly, 115 N.J.L. 500, 180 A. 832; Molnar v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 128 N.J.L. 11, 24 A.2d 392; Swift & Co. v. Von Volkum, 131 N.J.L. 83, 34 A.2d 897; Lohndorf v. Peper Bros. Paint Co., supra. However, because an employee continues his...