Carpenter v. Camp Mfg. Co
| Decision Date | 08 June 1911 |
| Citation | 71 S.E. 559,112 Va. 300 |
| Parties | CARPENTER. v. CAMP MFG. CO. et al. |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
A deed to standing timber and the right to cut and remove the same within a fixed period, and within such additional time as the purchaser may desire on paying interest on the price annually, gives the purchaser, after the expiration of the fixed period, a reasonable time in which to cut and remove the timber, and an additional reasonable time in which to remove the buildings, railroads, and tramways erected on the land as permitted by the deed.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Logs and Logging, Cent. Dig. § 9; Dec. Dig. § 3.*]
An owner conveyed standing timber, with a right to cut and remove the timber within a specified time, and such additional time as the purchaser might desire on paying interest on the price annually. Subsequently he conveyed the land to a third person, but reserved to himself all the timber on the land previously conveyed, and all rights to the timber, whether of reversion of the timber or payments to be made by the purchaser thereof. Held, that the rights reserved must be exercised within a reasonable time after the expiration of the period fixed for the cutting and removal of the timber by the purchaser thereof.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Logs and Logging, Cent. Dig. $ 9; Dec. Dig. § 3.*]
The court, in construing a deed, must give effect, if possible, to all of its terms.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. | 237; Dec. Dig. § 90.*]
The language of a deed must be construed most strongly against the grantor.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. § 235; Dec. Dig. § 90.*]
A covenant in a deed to standing timber, which gives to the purchaser the right to build and operate railroads on the land to remove the timber, or anything else which he may wish to carry over the railroads, gives to the purchaser the right, not only to build railroads to remove the timber acquired by that deed, but to transport anything else which he may wish to carry over the railroads; and his right thereto may continue for an indefinite period, subject to such control by the courts as will prevent the rights from being exercised inequitably to the owner.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Logs and Logging, Cent Dig. § 9; Dec. Dig. § 3.*]
Appeal from Circuit Court, Brunswick County.
Suit by W. R. Carpenter against the Camp Manufacturing Company and others. From a decree for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Reversed in part, and remanded.
See, also, 70 S. E. 496.
Marvin Smithey and R. B. Davis, for appellant.
E. R. Turnbull, Jr., and El P. Buford, for appellees.
KEITH, P. The Camp Manufacturing Company is the successor in title to the Brunswick Lumber Company, which purchased from John W. Harrison and wife all of the timber, pine and poplar, 10 inches in diameter across the stump and larger at the time of cutting, upon a certain tract of land, together with the privilege of erecting buildings and operating railroads, tramways, and bogy roads across the land, as set out in the deeds.
Each of the two deeds conveying the timber above referred to contains this provision: "The said party of the second part, its assigns or successors, shall have five years from the date of this deed in which to remove the timber herein conveyed from the said land; and, if they shall fail to remove said timber in the said time, they may have such further time in which to remove the same as they may desire: Provided, however, that they pay interest to the said parties of the first part, or their assigns, at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum on the amount of the purchase price above mentioned, from the expiration of the said five years until they remove the said timber."
These deeds were duly recorded In the clerk's office of Brunswick county. By a subsequent deed John W. Harrison conveyed this land to George C. Dromgoole, in which he reserved certain rights, as follows: " * * * But there is reserved to the parties of the first part all the timber on said land heretofore conveyed to the Brunswick Lumber Company, and all rights under the contracts of sale to said lumber company, whether of reversion of said timber or payments to be made by said company for any cause, and all other rights whatever."
The rights of the Brunswick Lumber Company under its deeds have passed to and are now vested In the Camp Manufacturing Company, and those of the grantor, John W. Harrison, have passed to and are now vested in the appellant, W. R. Carpenter, subject to the above reservation. John W. Harrison is since deceased, and Daisy R. Harrison is his devisee and personal representative.
Carpenter, the appellant, filed his bill, making the Camp Manufacturing Company, the Safe Deposit & Trust Company of Baltimore, trustee in a deed of trust executed by the Camp Manufacturing Company, and Daisy R. Harrison, in her own right and as per-sonal representative of John W. Harrison, deceased, parties defendant. His contention is that all the right's of the Camp Manufacturing Company and of Daisy R. Harrison under the deeds herein referred to have ceased, and he prays the court so to declare, as, being claimed under deeds of record, they constitute a cloud upon appellant's title, and he prays, also, for an injunction against the Camp Manufacturing Company, its agents, attorneys, and employés, to prohibit it from constructing or attempting to construct any spur tracks or branch lines of railway leading from or connecting with the line of lumber railway first constructed by said company across the Harrison plantation, and to enjoin and restrain the said company, its agents, etc., from hauling, transporting, or carrying lumber or any substance whatsoever over the said Harrison farm, except on and by means of the lumber railway first constructed and located by the said company across the said farm, except for the purpose of cutting and removing the timber now standing on the John W. Harrison plantation.
The case was regularly brought on to be heard upon the bill and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Williams v. Batson
...L.R.A. 513; Johnston v. Powhatan Min. Co., 103 S.E. 84; Thomas v. Gates, 31 F.2d 828; Young v. Camp Mfg. Co., 66 S.E. 843; Carpenter v. Camp Mfg. Co., 71 S.E. 559; Brown v. Surry Lbr. Co., 75 S.E. 84; Coast Lbr. Corp. v. Litchfield, 73 S.E. 182; Henderson v. Lyons, 209 P. 1095; Wright v. Ca......
-
Thomas v. Gates
...unless the parties clearly so intended and definitely expressed such intention. The subsequent Virginia cases of Carpenter v. Camp Mfg. Co., 112 Va. 300, 71 S. E. 559, and Brown v. Surry Lumber Co., 113 Va. 503, 75 S. E. 84, approve and follow Young and Wright v. Camp Mfg. Co., and this acc......
-
Gilford v. Ward Rue Lumber Co.
...providing appropriate language is used in the conveyances to indicate this intention and to accomplish the result. See Carpenter v. Camp Mfg. Co., 112 Va. 300, 71 S.E. 559. In that case, timber was sold to Brunswick Lumber Company by deed with provisions as to extension of time for removal,......
-
Adams v. Hazen
...by implication, for "a reasonable time" for such removal. Wright v. Camp Mfg. Co., 110 Va. 678, 66 S. E. 843; Carpenter v. Camp Mfg. Co., 112 Va. 300, 71 S. E. 559; Brown v. Surry Lumber Co., 113 Va. 503, 508, 75 S. E. 84; and authorities cited in such cases. The contract in the case before......