Carpenter v. City of Greenfield School District No. 6

• Decision Date: 21 May 1973
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 70-C-566.
• Citation: 358 F. Supp. 220
• Parties: Ivadell CARPENTER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF GREENFIELD SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 6 et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

358 F. Supp. 220

Ivadell CARPENTER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF GREENFIELD SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 6 et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 70-C-566.

United States District Court, E. D. Wisconsin.

May 21, 1973.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James J. Caldwell, Waukesha, Wis., for plaintiff.

Warren L. Kreunen, Milwaukee, Wis., for defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

REYNOLDS, Chief Judge.

This civil rights action concerns the dismissal of a teacher from her employment in a public grade school in Greenfield, Wisconsin. The plaintiff teacher contends the defendant School Board did not follow constitutionally required procedures in dismissing her during the term of her existing contract. She seeks $205,427.69 in damages, including $100,000 in punitive damages. Jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

I find that plaintiff received an adequate opportunity to be heard on one of the reasons for which she was dismissed, namely, her use of corporal punishment, and that dismissing her on the basis of that reason alone was not unreasonable. I also find that she did not receive an adequate opportunity to be heard on other reasons given for her dismissal, such as screaming at pupils. Upon these findings I conclude that plaintiff is not entitled to recover back pay, punitive damages, or compensatory damages for injury to her health, but that she may be entitled to a further hearing to clear her reputation of any false charges which she was not given an adequate opportunity to refute. Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.

The following material facts are not disputed. In August 1967, the plaintiff Ivadell Carpenter and the defendant School Board of the City of Greenfield, School District No. 6 ("School Board"), entered into a contract which provided that plaintiff was to teach from August 1967 until June 1968 for a stated salary. During October and November of 1967, Clyde Wallenfang, director of instruction for the School District, received numerous written and oral reports criticizing plaintiff's performance as a teacher on several grounds. He discussed the contents, but not the source, of these reports with the plaintiff. The school principal, elementary supervisor, school psychologist, and school social worker also reviewed the contents of these reports with the plaintiff. Wallenfang's subsequent discussions with plaintiff revealed that she felt corporal punishment was necessary and that she had physically punished some children as reported.

On November 30, 1967, Wallenfang met with plaintiff in the office of Principal Gerald Rakowski. Wallenfang told plaintiff she should resign and he would recommend that the School Board accept her resignation at their regular meeting on December 4, 1967. Wallenfang also told plaintiff that if she did not resign, he would recommend that the School Board discharge her. During this two-hour conference Wallenfang stated some of the reasons for his actions. Plaintiff denied some of the reasons but admitted striking the children. Wallenfang told plaintiff she would be on the agenda for the School Board meeting on December 4, 1967, and could discuss her situation with the Board. On December 1, Wallenfang sent plaintiff a letter¹ which was to serve as a written summary of the conference held on November 30, 1967. According to the terms of this letter, plaintiff was suspended at the end of the teaching day on December 1, 1967.

At the School Board meeting on December 4, 1967, the Board considered the matter during its executive session. Based upon the report he had received and his personal discussions with the plaintiff, Wallenfang recommended that the Board terminate plaintiff's employment. No other evidence supporting the reasons was offered. Plaintiff appeared at this session and was given an opportunity to make a presentation on her behalf. There is no indication that plaintiff was given a written statement of the charges against her or an opportunity to confront those who submitted the reports to Wallenfang. At the close of the meeting, a motion was unanimously approved to terminate plaintiff's contract with the School District effective December 6, 1967, based on the reasons presented by the school administration, if she had not already resigned.

On December 6, 1967, plaintiff delivered her letter of resignation to Clarence Allender, superintendent of the schools. Her letter stated:

"I feel that I have not had an adequate opportunity to present the various facets of this problem. I will appreciate a meeting with a diplomatic presentation of my side of the problem. * * *

"It is with a definite feeling of unfairness that I submit this resignation. * * *"

Allender and Wallenfang then met with plaintiff and arranged for her to have a second meeting before the Board on December 18, 1967. At this closed session of the Board, Charles Frailey, a representative from the Wisconsin Education Association, presented plaintiff's position and indicated that the conflict reflected a difference in teaching philosophies. Allender stated the administration's position. The director of the Board asked for a vote to change the previous Board action regarding plaintiff, and there being no vote, the previous action stood.

Plaintiff has never contended that her dismissal was in retaliation for conduct protected by the First or Ninth Amendments of the Constitution. Her claim to back pay rests solely on the defendants' alleged failure to follow fair procedures. Specifically, she contends that defendants should have provided her with a written statement of the reasons for dismissing her and an opportunity to confront those who made the reports on which the reasons were based.

Defendants' motion for summary judgment urges that the court is without jurisdiction because this is really a state breach of contract action. But the plaintiff does not allege breach of contract. She alleges that defendants acting under color of state law have deprived her of rights secured to her by the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. State law does not determine this question. Gouge v. Joint School District No. 1, 310 F. Supp. 984 (W.D.Wis.1971). Defendants' contention that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 grants jurisdiction to deal with conspiracies to deny equal protection but not due process must also be dismissed. While defendants are correct that 42 U.S.C. § 1985 grants jurisdiction only to deal with conspiracies to deny equal protection, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 grants jurisdiction for conspiracies to deny due process when the conspiracy was allegedly carried into effect. Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955).

Defendants base their motion for summary judgment on the following contentions: (1) the School Board and School District are not "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) no activity is alleged which constitutes individual action on the part of any defendant; (3) plaintiff has not met the burden of showing that the actions of defendants denied her procedural due process.

Defendants contend this action should be dismissed against the School District and the School Board since as municipal corporations they are not "persons" within the meaning of 42 U. S.C. § 1983. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). Cf. Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112, 119 (D.Mass.1969). In this circuit, however, municipal corporations are considered "persons" within the meaning of § 1983 when equitable relief is sought, though they are not so considered when "legal" relief is sought. Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1965); Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961); United States ex rel. Lee v. State of Illinois, 343 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1965); Sanberg v. Daley, 306 F. Supp. 277 (N. D.Ill.1969). Hence, plaintiff's requests for $100,000 in compensatory damages for injury to her health and for an additional $100,000 in punitive damages are barred. Her request for $5,427.69 in back pay which was lost as a result of her dismissal is not barred, however. In Schreiber v. Joint School District No. 1, Gibraltar, Wisconsin, 335 F.Supp. 745, 748 (E.D.Wis.1972), this court held that a money judgment of back pay would be considered equitable rather than legal and, therefore, was not barred even under § 1983.

Defendants maintain that the complaint should be dismissed as to persons named in their individual capacities because no activity is alleged which constitutes individual action on the part of any defendant. I agree. The complaint merely alleges that the individual members of the School Board acting in concert did compel plaintiff to resign without providing procedural safeguards:

"* * * the gravamen of the complaint is that they acted improperly as a corporate body in discharging the plaintiff. No individual action by any member of the board is complained about by the plaintiff. * * * the complaint does not state a cause of action against the individual members of the board, and they are entitled to dismissal as individuals. * * *" Abel v. Gousha, 313 F. Supp. 1030, 1031 (E.D.Wis.1970).

Defendants contend that they have satisfied the minimal requirements of procedural due process set forth in Shirck v. Thomas, 447 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1971). Shirck does not provide procedural due process standards for the dismissal of teachers because the case dealt with a teacher whose contract was not renewed. The U. S. Supreme Court in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed.2d 548 (1972), made it clear that different interests are implicated when a school board fails to renew a contract and when, as here, the board dismisses a teacher during the term of her contract. See also Wiesman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S.Ct. 215, 97 L.Ed. 216 (1952). Though a school board may act summarily in failing to renew a contract, it may not deprive a teacher of her interest in...