Carpenter v. Daar

• Decision Date: 01 February 2023
• Docket Number: SC 20524
• Citation: 346 Conn. 80,287 A.3d 1027
• Parties: Shane J. CARPENTER v. Bradley J. DAAR et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

346 Conn. 80

287 A.3d 1027

Shane J. CARPENTER

v.Bradley J. DAAR et al.

SC 20524

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 2, 2022

Officially Released February 1, 2023^*

Kyle J. Zrenda, with whom was Theodore W. Heiser, New London, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Beverly Knapp Anderson, for the appellees (defendants).

Alinor C. Sterling, Bridgeport, Jeffrey W. Wisner, and Sarah Steinfeld, Bridgeport, filed a brief for the Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

Liam M. West, Stamford, and Ryan T. Daly filed a brief for the Connecticut Defense Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.

ROBINSON, C. J.

This certified appeal requires us to consider the extent to which our case law, most significantly, Morgan v. Hartford Hospital , 301 Conn. 388, 21 A.3d 451 (2011), has resulted in the deviation of Connecticut's good faith opinion letter statute, General Statutes § 52-190a,¹ from the legislature's intention that it "prevent frivolous [medical] malpractice actions" but not "serve as a sword to defeat otherwise facially meritorious claims." Wilkins v. Connecticut Childbirth & Women's Center , 314 Conn. 709, 736 n.9, 104 A.3d 671 (2014). The plaintiff, Shane J. Carpenter, appeals, upon our grant of his petition for certification,² from the judgment of the Appellate Court upholding the dismissal of his dental malpractice action against the defendants, Bradley J. Daar and his business entity, Shoreline Modern Dental, LLC (Shoreline). Carpenter v. Daar , 199 Conn. App. 367, 369–70, 405, 236 A.3d 239 (2020). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that (1) because the opinion letter implicates the court's personal jurisdiction, the trial court should not have considered an affidavit filed by the plaintiff to supplement a potentially defective opinion letter (supplemental affidavit) as an alternative to amending the operative complaint, and (2) the author of the opinion letter, Charles S. Solomon,³ an endodontist, was not a "similar health care provider," as defined by General Statutes § 52-184c,⁴ to Daar, who is a general dentist. Our review of the plaintiff's claims leads us to confront a more fundamental issue under § 52-190a, namely, whether this court correctly concluded in Morgan that the opinion letter requirement implicates the court's personal jurisdiction for purposes of the procedures attendant to the motion to dismiss. See Morgan v. Hartford Hospital , supra, at 401–402, 21 A.3d 451. Having received supplemental briefing on this issue; see footnote 2 of this opinion; we conclude that Morgan was wrongly decided on this point. We now hold that the opinion letter requirement is a unique, statutory procedural device that does not implicate the court's jurisdiction in any way. We further conclude that, consistent with this court's decision in Bennett v. New Milford Hospital, Inc. , 300 Conn. 1, 12 A.3d 865 (2011), for purposes of the motion to dismiss pursuant to § 52-190a (c), the sufficiency of the opinion letter is to be determined solely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint and on the face of the opinion letter, without resort to the jurisdictional fact-finding process articulated in, for example, Conboy v. State , 292 Conn. 642, 651–52, 974 A.2d 669 (2009). Because the opinion letter in the present case established that Solomon was a similar health care provider to Daar under the broadly and realistically read allegations in the complaint, we conclude that the plaintiff's action should not have been dismissed. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case, much of which is aptly described in the opinion of the Appellate Court.⁵ "On February 21, 2018, the plaintiff commenced the present action against the defendants⁶ .... As to dental malpractice, the plaintiff alleged that, on June 16, 2015, during root canal surgery, Daar negligently failed to diagnose and treat an infection in the plaintiff's tooth and that, as a result, the plaintiff suffered an infection in his mouth, throat, face and neck that required additional emergency medical care, hospitalization, oral and neck surgery and continuing dental treatment. The plaintiff named Shoreline as a defendant on the basis of vicarious liability for Daar's negligent treatment.

"Pursuant to § 52-184c (c), the plaintiff further alleged that Daar held himself out as a specialist in endodontics on Shoreline's website by indicating that he had completed hundreds of hours of training in endodontics and by providing a general explanation of the nature of that dental specialty.

"The plaintiff attached to his complaint a good faith certificate and what he alleged in the complaint to be a ‘written and signed opinion from a similar health care provider stating that there appears to be evidence of negligence by the defendants, a violation of the standard of care, and providing [a] detailed basis for the formation of that opinion, along with a supplemental correspondence outlining that similar health care provider's qualifications.’ ... The ‘supplemental correspondence’ attached to the complaint, dated August 10, 2017, contained information regarding Solomon's qualifications to establish that he was a similar health care provider to Daar.⁷ The supplemental correspondence, also authored by Solomon, indicated that he is a graduate of Columbia University College of Dental Medicine (Columbia), had been licensed to practice dentistry in the state of New York, ‘with credentials that would satisfy the requirement of any other state,’ and received his ‘specialty [b]oards in [e]ndodontics’ in 1970. It also stated that Solomon practiced endodontics in New York for more than forty years, and that for the past eight years he has been a full-time clinical professor of endodontics at Columbia, ‘teaching clinical and didactic [e]ndodontics.’ " (Citation omitted; footnote added; footnote altered.) Carpenter v. Daar , supra, 199 Conn. App. at 370–72, 236 A.3d 239.

"On April 5, 2018, the defendants moved to dismiss the present action on the ground that the opinion letter did not comply with §§ 52-190a (a) and 52-184c because it failed to demonstrate that Solomon is a similar health care provider to Daar, who is a general dentist, not a specialist in endodontics. They argued that, as an endodontist, Solomon is not a similar health care provider under § 52-184c (b) because Daar is not a specialist in endodontics and was not holding himself out to be one. They further argued that Solomon also was not a similar health care provider under § 52-184c (c) because Daar is a practitioner of general dentistry and Solomon had not practiced or taught general dentistry within the five years preceding June 16, 2017 [i.e., the date of the incident giving rise to the claim]. In addition to submitting a memorandum of law in support of the motion to dismiss, the defendants attached an affidavit from Daar with other related exhibits.

"In his affidavit, Daar attested that he is a general dentist and has been licensed by the state of Connecticut to practice dentistry since November, 1982. He indicated that, as a general dentist, he provides such services as fillings, inlay and onlays, crowns and bridges, dentures, veneers, root canal treatments, simple extractions, teeth whitening, certain types of orthodontics, mouth guards, and some periodontal treatments. Daar stated that he performed the root canal treatment on the plaintiff's tooth in 2015 in his capacity as a general dentist. He further indicated that a quotation from Shoreline's website, on which the plaintiff relied in his complaint to support his allegations that Daar was holding himself out as a specialist in endodontics, was only a partial excerpt of a sentence, which stated in full: ‘[Daar] has completed hundreds of hours of training in [e]ndodontics, [o]rthodontics, [p]eriodontics, [d]ental [i]mplants, [s]leep [a]pnea and more.’

"In support of his allegation that Daar held himself out to be a specialist in endodontics, the plaintiff also relied on information found on the website related to Daar's practice, in particular, information related to endodontics that was accessed in a portion of the website related to ‘Patient Education’ and ‘Services.’ In his affidavit, Daar attested that, in the same portion of the website, eleven additional links appeared. These included links to the following subjects: educational videos, cosmetic and general dentistry, emergency care, implant dentistry, oral health, oral hygiene, oral surgery, orthodontics, pediatric dentistry, periodontal therapy and technology.

"The plaintiff filed an objection to the motion to dismiss on June 5, 2018. The plaintiff continued to argue that, as alleged in his complaint and on the basis of the statements on Shoreline's website, Daar had held himself out to be a specialist in endodontics, and, thus, Solomon, a specialist in endodontics, was a similar health care provider to Daar pursuant to § 52-184c (c). The plaintiff did not submit any evidence to dispute the facts set forth in Daar's affidavit, which sought to establish that, at the time of the root canal procedure, Daar was a general dentist, not a specialist in endodontics or someone holding himself out to be a specialist in endodontics. The plaintiff did not request leave to amend his complaint [pursuant to Practice Book § 10-60 ] to attach a new or amended opinion letter. Instead, the plaintiff attempted to cure the alleged defects in the opinion letter, which the defendants claimed mandated a dismissal, by submitting, as an exhibit to his objection to the motion to dismiss, [the] supplemental affidavit, executed by Solomon on May 30, 2018, which further elaborated on his qualifications as a similar health care provider. In his supplemental affidavit, Solomon attested in relevant part that he is a clinical professor of...