Carpenter v. Huffman

Citation314 So.2d 65,294 Ala. 189
PartiesRalph CARPENTER and Dorothy Carpenter v. Lizzie HUFFMAN. SC 1029.
Decision Date05 June 1975
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama

Owen & Ball, Bay Minette, for appellants.

Chason Stone, Chason & Partin, Bay Minette, for appellee.

JONES, Justice.

This case involves a boundary line dispute between coterminous landowners, Ralph and Dorothy Carpenter (appellants) and Lizzie Huffman (appellee). The land in question is a forty-foot wide strip which runs along the south border of the Carpenters' land and the north boundary of Mrs. Huffman's land. Although the deeds of the two parties are in accord as to their common boundary line, the disputed strip, which Mrs. Huffman claims by adverse possession, begins at the common record boundary and extends 40 feet into the property described in the Carpenters' deed.

After a hearing on the evidence, the trial Court decreed that the true boundary line between the properties of the parties was forty feet north of that shown in the deeds of the parties, thus vesting title in the disputed strip in Mrs. Huffman.

The agreed statement of facts indicates that Phil Alexander, the brother of Mrs. Huffman, bought four acres of land, which included the disputed strip, in 1948; but he did not receive a deed to it until 1953. He fenced in the four acres, running the fence along what he believed to be the correct property line, though in actuality the fence line was incorrectly some 40 feet north of his true boundary.

In 1959, he sold one-half acre to Mrs. Huffman and her northern boundary line was placed along the fence which Alexander had erroneously erected earlier. At that time Mrs. Huffman built a house on the one-half acre, half of which was on the disputed strip. A portion of the fence on her northern border was removed during the construction of her house. Also, a driveway was built which ran across the strip in question and a pump was placed in one of the old fence postholes. In 1968, she conveyed the property back to Alexander who in turn reconveyed it to her in 1971.

At the time the Carpenters purchased their property, the pump, the driveway, and a portion of the fence were standing. Their grantor informed them that 'the fence was in the wrong place,' so they had a survey made which showed, as did the original deeds, the true boundary line as 40 feet south of the old fence and running through the middle of Mrs. Huffman's house. This action was commenced on April 10, 1974, when Mrs. Huffman refused to sign an agreement to have her house moved.

This appeal presents the issue whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the trial Court's holding of privity of possession between Mrs. Huffman and her brother to allow her to tack her periods of possession onto his in order to establish title in Mrs. Huffman to the disputed strip by adverse possession. Because the facts are virtually undisputed, the essence of our function is to determine whether the trial Court correctly applied the law to those facts.

We hold that there was sufficient privity of possession to allow tacking and affirm the decision of the lower court establishing the boundary line between the parties.

Our adverse possession statute, Tit. 7, § 828, Code of Alabama 1940 (Recomp.1958), provides that it does not apply to cases involving a question as to boundaries between coterminous owners. The three alternative prerequisites 1) deed or other color of title, 2) annual listing of land for taxation, or 3) title by descent cast or devise from a predecessor, therefore, are not necessary to sustain a claim to title by a coterminous owner. Lay v. Phillips, 276 Ala. 273, 161 So.2d 477 (1964); Sylvest v. Stowers, 276 Ala. 695, 166 So.2d 423 (1964). That is to say, although the claimant is relieved of these three alternative conditions prescribed by § 828, he may still acquire title by the exercise of adverse possession for a period of ten years. Cambron v. Kirkland, 287 Ala. 531, 253 So.2d 180 (1971); Lay v. Phillips, supra; McNeil v. Hadden, 261 Ala. 691, 76 So.2d 160 (1954). However, the requirements that possession be open, notorious, hostile, continuous and exclusive are still applicable. Thompson v. Odom, 279 Ala. 211, 184 So.2d 120 (1966).

As...

To continue reading

Request your trial
34 cases
  • Watson v. Price
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Alabama
    • March 3, 1978
    ...therefore, not coterminous land owners and the complaint should have been dismissed by the trial Court. "The case of Carpenter v. Huffman, 294 Ala. 189, 314 So.2d 65 (1975), was frequently cited throughout the brief submitted for cross-complainants-appellees Young and Price. In that 1975 de......
  • Sparks v. Byrd
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Alabama
    • March 9, 1990
    ...471 So.2d 1250 (Ala.1985); Bussey v. Bussey, 403 So.2d 907 (Ala.1981); Mardis v. Nichols, 393 So.2d 976 (Ala.1981); Carpenter v. Huffman, 294 Ala. 189, 314 So.2d 65 (1975); Graham v. Hawkins, 281 Ala. 288, 202 So.2d 74 (1967). The record clearly reveals that the plaintiffs have "continuousl......
  • Littleton v. Wells
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • February 22, 2019
    ...for ten years, or by adverse possession for ten years. SeeReynolds v. Rutland, 365 So.2d 656 (Ala. 1978) ; Carpenter v. Huffman, 294 Ala. 189, 314 So.2d 65 (1975) ; Smith v. Brown, 282 Ala. 528, 213 So.2d 374 (1968) ; Lay v. Phillips, 276 Ala. 273, 161 So.2d 477 (1964) ; Duke v. Wimberly, 2......
  • Parker v. Rhoades
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • December 16, 2016
    ...for ten years, or by adverse possession for ten years. SeeReynolds v. Rutland, 365 So.2d 656 (Ala. 1978) ; Carpenter v. Huffman, 294 Ala. 189, 314 So.2d 65 (1975) ; Smith v. Brown, 282 Ala. 528, 213 So.2d 374 (1968) ; Lay v. Phillips, 276 Ala. 273, 161 So.2d 477 (1964) ; Duke v. Wimberly, 2......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT