Carpenter v. Mississippi Valley State Univ.
| Decision Date | 10 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | NO. 1:10CV136-SA-JAD,1:10CV136-SA-JAD |
| Parties | LAFAGUS O. CARPENTER PLAINTIFF v. MISSISSIPPI VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY; CAPTAIN ISSAC MORRIS, In His Individual Capacity; and CHIEF ROBERT SANDERS, In His Individual Capacity DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively For Summary Judgment [28], [30]. After reviewing the motions, responses, rules, and authorities, the Court finds as follows:
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, LaFagus O. Carpenter, began working at Mississippi Valley State University ("MVSU") in December 2004, as a Patrolman. Plaintiff contends that he was subjected to continued retaliation and discrimination after the Defendants became aware that he planned to provide testimony in a former co-worker's Title VII lawsuit.1 Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants questioned him about whether he would testify in his co-worker's action in December 2007, and again in August 2009. Plaintiff asserts that he endured a change in his shift hours and a demotion in November and December of 2009, after expressing his willingness to testify in the co-worker's suit. Plaintiff resigned from his employment at MVSU on January 28, 2010.
On May 18, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against MVSU and Captain Issac Morris ("Morris") and Chief Robert Sanders ("Sanders"), in their individual capacities, alleging: (1) discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq.; (2) retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; (3) a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; and (4) a claim for punitive damages. Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss [28] and a Motion for Summary Judgment [30], arguing they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to all of Plaintiff's claims.2
Summary judgment is warranted under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The rule "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323. The nonmoving party must then "go beyond the pleadings" and "designate 'specific facts showingthat there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324 (citation omitted). In reviewing the evidence, factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, "but only when . . . both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). When such contradictory facts exist, the Court may "not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000). However, conclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic arguments have never constituted an adequate substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002); SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1997); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
MVSU argues that it is immune under the Eleventh Amendment from Plaintiff's claims. The Eleventh Amendment provides as follows:
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens of Subjects of a Foreign State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. This immunity is far reaching. It bars all suits, whether for injunctive, declaratory, or monetary relief, against the state and its departments, see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-01, 104 S. Ct. 900, 908, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984), by citizens of another state, foreigners, or its own citizens, see Hans v. Louisiana,134 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 504, 33 L. Ed. 842 (1890).3 A suit against a state agency "is a suit against the state" when that agency is an arm of the state. Daigle v. Gulf State Utilities Co., Local Union Number 2286, et al., 794 F.2d 974, 980 (5th Cir. 1986). Defendant MVSU asserts that it is immune from suit as it is an arm of the State of Mississippi.4
Numerous courts have consistently found state universities similar to MVSU to be considered arms of the State of Mississippi. See, e.g., Meredith v. Jackson State Univ., 2010 WL 606402, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 17, 2010) () (citing Gentry v. Jackson State Univ., 610 F. Supp. 2d 564, 566 (S.D. Miss. 2009)); Chestang v. Alcorn State Univ., 2011 WL 1884728, at *4 (S.D. Miss. May 17, 2011) (). Further, the Fifth Circuit, in Whiting v. Jackson State University, considered the relevant "arm of the state" factors and concluded that 616 F.2d 116, 127 n.8 (5th Cir. 1980); (citing Henry v. Link, 408 F. Supp. 1204, 1207 (D.N.D. 1976), mod. on other grounds, 417 F. Supp. 360 (D.N.D. 1976)). Similarly, many other Fifth Circuit opinions hold that publicly funded state universities like MVSU are arms of the state. See Stotter v. Univ. of Tex. at San Antonio, 508 F.3d 812, 821 (5th Cir. 2007) ()(citations omitted) (emphasis added); Richardson v. Southern Univ., 118 F.3d 450, 454-56 (5th Cir. 1997) (). As such, the Court concludes that MVSU is indeed an arm of the State of Mississippi for purposes of this Court's Eleventh Amendment analysis.
Since the Court has determined that MVSU is an arm of the state, the Eleventh Amendment's immunity attaches to this action. A state's immunity from suit, however, is not absolute. See, e.g., Meyers v. Texas, 410 F.3d 236, 241 (5th Cir. 2005). There are three "exceptions" to such immunity from suit: (1) the Ex Parte Young doctrine, which allows certain actions to be brought against an employee in his or her official capacity, (2) waiver, and (3) abrogation. The Court considers each of these in turn.5
A suit against an employee in his or her official capacity is a suit against the entity of which the official is an agent. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989). However, an "exception" to immunity exists for suits seeking prospective injunctive relief against state employees in their official capacities. Under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908), the exception applies only if a suit alleging violations of federal law is "brought against individual persons in their official capacities as agents of the state, and the relief sought [is] declaratory or injunctive in nature and prospective in effect." Aguilar v. Texas Dep't of Crim. Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). The case of Ex Parte Young involved a challenge to aMinnesota law reducing the freight rates that railroads could charge. A railroad shareholder claimed that the new rates were un-constitutionally confiscatory and obtained a federal injunction against Edward Young, the Attorney General of Minnesota, forbidding him in his official capacity to enforce the state law. When Young violated the injunction by initiating an enforcement action in state court, the circuit court held him in contempt and committed him to federal custody. In his habeas corpus application in the Supreme Court, Young challenged his confinement by arguing that Minnesota's sovereign immunity deprived the federal court of jurisdiction to enjoin him from performing his official duties. The Supreme Court disagreed and explained that because an unconstitutional legislative enactment is "void," a state official who enforces that law "comes into conflict with the superior authority of [the] Constitution," and therefore is Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-160, 28 S. Ct. 441.
The logic of Ex Parte Young was motivated by a recognition of, and allegiance to, federal law as the supreme law of the United States. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 167, 28 S. Ct. 441 (). In other words, Ex Parte Young's logic is as follows: Young, in acting on behalf of the state, was accused of violating the United States Constitution; however, in ratifying the Constitution, states ceded power to the Supremacy Clause. As a consequence of that Clause, states are...
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