Carpenter v. School Dist. of City of Flint, Docket No. 57498

• Decision Date: 21 July 1982
• Docket Number: Docket No. 57498
• Citation: 115 Mich.App. 683,321 N.W.2d 772,5 Ed. Law Rep. 581
• Parties: Helen B. CARPENTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the CITY OF FLINT, Defendant-Appellee. 115 Mich.App. 683, 321 N.W.2d 772, 5 Ed. Law Rep. 581
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 772

321 N.W.2d 772

Helen B. CARPENTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the CITY OF FLINT, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 57498.

115 Mich.App. 683, 321 N.W.2d 772, 5 Ed. Law Rep. 581

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Feb. 9, 1982.

Decided April 23, 1982.

Released for Publication July 21, 1982.

[115 MICHAPP 684] Howard R. Grossman, Flint, (Donald H. Robertson, Flint, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.

John P. Siler, Flint, for defendant-appellee.

[115 MICHAPP 685] Before DANHOF, C. J., and CAVANAGH and WALSH, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right from a grant of summary judgment entered in favor of defendant.

The facts of this case are not at issue. Plaintiff is the widow of Frank J. Carpenter who, prior to his death in February of 1980, had been an employee of defendant school district for over 33 years. At the time of his death Mr. Carpenter was 53 years of age. Under the terms of a master contract between Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, Local 591, and defendant school district, Mr. Carpenter had accumulated, as of the date of his death, approximately 267 days of unused sick and emergency leave. There are no provisions in the master contract specifically addressing the effect the death of an employee has on accumulated sick and emergency leave. However, paragraph 15(e) of the contract does provide that upon resignation or discharge of an employee accumulated sick leave and emergency leave is forfeited. Paragraph 15(e) further provides that a qualified retiring employee may receive compensation for up to 120 days of unused sick and emergency leave.

Plaintiff's complaint alleged that under the Payments of Wages and Fringe Benefits Act, M.C.L. Sec. 408.471 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 17.277(1) et seq., she was entitled to be compensated for the unused leave her husband had accumulated prior to his death. Defendant disagreed.

The parties submitted a stipulated statement of facts and then cross-filed motions for summary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2(3). In her motion for summary judgment plaintiff argued that her husband's accumulated leave time was a fringe [115 MICHAPP 686] benefit to which she was entitled since the master contract did not specifically state that this benefit was to be withheld upon an employee's death. Defendant agreed that the accumulated leave time was a fringe benefit within the meaning of Sec. 1 of the Act, M.C.L. Sec. 408.471(e); M.S.A. Sec. 17.277(1)(e), but argued that, since the master contract did not specifically provide for payment for the unused leave time upon an employee's death, plaintiff was not entitled to the same.

In its initial ruling the trial court found that paragraph 15(e) of the master contract should be applied when an employee dies in that "death is the ultimate retirement". However, since the parties had not submitted any proof as to whether plaintiff's husband met the necessary qualifications for payment of the benefits under Sec. 15(e), the trial court denied both motions for summary judgment. Subsequently, defendant filed an affidavit to the effect that plaintiff's husband, at the time of his death, had not met the qualifications for payments under the retirement provisions of paragraph 15(e). The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment in favor of defendant. It is from this ruling which plaintiff appeals.

As she did before the trial court, plaintiff argues that Sec. 4, M.C.L. Sec. 408.474; M.S.A. Sec. 17.277(4), of the Wages and Fringe Benefits Act mandates that fringe benefits, such as unused leave, cannot be withheld from her because the master contract did not specifically provide for such withholding.

Before we address the merits of plaintiff's arguments, we note that our review of the Wages and Fringe Benefits Act is governed by the traditional rules of statutory construction. Thus, if the statute is unambiguous on its face, we will avoid further interpretation of its terms. However, if an ambiguity[115 MICHAPP 687] exists, it is our duty to give effect to the intent of the Legislature in enacting the statute. Charter Twp. of Pittsfield v. City of Saline, 103 Mich.App. 99, 104-105, 302 N.W.2d 608 (1981).

The Wages and Fringe Benefits Act indicates that payment of fringe benefits is controlled by the written employment contract or by a written policy. See M.C.L. Sec. 408.471(e); M.S.A. Sec. 17.277(1)(e) and M.C.L. Sec. 408.473; M.S.A. Sec. 17.277(3). The Act does not make a contract for the parties as to which type of fringe benefits are due. Rather, the Act governs the time and manner of payment of fringe benefits due under the contract. In order to provide for an expeditious settlement of a dispute regarding wages or fringe benefits the Act also provides that disputes are to be handled, initially, by the Department of Labor. ¹ M.C.L. Sec. 408.481; M.S.A. Sec. 17.277(11).

In our view the obvious goal of Sec. 4 is to ensure that an employee entitled to compensation for fringe benefits at a termination of employment is not unjustly deprived of his compensation. Thus, fringe benefits due at termination of employment may not be withheld unless the employee freely consents to the withholding. Such consent must be evidenced by a written contract or a signed statement. Section 4 was not meant to address a situation where an employee entitled to fringe benefits dies. Thus, plaintiff's arguments as to Sec. 4 are without merit.

Although Sec. 4 is not meant to address disposition of fringe benefits in the event of an employee's death, Sec. 10 is.

[115 MICHAPP 688] Section 10(1) indicates that where a written contract, written policy or written plan sets forth fringe benefits due a deceased employee and designates to whom and in what manner those fringe benefits are to be paid in the event of the employee's death, an employer must comply with the terms of the writing. Section 10(1) is obviously not applicable to the instant case since, as plaintiff admits on appeal, the written contract upon which she bases her claim does not specify that compensation for unused sick and emergency leave is to be paid to anyone in the event of an employee's death. Nor do we find that Sec. 10(2) is helpful to plaintiff since that section is meant to address those situations where a written...