Carpenter v. Scott
| Decision Date | 31 December 1881 |
| Parties | HORACE F. CARPENTER v. CHARLES H. SCOTT, Deputy Sheriff. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
A conveyed to B. personalty under an agreement purporting to be a lease, by the terms of which certain payments were to be made by B. to A., at fixed times. In case B. failed to pay as provided, A. might take possession of the personalty. On the expiration of the lease, B., having complied with its terms was to receive a bill of sale of the personalty.
Pending the lease, B. mortgaged the personalty to C. Subsequently the last payment was made by B. to A., and B. received a receipted bill of sale from A. A. immediately attached the personalty in an action against B., whereupon C. replevied the personalty.
Held, that the so-called lease was a conditional sale.
Held, further, that B. acquired under this conditional sale rights of which A. could not deprive him, and which, in the absence of any stipulation forbidding it, B. could sell or mortgage.
Held, further, that on the last payment the title to the personalty vested in B., whose mortgage became valid, and took precedence of A.'s attachment.
Williams v. Briggs, 11 R.I. 476, and Cook v. Corthell, 11 R.I. 482, explained and distinguished.
REPLEVIN. Heard by the court, jury trial being waived. The facts involved appear in the opinion of the court.
The parties litigant waived a jury trial, and stipulated that " if said Carpenter mortgage is decided to be valid as to said rolling mill, then Carpenter is to have judgment for his costs; if, on such trial, his said mortgage is decided not valid as to said rolling mill, then Charles H. Scott is to have judgment for restoration and costs, and damages not to exceed twenty-five dollars, the case to be tried at the October Term, 1881, of the Supreme Court."
Simon S. Lapham, for plaintiff.
Ballou & Jackson, for defendant.
This is an action of replevin to recover possession of a rolling mill, attached by the defendant, a deputy sheriff. On the 17th day of November, 1879, the Willets Manufacturing Company delivered to John Anthony the mill in question under an agreement, purporting to be a lease, by which Anthony was to pay them for the mill five hundred dollars, in twenty monthly installments of twenty-five dollars each, the first on the date named and the rest on the 17th day of each succeeding month, with interest at seven per cent. per annum. If Anthony failed to make any payment within five days after the date specified for such payment, the Willets Manufacturing Company might terminate the contract and take immediate possession of the mill. At the expiration of the lease, Anthony, having complied with its conditions, was to receive a bill of sale of the mill. At the date of the delivery of the mill to Anthony, he was a member of a partnership composed of Thomas Anthony, Thomas J. Linton, and himself. The business of the partnership was at that time, and until the 11th day of March, 1880, continued to be, transacted in the name of John Anthony. The contract for the mill, though in his name, was for the benefit of the partnership, and the partnership funds were used for the first payment, and for the successive payments of the installments as they became due. On the 11th day of March, 1880, the partnership, under the name of John Anthony & Co., executed and delivered to the plaintiff a mortgage, signed by each of the partners, and purporting to convey, besides their other property, the mill in question " subject to a certain claim of the Willets Manufacturing Company." In July following John Anthony withdrew from the partnership, and the business after that date was conducted under the name of Thomas Anthony & Co. On the 22d day of June, 1881, the last installment of the rent, or price, of the mill was paid, and the Willets Manufacturing Company gave a receipted bill of sale of it to Thomas Anthony & Co. This bill of sale named John Anthony as the vendee, and acknowledged...
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Arnold v. Chandler Motors of Rhode Island, Inc.
...the transaction as a lease, the court in its opinion treats it as an agreement for sale upon the performance of conditions. In Carpenter v. Scott, 13 R. I. 477, the court said of a similar agreement that, although it was in form a lease, it should be regarded in law as a conditional The def......
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Osmer v. Lemay-Wegmann Brokerage Co.
...vests so completely that he could maintain replevin to recover possession. [Williston on Sales, sec. 331, citing and quoting Carpenter v. Scott, 13 R.I. 477, l. c. It may be that by electing to sue on the notes, plaintiff would cut himself off from any right to recover either the letters pa......
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Goldstein v. Mack Motor Truck Co.
...of the truck was given by the plaintiff to Scudder constituted a conditional sale contract, although termed a "lease." Carpenter v. Scott, 13 R.I. 477. The evidence shows beyond dispute that Scudder had breached the terms of this agreement in several ways and that, therefore, the plaintiff ......
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Hess v. Paulo
...N. Y. S. 1044; Crompton v. Pratt, 105 Mass. 255;Currier v. Knapp, 117 Mass. 324; Englehart v. Sage, 73 Mont. 139, 235 Pac. 767; Carpenter v. Scott, 13 R. I. 477.) Thus from either view, until Lamb's agreement of absolute sale became effective to pass title to the plaintiff, Lamb held the ab......