Carpenter v. Smith
| Decision Date | 22 May 1952 |
| Docket Number | No. 2103,2103 |
| Citation | 89 A.2d 168,79 R.I. 326 |
| Parties | CARPENTER et al. v. SMITH et al. Eq. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Swan, Keeney & Smith, Frederick W. O'Connell and Ernest A. Jenckes, all of Providence, for complainants.
Sherwood & Clifford, Sidney Clifford, Raymond E. Jordan, Charles H. Drummey, Edwards & Angell, Elmer E. Tufts, Jr., Wilfrid E. McKenna, William S. Flynn, Elmer S. Chace and James J. Corrigan, all of Providence, and Francis M. Flaherty, City Sol. of Attleboro, Mass., for respondents.
This is a bill in equity for a construction of the will of Albert Walker, late or the city of Providence, deceased, and for instructions to the trustees thereunder relative to the distribution of certain unused income derived from a residuary trust. The complainants are the surviving trustees under that will. The respondents are of age and are all the persons who have or might possibly have any interest in the residuary estate. Through their attorneys they filed answers joining in the prayers of the bill and then testimony was taken in the superior court. When the cause was ready for hearing for final decree it was certified to this court for determination in accordance with General Laws 1938, chapter 545, § 7.
The testator Albert Walker died September 15, 1904 and his will, which was executed September 14, 1903, was duly probated in Providence. At the time of the execution of the will the testator's wife, his parents, brothers and sisters, and all his children had deceased excepting only his daughter Mabel Walker, who was then thirty years of age. She had no mental or other extensive disability aside from the fact that the was severely handicapped from childhood by deafness resulting from scarlet fever. Because of such deafness her education in school was shortened and her facility of speech was thereby greatly retarded. As stated, at the testator's death Mabel Walker was his only surviving child and heir at law. She died single and intestate on March 24, 1948, and the administrator of her estate is one of the respondents. The other respondents include the heirs at law and next of kin of Mabel, the remaindermen named in the residuary trust under the will, and the representatives of certain deceased remaindermen.
The will of Albert Walker contains eleven clauses. In the first nine the testator made provisions for the payment of debts and of eight small legacies. The tenth clause disposes of all the residue of his estate in trust for Mabel's benefit, and the eleventh nominates as sole executor one of the three persons named as residuary trustees. The pertinent part of the tenth or residuary clause, which is particularly in issue here, reads as follows:
'Tenth, All the rest and residue of my estate both real and personal and wheresoever the same may be situated of which I shall die seized and possessed, I give, devise and bequeath to Frank A. Balcom, of Mansfield, Massachusetts, Howard L. Carpenter, of Providence, Rhode Island and Ida Frances Drown, of Providence, Rhode Island, with power to sell, invest and reinvest but without liability for loss on such investments, to them and their heirs, but in strict trust nevertheless for the benefit of my daughter, Mabel Walker, upon the following terms and conditions:
'Upon the death of my said daughter, Mabel Walker, if she shall leave any issue, I give, devise and bequeath to her issue including the children of any deceased child per stirpes absolutely in fee simple, seven eighths ( 7/8) of my said trust estate which shall remain after the death of my said daughter, but if my said daughter shall die leaving no issue and shall also be at the time of her death single and sole, I direct that said seven eighths of said trust estate shll be disposed of as follows: * * *.' (Italics ours.)
In the omitted part above indicated fractional gifts over to several remaindermen, including two of the trustees and the wife of the third, are set forth, and the clause then continues as follows:
'And I direct my said trustees to hold the remaining one eighth ( 1/8) part and to use so much thereof either of the principal or interest as they may deem necessary for the maintenance of my said house at No. 167 Medway Street, Providence, Rhode Island, during the lives of Hattie Maria Drown and Ida Frances Drown or the longest liver of them, for the payment of taxes, repairs, insurance, water rates and other necessary expenses, and upon the death of the survivor of said Hattie Maria Drown and Ida Frances Drown, my said trustees shall divide among those who were my legal representatives at the time of my decease and their heirs, per stirpes, share and share alike, said remaining one eighth ( 1/8) part of said trust estate and its accumulations, if any.' (Italics ours.)
This will was before us for interpretation on other issues in a previous case. Carpenter v. Smith, 77 R.I. 358, 75 A.2d 413. The question now presented involves the construction of a part of the testator's trust of the residue of his estate and is stated as follows: 'Under the terms of the Tenth clause of said will of Albert Walker what disposition should the complainants make of the income of said trust estate with the accumulations thereof in their hands and possession at the time of the death of said Mabel Walker over and above the portion of said income theretofore expended for said Mabel Walker's comfortable support and for the other purposes of said trust?'
All the respondents concede that the paramount intent of the testator, as clearly evidenced by the plan and provisions of the whole will, was the welfare, comfortable support, and security of his only daughter and that all other dispositions were entirely secondary to his overwhelming desire to make the whole residuary estate, if necessary, available for Mabel's benefit. They also agree that the testator's intent should be ascertained, if possible, from the language of the will itself and that such intent should be given effect unless contrary to some established rule of law. Moreover there is no dispute as to other well-known rules of construction which are aids to the proper consideration of a will and which permit recourse to the evidence if there is a latent ambiguity. In the circumstances, therefore, it is unnecessary to restate those rules, many of which were indicated and applied in our previous opinion in Carpenter v. Smith, supra, and in Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Thomas, 73 R.I. 277, 54 A.2d 432. However, notwithstanding such apparent agreement the two groups, in urging an answer to the above question, arrive at completely opposite conclusions.
In our judgment the great difficulty underlying this conflict is due primarily, if not entirely, to the fact that each group appears to adopt a different approach to the construction of the language used by the testator to express his intended dispositions. The respondents associated with the administrator of Mabel's estate view the will as of the date it was executed and project the testator's actual language against the background of circumstances then existing and known especially to him from his own experience. In the light of such peculiar facts they examine the language of the residuary clause, in accordance with the pattern of the whole will and with established rules of construction, to ascertain the testator's intent and to determine whether the intent thus disclosed is inconsistent with any other pertinent provision of the will or any rule of law.
Applying that formula, such respondents contend that the language of the trust is clear and unambiguous; that such language, if considered grammatically and according to the ordinary meaning of the words used, especially in the light of then known circumstances, clearly discloses the testator's intent to give no discretion whatsoever to the trustees to determine or limit the amount of income to be used for Mabel's comfortable support, no power to cut down her beneficial interest in all the income of said trust, and no authority to the trustees either to accumulate income from this trust for a gift over or to include any accumulated or unused income as a part of the gift over of the principal of the trust estate to the remaindermen.
In short, according to their analysis the testator clearly intended Mabel to have in effect the...
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