Carpenter v. State

• Decision Date: 08 June 1921
• Docket Number: No. 23847.,23847.
• Citation: 190 Ind. 611,131 N.E. 375
• Parties: CARPENTER v. STATE.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

190 Ind. 611

131 N.E. 375

CARPENTER

v.STATE.

No. 23847.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

June 8, 1921.

Appeal from Criminal Court, Marion County; James A. Collins, Judge.

Elijah Carpenter, alias Lige Carpenter, was convicted of receiving stolen goods, and he appeals. Affirmed.Frank P. Baker, Clyde E. Baker, and Edward O. Snethen, all of Indianapolis, for appellant.

U. S. Lesh, Atty. Gen., and Mrs. Edward Franklin White, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State.

TRAVIS, J.

This is a prosecution for receiving stolen goods, as defined by section 381, chapter 169, Acts 1905, p. 668, Burns' R. S. 1914, § 2273. The errors brought to this court are: (1) Overruling appellant's motion for a new trial; and (2) that the judgment appealed from is not fairly supported by the evidence.

The specifications of error of law in the motion for a new trial relate to the evidence, both to the introduction of evidence by the state, and the court's refusal of the introduction of evidence by the accused. Of the three vital elements of proof of this crime, to wit: (1) The larceny of the goods; (2) the subsequent reception of the stolen goods by the accused; (3) that the accused knew the goods were stolen—evidence which relates to the first and third elements to be proven are complained of on this appeal.

Evidence was introduced by the state which tended to prove the accused guilty of other similar offenses for the purpose of proving his guilty knowledge. The questions which elicited this evidence were objected to by appellant, and the question is presented here upon exceptions to the rulings of the trial court thereon. The appellant cites the case of Strong v. State (1882) 86 Ind. 208, 44 Am. Rep. 292, as sustaining his contention. The crime charged in this case was for obtaining money under false pretenses, in which the intent of its commission is inferred from the act itself, and the jury would not be aided in determining guilt, by the proof of the commission by the accused of other similar offenses. Wharton's Crim. Ev. (10th Ed.) § 36; Kahn v. State (1914) 182 Ind. 1, 105 N. E. 385. It was not error to admit evidence of the commission of other similar crimes by the accused for the purpose of proving intent in the case at bar. Roscoe's Criminal Evidence (8th Am. Ed.) p. 141; Beuchert v. State (1905) 165 Ind. 523, 76 N. E. 111, 6 Ann. Cas. 914. The proof of other crimes of like nature by the accused for the purpose of proving guilty knowledge was permitted by statute in England. Prevention of Crimes Act 34 & 35 Victoria, c. 112, § 19, which recognized the necessity of permitting the introduction of such evidence in prosecutions for receiving stolen goods. While the admission of such evidence is not governed by statute in this state, the rule made by statute in England has become the rule of evidence in the states of the United States. Beuchert v. State, supra.

It is contended by the accused in his brief that, if he is guilty of any crime in connection with the goods in question, it is that of “an accessory before the fact, a conspirator.” It is sufficient in answer to state that an accomplice of the thief may be convicted of receiving the goods stolen, if in fact he did receive them. 34 Cyc. 518. The accused testified that the goods alleged to have been stolen were in his possession, but he denied the larceny of them, which further disposes of the question of his being an accessory, instead of a receiver of the goods stolen. This brings us to the question of the proof of the first element of proof of the crime, as stated above, viz. the larceny of the goods.

The accused, at his trial, objected to the introduction of record evidence to establish the theft of the goods, which was overruled by the trial judge, and such record evidence was admitted. This was error. The decisions of the courts of the different states and the United States courts are not in...