Carpenter v. State, No. 3-776A160

Docket NºNo. 3-776A160
Citation177 Ind.App. 161, 378 N.E.2d 908
Case DateAugust 02, 1978
CourtCourt of Appeals of Indiana

Page 908

378 N.E.2d 908
177 Ind.App. 161
Bruce CARPENTER, Defendant-Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee.
No. 3-776A160.
Court of Appeals of Indiana, Third District.
Aug. 2, 1978.

[177 Ind.App. 162]

Page 909

Stephen R. Carlson, Smith & Carlson, Auburn, for defendant-appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Elmer Lloyd Whitmer, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellee.

GARRARD, Presiding Judge.

Carpenter was tried by jury and convicted of theft. The evidence disclosed that at about 3:30 p. m. on October 31, 1974, Carpenter entered Carbaugh's Jewelry in Auburn, Indiana, for the second time that day. At the time the salesclerk was occupied with Althea Sexton, the woman with whom Carpenter had been living for some three years. As the clerk went to the back of the store with Sexton to prepare a claim check for a clock that was to be repaired, she observed Carpenter lean over a display case containing diamond rings, reach into the case and then withdraw his hand and put it in his pocket. The clerk called out at Carpenter and called to the store owner for help. Carpenter ran from the store and managed to elude the store owner, who gave chase. The police were called and given Carpenter's description. It was ascertained that rings valued at nearly ten thousand dollars ($10,000) were missing.

Shortly thereafter Carpenter was arrested by a county policeman who had heard the reported theft and description of Carpenter broadcast by police radio. An hour or two later police located a number of the diamond rings in an automobile Carpenter had been using that day. When these were displayed to Carpenter he agreed to give a written confession and disclose the whereabouts of the remaining gems if the police would agree that charges would not be pressed against Sexton as an accessory.

On appeal Carpenter asserts that evidence of the recovered jewels as well as his confession should have been excluded at trial. He also contends he was entitled to discharge pursuant to Indiana Rules of Procedure, Criminal Rule 4 for delay in commencing his trial. We find there is no reversible error.

I. Motion for Discharge

Carpenter was arrested the day of the crime. Formal charges were instituted on

Page 910

November 4th, and the time limits of CR 4 began to run [177 Ind.App. 163] on that date. On December 15, 1974, Carpenter escaped from the DeKalb County jail. He was returned to custody May 23, 1975. After some delay his trial commenced January 15, 1976. 1

Pursuant to CR 4(C) Carpenter was entitled to be brought to trial within one (1) year. That period was extended by the time he was free as an escapee pursuant to CR 4(F). Thus, for purposes of CR 4(C), when Carpenter's trial commenced there were nearly three months remaining before he would be entitled to discharge.

He argues, however, that the January trial date violated the requirement of CR 4(A) which provides that a defendant be released on his own recognizance if he has been held in jail without trial for more than six (6) months. He urges that discharge is the only viable remedy if a defendant is not released from jail at the expiration of the six month period. We disagree. Moreover, the history of CR 4(A) clearly demonstrates a contrary intent, and our Supreme Court so held in Collins v. State (1977), Ind., 364 N.E.2d 750; See also Lewis v. State (1976), 264 Ind. 288, 342 N.E.2d 859. 2

II. Admissibility of Fruits of the Crime

Carpenter first argues that evidence concerning the gems and their recovery should have been excluded because the probable cause affidavit which was filed on November 4th in support of the information and warrant request was defective. We need not consider the specifics of this affidavit since it did not provide the basis for securing the evidence in question. Carpenter was arrested on October 31st without a warrant and the facts were sufficient to establish probable cause. 3 The evidence he seeks to exclude was secured as the result [177 Ind.App. 164] of that arrest four days before the affidavit he challenges was filed. Accordingly, the arrest was valid and evidence secured as a result thereof was admissible regardless of whether the subsequently filed affidavit was sufficient. Mendez v. State (1977), Ind., 367 N.E.2d 1081; DeWeese v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 520, 282 N.E.2d 828.

Appellant's principal contention, and that presented in the motion to suppress heard by the trial court, is that the state lacked probable cause to make a warrantless search of the vehicle from which the first portion of jewelry was recovered.

Carpenter was arrested around 4:00 p. m. About 5:15 p. m. two police officers, who had returned to the scene seeking a hat Carpenter was wearing when he was in the jewelry store, located a green station wagon parked at a meter about seventy-five feet from the jewelry store. Upon entering the vehicle one of the officers discovered the rings in a shoe on the passenger side of the vehicle. It is undisputed that Carpenter had borrowed the vehicle for the day from its owner, and that no one had consented to a search of the vehicle.

Carpenter moved to suppress the evidence on grounds of an unconstitutional search and after hearing, the court denied the motion. When the evidence was offered at trial Carpenter again objected. It appears that evidence offered by the state at the suppression hearing was inadequate to establish probable cause for a search. However, considerable additional evidence was introduced at the trial bearing directly upon the probable cause requirement. Thus, the question we must first determine is what evidence may we look to in order to

Page 911

judge whether reversible error was committed?

Of course, there is abundant authority that precludes evidence introduced after a ruling from rendering the ruling Incorrect ab initio. These cases proceed on the basis that a party has the burden of establishing the basis for his objection and if he neglects to do so he may not complain of the result. See, e. g., State v. Smithers (1971), 256 Ind. 512, 269 N.E.2d 874; Morgan v. State (1923), 194 Ind. 39, 141 N.E. 790. Here the question is the reverse: May evidence produced after the ruling on a motion to suppress be considered to Sustain the ruling admitting the evidence?

[177 Ind.App. 165] Three reasons persuade us the evidence should properly be considered.

First, the primary objectives of our legal system are to afford litigants a fair trial and to reach a just result. Where the record demonstrates the result was just, procedural or evidentiary irregularities may be overlooked where the defendant had a fair, although not a perfect, trial. An illustration close to the present context arises in cases where evidence is admitted over proper objection although a proper foundation to establish its admissibility had not been laid when the evidence was offered. If the necessary foundation is later made to appear, the question is deemed to be merely one of the order of proof and the ruling will be upheld since the record as a whole demonstrates the evidence was properly admissible. See, e. g., Beeler v. State (1952), 230 Ind. 444, 104 N.E.2d 744; Dixon v. State (1945), 223 Ind. 521, 62 N.E.2d 629.

Secondly, the ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress is not intended to serve as the final expression concerning admissibility. Not only must an objection be made when the evidence is offered at trial in order to preserve error, Pointon v. State (1978), Ind., 372 N.E.2d 1159, but the court may hear additional evidence regarding admissibility and reconsider its earlier ruling. See, e. g., Magley v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 618, 335 N.E.2d 811; Carson v. State (1975), Ind.App., 326 N.E.2d 624.

Most importantly, however, the very purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be served by failing to consider such evidence. One must recall that there is nothing inherently untrustworthy or suspicious about the evidence sought to be excluded by such motions. Ordinarily, the case is quite the contrary. The purpose of the rule excluding the fruits of an unconstitutional search or seizure is to attempt to dissuade government agents from indulging in unconstitutional conduct by denying them the ability to profit from such activity. Weeks v. United States (1914), 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652. However, that prophylactic effect has no bearing where the search was, in fact, constitutionally proper but the facts were not sufficiently brought forth at the initial hearing. To exclude the evidence under such circumstances when the record at trial adequately discloses a permissible search would [177 Ind.App. 166] provide no deterrence to erroneous police conduct but permit all the adverse consequences attending the exclusion of evidence necessary or helpful in convicting the guilty. See Stone v. Powell (1976), 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067, Reh. den. 429 U.S. 874, 97 S.Ct. 197, 50 L.Ed.2d 158.

As the United States Supreme Court stated in Carroll v. United States (1925), 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543:

"Counsel finally argue that the defendants should be permitted to escape the effect of the conviction because the court refused...

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9 practice notes
  • Decker v. State, No. 2-877-A-331
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • March 5, 1979
    ...offered in order to preserve the error for appeal. Lagenour v. State (1978), Ind., 376 N.E.2d 475; Carpenter v. State (1978), Ind.App., 378 N.E.2d 908. ISSUE Motion to withdraw appearance. The Defendant next states that the trial court erred in overruling the motion of Alex Rogers to withdr......
  • Fox v. State, No. 2-376A109
    • United States
    • January 30, 1979
    ...a proper foundation sufficient to uphold the trial court's prior ruling admitting the evidence. See, Carpenter v. State, (1978) Ind.App., 378 N.E.2d 908, 20 In light of our disposition of this issue, we will not address Kapp's arguments pertaining to the violation of the discovery order. We......
  • Mack v. State, No. 3-1177A294
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • September 21, 1978
    ...had no reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion into Zwadlo's automobile. See Carpenter v. State (1978), Ind.App., 378 N.E.2d 908. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Mack's motion to suppress testimony regarding the stop and search of the automobile Mack ......
  • Gajdos v. State, No. 383S81
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • April 30, 1984
    ...on a pretrial motion to suppress is not intended to serve as the final expression concerning admissibility. Carpenter v. State, (1978) 177 Ind.App. 161, 378 N.E.2d 908. The trial court did not err in allowing the state to ask why Beverlin had been The defendant next contends that he was dep......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
9 cases
  • Decker v. State, No. 2-877-A-331
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • March 5, 1979
    ...offered in order to preserve the error for appeal. Lagenour v. State (1978), Ind., 376 N.E.2d 475; Carpenter v. State (1978), Ind.App., 378 N.E.2d 908. ISSUE Motion to withdraw appearance. The Defendant next states that the trial court erred in overruling the motion of Alex Rogers to withdr......
  • Fox v. State, No. 2-376A109
    • United States
    • January 30, 1979
    ...a proper foundation sufficient to uphold the trial court's prior ruling admitting the evidence. See, Carpenter v. State, (1978) Ind.App., 378 N.E.2d 908, 20 In light of our disposition of this issue, we will not address Kapp's arguments pertaining to the violation of the discovery order. We......
  • Mack v. State, No. 3-1177A294
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • September 21, 1978
    ...had no reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion into Zwadlo's automobile. See Carpenter v. State (1978), Ind.App., 378 N.E.2d 908. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Mack's motion to suppress testimony regarding the stop and search of the automobile Mack ......
  • Gajdos v. State, No. 383S81
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • April 30, 1984
    ...on a pretrial motion to suppress is not intended to serve as the final expression concerning admissibility. Carpenter v. State, (1978) 177 Ind.App. 161, 378 N.E.2d 908. The trial court did not err in allowing the state to ask why Beverlin had been The defendant next contends that he was dep......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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