Carpenter v. U.S. Express Co.

• Decision Date: 20 December 1912
• Citation: 139 N.W. 154,120 Minn. 59
• Parties: CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES EXPRESS CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

120 Minn. 59

139 N.W. 154

CARPENTER

v.UNITED STATES EXPRESS CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Dec. 20, 1912.

Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; Wilbur F. Booth, Judge.

Action by E. L. Carpenter against the United States Express Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

Plaintiff, by an agent, gave to defendant, an express company, valuable furs in wrapped packages for shipment from New York to Minneapolis, and accepted a shipping receipt therefor wherein it was stipulated that in case of loss the value did not exceed $50. Adhering to the rule in Porteous v. Adams Express Co., 115 Minn. 281, 132 N. W. 296, the shipping receipt became, under the decisions of New York, a valid contract in all its terms.

Held, also, that the findings that the shipping receipt is a contract entered into fairly, and is just and reasonable, is supported by the evidence.

A contract, valid in the state where made, will be enforced by the courts of this state, when not contravening the public policy of the state, or its laws.

Upon the facts herein plaintiff is not in a position to raise the question whether a contract of interstate carriage should be construed in accordance with the laws of the state where the breach occurred, rather than in accordance with the laws of the state where made.

The finding to the effect that defendant had legal rates graduated in accordance with the value of the shipment, so that it was lower when the value of the shipment was limited to $50 or less, and correspondingly higher when valued in excess of said sum, is sustained by the evidence, so that no special consideration need by shown for the limited liability, other than the lower rates in force for shipments made thereunder.

The Carmack amendment of the Hepburn act (Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, s 7, pars. 11, 12, 34 Stat. 595 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1307]) does not prevent a common carrier from making valid shipping contracts limiting liability according to an agreed value upon interstate shipments under legal tariff rates. Powell & Simpson, of Minneapolis (Ernest C. Carman, of Minneapolis, of counsel), for appellant.

Frank B. Kellogg, C. A. Severance, and Robert E. Olds, all of St. Paul, for respondent.

HOLT, J.

The judgment appealed from was entered upon findings of fact after trial to the court, and involves the right of plaintiff to recover from the defendant, an express company, for goods lost in transit, any more than the limited amount stated in the shipping receipt issued by defendant when the goods were delivered to it. Plaintiff resides in Minneapolis, Minn., and on February 20, 1907, while stopping at a hotel in New York City, gave valuable furs done up in paper boxes to a valet in the hotel, with instructions to send by express to Minneapolis. The valet took the boxes to a porter in the hotel who attends to such matters, and the porter prepared the boxes for shipment by placing heavier wrappers around them. It was customary for an agent of defendant to call at the hotel for articles which guests might desire to send over its routes. The porter turned over these boxes, and $2 to pay expressage thereon, to defendant's agent, who, in return, issued a shipping receipt, which purported to limit the recovery in case of loss to $50. The trial court found that this shipping receipt became the contract between the parties in regard to the shipment, that it was fairly entered into, that it was valid under the laws of the state of New York, where made, and contravened neither the public policy or law of this state nor any act of Congress, that the rate charged was fair for the limited liability assumed, and that the limitation of liability in the receipt was just and reasonable in the eye of the law. Plaintiff appeals, because the recovery was limited to the $50. He insists that he is entitled to $400, the full value of the furs lost.

[7] One contention is that, since the evidence in the case consists of admissions, documents, and depositions, this court is in as good position to determine the ultimate facts as was the trial court, and therefore the rule that the findings of the trial court on issues of fact will stand, unless manifestly without support in the evidence, does not here apply. This is not so. The duty to determine the issues of fact is by law laid upon the trial court, where there is no jury; and the appellate court may not interfere therewith, save to ascertain whether the record presents evidence which fairly sustains the findings. Treat v. Kellogg, 104 Minn. 54, 115 N. W. 947;Wunder v. Turner, 138 N. W. 770 (not yet officially reported), and cases therein cited.

[1][2][3] Under the findings of the court, the contract of shipment, if made in this state, would have been valid as to the limitation of value, under the doctrine announced in Alair v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 53 Minn. 160, 54 N. W. 1072,19 L. R. A. 764, 39 Am. St. Rep. 588, and ever since recognized. And we think the findings cannot be successfully attacked on appeal. But, even if it were conceded that the findings are wrong, the undisputed facts herein bring this case squarely within that of Porteous v. Adams Express Co., 115 Minn. 281, 132 N. W. 296, so that the law, as it exists in New York, where the shipment was made, governs, and thereunder a shipper, who receives a receipt similar to the one here in question, without objection, is, in the absence of fraud, concluded by its terms. A contract valid in the state where made will be enforced by the courts here, if it does not conflict with the public policy or laws of our state.

[4] Plaintiff earnestly insists that, on grounds not presented or considered in the Porteous Case, the limitation is invalid, or not binding: First, because, this being an interstate shipment, the law of the state where the loss occurs determines the validity of the limitation in the shipping receipt, and not that of the place where the contract is made. The weight of authority is against the proposition. 9 Cyc. 682, states: ‘A contract of carriage of goods from one country to another is governed by the laws of the country where made’-citing numerous cases. And although not expressly presented in the Porteous Case, supra, it was held that the law of New York, where the shipment was made, determined the validity of the contract. But, even if we were to follow the doctrine that the terms of the contract ‘should be construed in accordance with the law of the state where its negligent breach occurs,’ as held in Hughes v. Penn. R. Co., 202 Pa. 222, 51 Atl. 990,63 L. R. A. 513, 97 Sm. St. Rep. 713, and also by the New Hampshire and Ohio courts in Barter v. Wheeler, 49 N. H. 9, 6 Am. Rep. 434;Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. Co. v. Sheppard, 56 Ohio St. 68, 46 N. E. 61,60 Am. St. Rep. 732, it does not avail plaintiff; for the evidence fails to show where the loss occurred. The limitation of value was valid where the contract was made, and, under the findings, valid here, where the goods were to be delivered.

[5] Secondly, it is said there was no special consideration for this limited liability. The rule in Missouri and some other states is that there must be a special consideration to support a contract limiting liability. George v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 214 Mo. 551, 113 S. W. 1099,127 Am. St. Rep. 690. But in none of the adjudicated cases in this court upon this subject has it been suggested that a consideration apart from the usual rates for the estimated value of the shipment is necessary to obtain a binding limitation of value. In addition to the Alair and Porteous Cases, supra, may be cited Douglas v....