Carpenter v. United States
Decision Date | 12 December 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 15-415L,15-415L |
Parties | CARPENTER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. Claims Court |
Rails-to-Trails; Fifth Amendment Takings; Arkansas Law; Property Interest Conveyed; Easements versus Fees; Multifactor Test; Partial Summary Judgment
Steven M. Wald, St. Louis, MO, for plaintiffs. Michael J. Smith, St. Louis, MO, and Thomas S. Stewart and Elizabeth G. McCulley, Kansas City, MO, of counsel.
Jacqueline C. Brown, Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, with whom was John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant.
OPINION ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pending before the court in the above-captioned rails-to-trails case are cross-motions for partial summary judgment filed pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC") by plaintiffs Joy Mayer, Wadena Sue Ramsey, Johnny Ray Ramsey, Roger Dean Ramsey, Ronnie E. Ramsey, Ronda R. May, Dan Reber and Lisa Reber, and Cindy M. Pruss ("plaintiffs") and by defendant the United States ("the government"). Plaintiffs all own land in Pulaski County, Arkansas. At issue in this case is whether the creation of a recreational trail resulted in a Fifth Amendment taking of plaintiffs' land.
Plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to compensation under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, and the Fifth Amendment based on the issuance of a Notice of Interim Trail Use by the Department of Transportation's Surface Transportation Board authorizing the conversion of a railroad corridor running across their properties to a recreational trail pursuant to the National Trails Systems Act, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) ("the Trails Act"). Plaintiffs claim that they own the land underlying the railroad corridor and that the government deprived them of regaining use of their property unencumbered by railroad easements when the Surface Transportation Board issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use in November 2010. Plaintiffs argue that the Notice of Interim Trail Use gave rise to a taking of their property without just compensation, in contravention of the Fifth Amendment.
This case turns on the interpretation of three deeds plaintiffs' predecessors in interest conveyed to the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company. The only question before the court in the pending motions is whether, under Arkansas law, each of the deeds conveyed a fee or an easement to the railroad. Plaintiffs argue that under Arkansas law each deed conveyed only an easement to the railroad and thus the government took their land when the corridor was converted to a trail. The government argues that under Arkansas law the deeds conveyed a fee and therefore the conversion of the railroad corridor to a trail did not take any of plaintiffs' property.
For the reasons discussed below, the court concludes that plaintiffs have the better reading of Arkansas law and therefore plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED. The government's cross-motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED.
The Trails Act is discussed in many cases and relevant provisions are briefly summarized below. The Surface Transportation Board has "exclusive and plenary authority over the construction, operation, and abandonment of most of the nation's rail lines." Rogers v. United States, 814 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). If a railroad proposes to abandon a rail line, then a state, political subdivision, or qualified private organization may request to use the corridor for interim trail use and "rail banking" under section 1247(d). See 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a). If the railroad agrees to negotiate with the proposed trail operator, the Surface Transportation Board will issue a Notice of Interim Trail Use. Id. § 1152.29(d). A Notice of Interim Trail Use suspends the abandonment of a rail corridor by a railroad and preserves the corridor for future railroad use. Rogers, 814 F.3d at 1303 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(d); Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Because the corridor is not abandoned but is instead converted to a new use, the Federal Circuit has found that "[t]he government must provide just compensation under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause if the issuance of a [Notice of Interim Trail Use] results in the taking of private property." Id. (citing Whispell Foreign Cars, Inc. v.United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 324, 330 (Fed. Cl. 2011)). A taking arises when the property underlying the corridor is not returned to the owners of the property. Therefore, in order to establish a Fifth Amendment taking, a private party must demonstrate a valid interest in the property at issue. Id. (citing Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
As noted above, plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment takings claims are based on three deeds plaintiffs' predecessors in interest conveyed to the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company in 1917 and 1919. The rail line was eventually transferred to the Union Pacific Railroad Company, which operated rail service along the corridor until some years before 2010. See Def.'s Mot. 6, Ex. 1.
On August 11, 2010, the City of North Little Rock in Pulaski County, Arkansas, filed a request for a Notice of Interim Trail Use to the Surface Transportation Board in order to negotiate with the Union Pacific Railroad for the acquisition of the corridor for use as a trail under the Trails Act and 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29. See Pl.'s Mot. Exs. B, C. On November 19, 2010, the Surface Transportation Board issued a Decision and Notice of Interim Trail Use. See Pl.'s Mot. Ex. C.
The claims of plaintiffs Dan Reber and Lisa Reber are based on the below-quoted deed, dated February 5, 1919, issued by Addie Fountain to the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company ("the Addie Fountain deed"):
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