Carpenter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 May 2008 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 06-0906. |
| Citation | 614 F.Supp.2d 745 |
| Parties | Virgile O. CARPENTER v. WAL-MART STORES, INC. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
James L. Carroll, Mixon & Carroll, Columbia, LA, for Virgile O. Carpenter.
Stephen P. Beiser, Brian M. LeCompte, McGlinchey Stafford, New Orleans, LA, for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
RULING
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 28) filed on behalf of named defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. by the correct defendant, Wal-Mart Louisiana, L.L.C. ("Wal-Mart"). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted. By separate judgment, all of the claims of the plaintiff, Virgile O. Carpenter ("Carpenter") will be dismissed with prejudice.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that summary judgment
should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Id. A genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If the movant produces evidence tending to show there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmovant must then direct the Court's attention to evidence in the record sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir.1996) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). In the analysis, all inferences are drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Herrera v. Millsap, 862 F.2d 1157, 1159 (5th Cir. 1989). However, mere conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and such allegations are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Brock v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 976 F.2d 969, 970 (5th Cir.1992). Finally, "a mere scintilla [of evidence] is not enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir.1994) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
This case may be summarized very simply: Carpenter alleges that Wal-Mart unlawfully discriminated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Carpenter alleges that her various medical problems, including lupus, fibromyalgia, and osteoarthritis, constitute disabilities that Wal-Mart framed her for attempting to steal a digital camera and battery from the store on September 24, 2004; and that Wal-Mart then terminated her within a month after the incident because of her disability. In defense, Wal-Mart argues that, although she had various ailments, Carpenter was not disabled; that she was not framed but actually did attempt to commit theft; and that she was fired for her attempted theft, rather than because of any disability, actual or perceived.
Carpenter filed an Equal Opportunity Employment Commission ("EEOC") Charge on June 14, 2005, alleging several types of discrimination. The EEOC dismissed the Charge on January 19, 2006, and on April 19, 2006, Carpenter filed suit in the Eighth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Winn, Louisiana, specifically claiming that Wal-Mart discriminated against her on the basis of disability. (Doc. 6-2, p. 2, par. 11). The complaint is silent as to any other type of discrimination and any claim concerning retaliation. Wal-Mart properly removed the suit to this Court on May 26, 2006, asserting both federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. On September 6, 2007, Wal-Mart filed the instant motion for summary judgment (Doc. 28), which concerns all of Carpenter's claims.
That is the simple overview. The law applicable to this case, as set out in the next section, is also relatively simple. The difficulty lies in setting out the facts in detail—whether actually undisputed or disputed but presumed to be in the plaintiff's favor—and the task is made especially arduous by the plaintiff's strenuous objections (Doc. 34-2) to Wal-Mart's statement of undisputed material facts (Doc. 28-2), which often have no basis in record evidence. The only path to the other side of this thicket of facts is through the middle. LR56.2 ("Opposition to Summary Judgment") provides:
Each copy of the papers opposing a motion for summary judgment shall include a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts as to which there exists a genuine issue to be tried. All material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed admitted, for purposes of the motion, unless controverted as required by this rule.
Id. Below, we examine Wal-Mart's statement of purportedly uncontested material facts in the order presented, noting for each one whether it is contested as required by LR56.2 and, if contested, determining whether and to what extent it is genuinely in dispute. Each statement is set out as a block quote in bold below with our notes following in the text.
1. Plaintiff was hired by Wal-Mart at its Winnfield, Louisiana store in 1995 and worked as a cashier, door greeter and sales associate during the course of her employment.
(Doc. 28-2, p. 1). This paragraph is not contested and is deemed admitted pursuant to LR56.2.
2. The only significant problems that plaintiff experienced at work prior to her termination in 2004, was that she and some of the older cashiers began to receive less favorable schedules and fewer hours in approximately early 2003 and she was replaced in the Garden Center by a younger, Hispanic male in August 2004.
(Doc. 28-2, p. 1). Carpenter argues that this paragraph is a conclusion of law rather than a statement of fact; however, because it lists only facts, we disagree. Next, Carpenter disputes this paragraph's characterization of her "only significant problems." (Doc. 34-2, par. 3). Although she does admit to the truth of the problems listed, she also asserts, "As Plaintiff testified to in her deposition, she complained about Latasha Jones, her Customer Service Manager [sic] failing to allow her the breaks that she needed." (Doc. 34-2, par. 3). Carpenter does not cite the relevant record evidence supporting this assertion. We find one reference in Carpenter's deposition linking Jones with Carpenter's complaints about breaks:
(Carpenter Depo, p. 42).1 We assume that Carpenter did at least complain about breaks to Latasha Jones for some reason.
Carpenter continues, "Further Plaintiff testified that she needed these breaks as an accommodation for her disabilities so that she could perform the essential functions of her job." (Doc. 34-2, par. 3). Again, Carpenter cites to no record evidence to support this statement, and we can find none. Carpenter's memorandum in opposition to Wal-Mart's motion for summary judgment contains similar assertions under a paragraph labeled "Regarded as Disabled," citing to various passages from Carpenter's deposition:
[Carpenter] stated that she complained about her schedule and Defendant's refusal to allow her breaks. [Carpenter deposition] 30-33. Continual requests for these breaks resulted in further punishment of late night shifts [sic] and further complaints by Plaintiff. Id., 34-35.... On three occasions she complained about her supervisor's refusal to allow her breaks, as well as about her supervisor/Customer Service Manager [sic] improperly collecting Plaintiff's "money bag." Id. 35-37, 42....
(Doc. 34, par. 19).
Based on the direct citations to the Carpenter deposition, we could expect those passages to at least link the complaints about breaks to some kind of medical condition. Instead, pages 30-35 almost exclusively concern scheduling problems relating to Carpenter's and other employees' shifts ending late at night. There is no reference to any disability—or, indeed, to any health concerns—and the only reference to breaks is the following passage:
Pages 35-37 of the deposition do not contain even a single reference to breaks. Instead, Carpenter details her complaints to management concerning Latasha Jones:
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