CARPENTERS LOCAL, ETC. v. Pratt-Farmsworth, Civ. A. No. 80-1570.

• Decision Date: 02 April 1981
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 80-1570.
• Citation: CARPENTERS LOCAL, ETC. v. Pratt-Farmsworth, 511 F.Supp. 509 (E.D. La. 1981)
• Parties: CARPENTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 1846 of the UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Carpenters District Council of New Orleans and Vicinity Pension Trust, Carpenters District Council of New Orleans and Vicinity Health and Welfare Plan, Carpenters District Council of New Orleans and Vicinity Apprenticeship Educational and Training Program, William John Fortney; Kenneth J. Perkins; Donald C. Haynes; Rayford H. Colamari; Lothard J. Broussard, Sr.; Franklin B. Hunter; Elaire Dauzat; Dennis J. Savoy; Lawrence J. Rousselle; Desire Bergeron; Vernon D. Harvey; and William J. Brignac, Jr. (Hereinafter Class I), James E. Crawford; Lawless J. Martin; Robert Brown; Charles Mitchell; Nathaniel E. Williams; Johnnie Williams; Fred Scott and Lee R. Miskell (Hereinafter Class II); and James E. Crawford; Lawless J. Martin; Robert Brown; Nathaniel E. Williams and Lee R. Miskell (Hereinafter Class III) v. PRATT-FARNSWORTH, INC.; Halmar, Inc.; New Orleans District, Associated General Contractors of Louisiana, Inc.; At Large District, Associated General Contractors of Louisiana, Inc.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

511 F. Supp. 509

CARPENTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 1846 of the UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Carpenters District Council of New Orleans and Vicinity Pension Trust, Carpenters District Council of New Orleans and Vicinity Health and Welfare Plan, Carpenters District Council of New Orleans and Vicinity Apprenticeship Educational and Training Program, William John Fortney; Kenneth J. Perkins; Donald C. Haynes; Rayford H. Colamari; Lothard J. Broussard, Sr.; Franklin B. Hunter; Elaire Dauzat; Dennis J. Savoy; Lawrence J. Rousselle; Desire Bergeron; Vernon D. Harvey; and William J. Brignac, Jr. (Hereinafter Class I), James E. Crawford; Lawless J. Martin; Robert Brown; Charles Mitchell; Nathaniel E. Williams; Johnnie Williams; Fred Scott and Lee R. Miskell (Hereinafter Class II); and James E. Crawford; Lawless J. Martin; Robert Brown; Nathaniel E. Williams and Lee R. Miskell (Hereinafter Class III) v. PRATT-FARNSWORTH, INC.; Halmar, Inc.; New Orleans District, Associated General Contractors of Louisiana, Inc.; At Large District, Associated General Contractors of Louisiana, Inc.

Civ. A. No. 80-1570.

United States District Court, E. D. Louisiana.

April 2, 1981.

Jerry L. Gardner, Jr., Barker, Boudreaux, Lamy, Gardner & Foley, New Orleans, La., for plaintiffs.

Frederick A. Kullman, Kullman, Lang, Inman & Bee, James Burton, Brian, Simon, Peragine, Smith & Redfearn, New Orleans, La., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JACK M. GORDON, District Judge.

Defendants, Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc.; Halmar, Inc.; Associated General Contractors of Louisiana, Inc., New Orleans District; and Associated General Contractors of Louisiana, Inc., At Large District, have moved the Court for dismissal of and, alternatively, for summary judgment in plaintiffs' suit styled as a class action. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs brought this action on behalf of all members of and all persons seeking employment through Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 and Pile Drivers Local Union No. 2436 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO. Additional represented plaintiffs include all affiliated participants and beneficiaries of the Carpenters District Council of New Orleans and Vicinity's Pension Fund, Health and Welfare Plan, and Apprenticeship Educational and Training Program. Also joined are the plaintiffs named of Class I, Class II, and Class III. Heretofore, the Court has not considered the merits of the class certification issue. Oral argument was heard on September 24, 1980, after which the Court took the matter under submission. Having reviewed the arguments, the memoranda of counsel, and the applicable law, the Court has decided to GRANT defendants' motion to dismiss.

The instant action evolved from the Carpenters District Council's bargaining relationship with the Associated General Contractors, Inc., New Orleans District (hereinafter AGC, New Orleans), and the Associated General Contractors of Louisiana, Inc., At Large District (hereinafter AGC, At Large). Defendants Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc. (hereinafter Farnsworth) and Halmar, Inc., (hereinafter Halmar), employers engaged in the building and construction industry, affiliated themselves with the AGC organizations, thereby authorizing AGC to bargain in their behalf with the Carpenters District Council over wages, terms, and conditions of employment. Accordingly, AGC, New Orleans negotiated the collective bargaining agreement extending from May 1, 1977 to April 30, 1980 with the Carpenters District Council—such agreement constitutes the controverted subject matter of this suit.

The gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint is that defendants have conspired to restrain competition and to monopolize the construction industry in New Orleans and vicinity. Allegedly, Farnsworth established Halmar to create a union-free environment with the purpose of circumventing the "Craft Agreement," the collective bargaining agreement with plaintiff union. Plaintiffs further claim that the district organizations of the defendant AGC have participated in this monopoly through utilization of those "open-shop" contractors represented by the AGC, At Large.

In pursuance of their complaints, plaintiffs have filed this action, stating causes of action under three different sets of federal statutes; namely, (i) Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, as amended 29 U.S.C. § 185(a); (ii) The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (hereinafter ERISA); and (iii) the Clayton and Sherman Antitrust Acts, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 12-27 and 28 U.S.C. § 1332 et seq. Let us consider each of these in turn.

I. The Section 301 Allegations

The Labor Management Relations Act, Section 301(a) establishes federal court jurisdiction for collective bargaining agreement violations.

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)

Thus, suits maintainable under Section 301 must be based upon a collective bargaining agreement existing "between an employer and a labor organization...."

A. The Section 301 Allegations as applied to the AGC organizations

The Associated General Contractors of Louisiana, Inc. acts through its Collective Bargaining Committee as the bargaining agent for certain Association members. Solely those parties which signify their intention to accept the agreement's terms are contractually bound. The agreements, then, are neither negotiated for nor binding upon any other Association member, nor upon the Association itself. This is evidenced by the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article I—

PARTIES AND DEFINITIONS:

Section I. The parties to this Agreement are the following:

(a) Those members of the New Orleans District, Associated General Contractors of Louisiana, Inc. signatory hereto and listed in Appendix "A", together with such other members of said District who may hereafter become signatory hereto, hereinafter referred to as "Contractors" or "Employers" collectively, and as "Contractors" or "Employer" individually.

(b) Those Unions signatory hereto and listed in Appendix "B", hereinafter referred to as "Unions" collectively, and as "Union" individually. emphasis added

The AGC, New Orleans and the AGC, At Large are not signatories to the agreement. Rather, it is those members of the AGC, New Orleans that are contractually bound.

The absence of such contractual relationship between AGC, New Orleans or AGC, At Large and Carpenters District Council mandates dismissal as to them of the Section 301 claim under settled authority in this jurisdiction. In Dixie Machine Welding & Metal Works, Inc. v. Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, 243 F.Supp. 489 (E.D.La.1965), the plaintiff brought suit in state court to enjoin defendant's picketing. The defendant-union sought removal to the federal court on the basis that it was a Section 301 action. The court said:

Defendant-union argues that this suit is based in part on the alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement between the plaintiff-employer and various labor organizations and for that reason arises under Section 301. This contention is erroneous, however, because there is no collective bargaining agreement between the parties to this suit.... While it is alleged by plaintiff that the activity of its employees (resulting from their refusal to cross the picket line of Defendant) is being carried on in violation of the collective bargaining agreements between plaintiff and its employees, this suit is not against plaintiff's employees but against Marine Engineers Beneficial Association with which Plaintiff has no agreement of any kind. Between the parties to this action, therefore, there is no collective bargaining agreement and this is not a "suit for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization" or between labor organizations which Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act would confer jurisdiction in this court. 243 F.Supp. at 491. emphasis in the original

See also United Steel Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Rome Industries, Inc. d/b/a Rome Plow Company, 437 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1970).

B. The Section 301 Allegations as applied to Farnsworth and Halmar

While Halmar is not a signatory to the contract, plaintiffs have argued that the affiliation between Farnsworth and Halmar should result in their characterization as a "single employer." This classification, plaintiffs contend, would impose the terms of the bargaining agreement upon Halmar.

The Court cannot agree with plaintiffs' contention because adoption of that position inevitably would result in this Court's usurpation of power to determine the appropriate "bargaining unit" reserved to the National Labor Relations Board. Section 9(b) of the National Labor Relations Act provides the following directive.

The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, or subdivision thereof .... 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)

South Prairie Construction Company v. Operating Engineers, 425 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1842, 48 L.Ed.2d 382 (1976) (commonly known as the Peter Kiewit case) presents a parallel situation. The union there filed a complaint with the N.L.R.B. alleging that South Prairie and Kiewit's refusal to apply the bargaining agreement effective between the Union and Kiewit to South Prairie's employees constituted a violation of the National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5) and (1), as amended 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) ...