Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Citation: 360 Pa. 94,61 A.2d 426
• Decision Date: 27 September 1948
• Parties: CARPENTERTOWN COAL & COKE CO. et al. v. LAIRD et al.

360 Pa. 94
61 A.2d 426

CARPENTERTOWN COAL & COKE CO. et al.
v.
LAIRD et al.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Sept. 27, 1948.

Miscellaneous Docket, Petition No. 1541, for the Issuance of a Writ of Prohibition.

Proceeding on the petition of Carpentertown Coal & Coke Company and Thomas H. Eddy and others, trustees of Thaw Coke Trust, under the will of William Thaw, deceased, against Richard D. Laird, president judge of the court of common pleas of Westmoreland county, and H. I. Tripp and others, associate members of the state mining commission, convened in the court of common pleas of Westmoreland county, for a writ of prohibition to prevent the mining commission from usurping judicial authority, wherein the turnpike commission intervened.

Writ refused and petition dismissed without prejudice.

61 A.2d 427

Before MAXEY, C. J., and DREW, LINN, STERN, PATTERSON, STEARNE and JONES, JJ.

Carroll Caruthers, of Greensburg, Pa., and William A. Meyer and Kountz, Fry, Staley & Mayer, all of Pittsburgh, for Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co.

Thomas G. Taylor, of Greensburg, John D. McIntyre and Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, all of Pittsburgh, for Thaw Coke Trust.

Portser, Gregg & McConnell, of Greensburg, Douglass D. Storey, of Harrisburg, Jas. Gregg, of Greensburg, and Storey & Bailey, of Harrisburg, for respondent State Mining Commission.

Douglas D. Storey, of Harrisburg, James Gregg, of Greensburg, and John D. Faller, of Harrisburg, for Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission.

HORACE STERN, Justice.

It is alleged that a State Mining Commission in Westmoreland County is threatening to exercise a jurisdiction which it does not possess, and we are asked to issue a writ of prohibition to prevent such usurpation of judicial authority.

In 1944 Carpentertown Coal and Coke Company, lessee from the Thaw Coke Trust of coal underlying the Pennsylvania Turnpike, caused a State Mining Commission to be convened under the provisions of the Act of July 3, 1941, P.L. 259, 52 P.S. § 1501 et seq., in order to determine what portion of the coal must be left in place to support the turnpike and to assess the resulting damages to the Company. On appeal to this court it was held that the State Mining Commission had jurisdiction in the proceedings over the Turnpike Commission. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission Appeal, 351 Pa. 139, 40 A.2d 404. The State Mining Commission found that the Turnpike Commission had waived the right to vertical and lateral support, that the Coal Company could remove all the coal, and that it was therefore not entitled to recover any damages. After certain subsequent proceedings, here immaterial, the Coal Company proceeded to mine the coal, the greater portion of which has now been removed. In November, 1947, more than two years after the last order and decree in the proceedings had been made by the State Mining Commission, the Turnpike Commission petitioned it to order the Coal Company, lessee, and the Thaw Coke Trust, owner, to pay the Turnpike Commission a certain specified sum as damages resulting from the subsidence of one of its bridges caused by alleged failure of the Company to mine the coal in an orderly fashion; also that the Company be ordered to cease meanwhile from further operations. On the basis of this petition the President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, acting as Chairman of the State Mining Commission, issued a rule upon the owner and the lessee to show cause why the prayer should not be granted. Thereupon the Thaw Coke Trust and the Coal Company filed the present petition in this court for a writ of prohibition to enjoin the State Mining Commission from any further action in the proceedings, contending that its jurisdiction had ceased after the expiration of the appeal period from its last order or decree in July, 1945, and contending also that it did not have jurisdiction to assess damages against the owner or lessee of the coal after it had once finally determined that all the coal could be removed,-indeed, that it had no power in any case whatsoever to assess damages against the coal owner or lessee.

The Turnpike Commission, having been granted permission to intervene as a party respondent, opposes the petition on two grounds: (1) that this court has no constitutional power to issue a writ of prohibition; and (2) even if such power exists it should not be exercised in the present instance. The Commonwealth has filed a brief disputing the former but concurring in the latter of these contentions. The argument

61 A.2d 428

against the existence of the power is based upon Article V, section 3 of the Constitution, P.S., which provides that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in cases of injunction where a corporation is a party defendant, of habeas corpus, of mandamus to courts of inferior jurisdiction, and of quo warranto as to all officers of the Commonwealth whose jurisdiction extends over the State, ‘but shall not exercise any other original jurisdiction’.

Prohibition is a common law writ of extremely ancient origin,-so ancient, indeed, that several forms for its use are set forth in Glanville, the earliest known treatise on English law (1187); in the following century it was recognized by Bracton as an established part of the common law. Being a prerogative writ of the king it was originally employed exclusively by the Court of King's Bench, but subsequently issued out of the Courts of Chancery, Common Pleas and Exchequer as well. Its principal purpose is to prevent an...