Carr v. General Insulated Wire Works, Inc., 3216

• Decision Date: 19 October 1965
• Docket Number: No. 3216,3216
• Citation: 100 R.I. 203,213 A.2d 700
• Parties: John CARR v. GENERAL INSULATED WIRE WORKS, INC. Eq.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 700

213 A.2d 700

100 R.I. 203

John CARR v. GENERAL INSULATED WIRE WORKS, INC.

Eq. No. 3216.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Oct. 19, 1965.

Edward I. Friedman, Albert Watt, Providence, for petitioner.

Joseph A. Kelly, Providence, for respondent.

ROBERTS, Justice.

This is an employee's original petition seeking compensation for total incapacity and for specific injuries pursuant to the pertinent provisions of G.L.1956, § 28-33-19. The cause is now before this court on the petitioner's appeal from a decree of the full commission entered on October 26, 1964 affirming a decree entered on May 20, 1964 by a trial commissioner, in which the instant petition was denied and dismissed. The cause has been before this court on prior appeals taken by both the petitioner and the respondent from the decree of the full commission entered on May 29, 1963, at which time the cause was remanded by this court to the full commission for further proceedings in accordance with our opinion in Carr v. General Insulated Wire Works, Inc., R.I., 199 A.2d 24.

The record discloses that petitioner was injured in 1957 while in the employ of respondent and was paid compensation for total incapacity for a period of thirteen weeks on the basis of a nonprejudicial agreement. Thereafter he filed the instant petition for compensation, and after a hearing thereon a trial commissioner filed a decision on January 11, 1962 wherein he found petitioner had failed to establish that his injuries were compensable and denied and dismissed the petition. Thereafter and before a decree was entered thereon, petitioner moved that the cause be reopened for the submission by him of further testimony on the question of causation. The motion was granted, and on December 20, 1962, after the reception of additional evidence, the trial commissioner entered a decree granting petitioner compensation for total incapacity but denying him specific compensation.

This decree of the trial commissioner was appealed to the full commission, and on May 29, 1963 the full commission entered a decree in which the decree of the trial commissioner was affirmed. From the decree of May 29 appeals were taken to this court both by petitioner and respondent. We held that the contention of respondent had merit, that is, that the trial commissioner was without jurisdiction under the statute to reopen the case in the circumstances and to hear further evidence. We said that we were constrained to 'conclude that the full commission erred in holding that the trial commissioner had acted within his jurisdiction in reopening the cause and admitting further testimonial evidence and in not expunging from the record the evidence thus unlawfully included therein. * * * In all the circumstances, however, we find the conclusion inescapable that the cause must be remanded to the full commission for the purpose of enabling it to make a review of the decree of the trial commissioner pursuant to the intent of the statute, that is, on a record purged of such evidence that may unlawfully have been included therein.' Carr v. General Insulated Wire Works, Inc., supra.

After remand and pursuant to ur opinion, the full commission entered an order dated May 15, 1964 wherein it expunged from the record all of the testimony and exhibits admitted during the course of the extended hearing; vacated the decree of the trial commissioner dated December 20, 1962; reinstated the decision of the trial commissioner filed on January 11, 1962; and remanded the cause to the trial commissioner for the entry of a decree upon the decision filed January 11, 1962. The trial commissioner subsequently complied with this order of the full commission and on May 20, 1964 entered a decree in which he found, inter alia, that petitioner had failed to prove 'that his present incapacity is in any way, causally related to or connected to or caused by the fall at work on October 10, 1957' and denied and dismissed the petition.

The procedures followed by the commission after our remand of the cause were, in our opinion, entirely proper. We recognize that in United States Rubber Co. v. Dymek, 87 R.I. 310, 140 A.2d 507, we held that the full commission is without jurisdiction on review of a decree of a trial commissioner to remand the cause for amendment or enlargement of the record. It is clear, however, that here the reference of the cause back to the trial commissioner was only for the entry of a decree upon the record established at the original hearing. In the circumstances we find no error in the procedures adopted by the commission to clear the record of...