Carr v. State

• Decision Date: 07 July 1989
• Docket Number: No. 46663,46663
• Citation: Carr v. State, 380 S.E.2d 700, 259 Ga. 318 (Ga. 1989)
• Parties: CARR v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 700

380 S.E.2d 700

259 Ga. 318

CARR v. The STATE.

No. 46663.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

July 7, 1989.

L. David Wolfe, Atlanta (Court-appointed), for James A. Carr.

Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Joseph J. Drolet, Benjamin H. Oehlert III, Asst. Dist. Attya., Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Leonore Grant, Atlanta, for the State.

MARSHALL, Chief Justice.

James A. Carr appeals his conviction of the malice murder of Tommy Williams, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. ¹ We affirm.

This was a contract killing in which Troy Crumbley hired the appellant and Jimmie Lee Ruth to kill Williams. The indictment listed the appellant, Troy Crumbley, and Jimmie Lee Ruth as charged with the murder of Tommy Williams. Crumbley confessed under the Witness Protection Program and pleaded guilty before appellant's trial. Crumbley received a life sentence for his part in the murder. Jimmie Lee Ruth was tried in the same trial with the appellant and was acquitted.

The evidence presented in the trial court describes the following facts. Troy Crumbley, a known drug dealer, had been shot in the mouth in 1984.

He hired the victim, Tommy Williams, whom he suspected of shooting him, to work at his service station-convenience store in order to obtain information on Williams' co-conspirators. Crumbley hired the appellant and Jimmie Lee Ruth to kill Williams. The killing was carried out in a laundromat by the appellant and in the presence of the state's key witness, Thadeaus Dozier. Carr first denied knowing anything about the shooting; however, he later admitted to being there but denied shooting Williams.

The state's case hinged upon the testimony of Thadeaus Dozier, a witness to and former suspect in the murder. During the trial, Officer Price, when asked by the prosecutor if he caused Dozier to take a polygraph test, responded that Dozier had taken a polygraph test. The appellant's attorney objected and after the jury left the courtroom, he made a motion for mistrial. The court overruled both the objection and the motion for mistrial on the ground that the evidence of the polygraph test was part of the police investigation.

1. In his first enumeration of error, the appellant claims that the trial court erred in allowing the presentation to the jury of unstipulated testimony that the state's key witness, Dozier, had taken a polygraph test.

The state asserts that the court was correct in denying the appellant's objection to the polygraph evidence and in denying the appellant's motion for mistrial. We agree. " '[T]he mere fact that the jury is apprised that a lie detector test was taken is not necessarily prejudicial if no inference as to the result is raised....' (Emphasis in original.) Stack v. State, 234 Ga. 19, 23, 214 S.E.2d 514 (1975)." White v. State, 255 Ga. 210, 213(6), 336 S.E.2d 777 (1985). The appellant opened the door to this type of testimony by focusing on the police investigation in his cross-examination of Officer Price. At the close of the appellant's cross-examination, the state redirected the witness and asked him if he had caused Dozier to take a polygraph. The purpose of this evidence was to show the reasons for the investigator's conduct and why he sought an arrest warrant for the appellant. This use of polygraph evidence is proper when explaining the motives and conduct of the investigating officers. Cromer v. State, 253 Ga. 352(3), 320 S.E.2d 751 (1984); Herlong v. State, 236 Ga. 326(3), 223 S.E.2d 672 (1976). Herlong also states at p. 328, 223 S.E.2d 672, "[t]he decision in Stack did not require, as a matter of law, that a new trial be granted on every occasion where a jury is apprised that a lie detector test has been given."

The appellant asserts that this evidence is inadmissible because it bolstered the testimony of Thadeaus Dozier. See Cromer v. State, supra. Polygraph tests are not a reliable source of evidence, and due to this fact, the law only allows them in evidence when both parties stipulate to the admission of such evidence. " 'In general, it is impermissible for the state to bolster the credibility of a state's witness or impugn the credibility of the defendant by eliciting testimony to the effect that the witness or the defendant were administered polygraph examinations. [Cits.]' " Wilson v. State, 254 Ga. 473, 476, 330 S.E.2d 364 (1985). This argument should have been made to the trial court when the state made reference to the polygraph test in its closing argument. However, both defense attorneys failed to object; therefore, they will not be heard to complain of error on this ground.

2. The appellant argues that the trial court erred in not ordering a mistrial after the state made statements which could prejudice the thinking of the jury. The appellant asserts that it was improper for the prosecution to state in its closing argument that Crumbley had made a statement to the police, when Crumbley had, in fact, invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination at the trial, and thus, evidence of this statement had not been presented to the jury through testimony at the trial. The defense...