Carranza v. State

• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: HUNSTEIN
• Citation: Carranza v. State, 266 Ga. 263, 467 S.E.2d 315 (Ga. 1996)
• Decision Date: 19 February 1996
• Docket Number: No. S95G1416,S95G1416
• Parties: CARRANZA v. The STATE.

Page 315

467 S.E.2d 315

266 Ga. 263

CARRANZA v. The STATE.

No. S95G1416.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Feb. 19, 1996.

Appeal from Superior Court, Colquitt County; Harry Jay Altman, II, Judge.

Dwight H. May, James M. Bivins, II, Moultrie, for Miguel Carranza.

Charles M. Stines, Asst. Dist. Atty., Moultrie, H. Lamar Cole, Dist. Atty., Valdosta, for State.

Michael A. Caldwell, Delong, Caldwell, Logue & Wisebram, L.L.C., Atlanta, for Amicus Appellee.

Steven R. Wisebram, Delong, Caldwell, Logue & Wisebram, L.L.C., Atlanta.

HUNSTEIN, Justice.

We granted Miguel Carranza's application for writ of certiorari to consider whether under the facts in this case, law enforcement officers were required to obtain a warrant before entering Carranza's home either to arrest him or to conduct a search. Because we find that in the absence of any exigent circumstances the officers were required to obtain a warrant, we reverse in part the Court of Appeals. State v. Carranza, 217 Ga.App. 431, 457 S.E.2d 699 (1995).

This case involves what is known as a "buy-bust" procedure. An undercover informant was sent by agents of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and local law enforcement agencies to Carranza's home to arrange the purchase of fraudulent documents (e.g., social security and green cards). The informant wore a radio transmitter ("body bug") under his clothing so that the conversation in the home could be electronically monitored by officers outside the home. See OCGA § 16-11-66. The evidence established that the officers overheard a conversation in which the parties discussed how the documents were falsified, how falsified documents could be obtained from a source in California, and an agreement to obtain such documents for the informant. Pursuant to a pre-arranged verbal signal, the informant alerted the officers that the money for the falsified documents had been exchanged. Upon hearing that signal, the officers rushed to the door of Carranza's home, announced "ready," and, with weapons drawn, entered the home by opening the unlocked front door. It is uncontroverted that the officers acted without an arrest or search warrant. Carranza was arrested and falsified documents were found in his wallet. Carranza's 18-year-old wife, an illegal immigrant who spoke no English, led officers to other falsified documents. Carranza was subsequently taken to the police station where, after being read his Miranda rights, he made an incriminating statement.

At the hearing on Carranza's motion to suppress the documents and statement, INS Special Agent Craig Covert testified that entry into Carranza's home was made based solely upon the belief that officers had probable cause to believe a felony was taking place in the residence. Covert stated that he had information from a confidential informant two days before the arrest that falsified documents could be purchased at the home, although he was unaware of any previous purchases of falsified documents from the home.

1. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution recognizes the right of the people "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." See also Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIII of the Georgia Constitution (1983).

It is axiomatic that the "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." [Cit.] And a principal protection against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on agents of the government who seek to enter the home for purposes of search or arrest. [Cit.]

Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748(II), 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2097, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984). The U.S. Supreme Court has thus held that even where probable cause exists, warrantless intrusion of a person's home is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent consent or a showing of exigent circumstances. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211(III), 101 S.Ct. 1642, 1647, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981). To conclude otherwise would require "disregard[ing] the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic." (Footnote omitted.) Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1388, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980).

The purpose of the warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment is to allow a neutral judicial officer to assess whether the police have probable cause to make an arrest or conduct a search. Steagald v. United States, supra, 451 U.S. at 212, 101 S.Ct. at 1647-48.

[T]he placement of this checkpoint between the Government and the citizen implicitly acknowledges that an "officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime," [cit.], may lack sufficient objectivity to weigh correctly the strength of the evidence supporting the contemplated action against the individual's interests in protecting his own liberty and the privacy of his home. [Cits.]

Id. See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2333, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (recognizing the "essential protection of the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment"). Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that

[a]bsent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals.

McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-456, 69 S.Ct. 191, 193, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948).

The Court of Appeals in this case reversed the trial court's grant of Carranza's motion to suppress on the basis of a provision in OCGA § 17-4-20(a) authorizing a law enforcement officer to make an arrest without a warrant "if the offense is committed in his presence or within his immediate knowledge." ¹ Because this statutory language encompasses personal knowledge obtained through senses other than sight, see Marsh v. State, 182 Ga.App. 892, 893, 357 S.E.2d 325 (1987); see also O'Keefe v. State, 189 Ga.App. 519(3), 376 S.E.2d 406 (1988), such that testimony by law enforcement officers regarding matters overheard due to electronic amplification constitutes direct, primary evidence, Ferrell v. State, 203 Ga.App. 479(1), 416 S.E.2d 903 (1992); Goodwin v. State, 154 Ga.App. 46(1)(a), 267 S.E.2d 488 (1980), the Court of Appeals concluded that Carranza committed a crime "in [the] presence or within [the] immediate knowledge" of the officers overhearing the conversation so as to authorize a warrantless arrest of Carranza in his home. OCGA § 17-4-20(a).

Probable cause clearly exists where, as here, a crime is committed in the presence of law enforcement officers. See generally Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); Durden v. State, 250 Ga. 325(1), 297 S.E.2d 237 (1982). That does not, however, end the inquiry.

It is elementary that probable cause, however well founded, can provide no justification for a warrantless intrusion of a person's home absent a showing "that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, [403 U.S. 443, 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), and cits.].

Clare v. State, 135 Ga.App. 281, 284, 217 S.E.2d 638 (1975). In this case, the record reflects there were no exigent circumstances present to authorize the officers' warrantless intrusion of Carranza's home. There was no pending danger of injury to any individual; the contraband purchased by the informant was not present in the home and thus was not in immediate danger of destruction; there was no evidence of flight, other than Agent Covert's unsubstantiated concern; ² there was no testimony that individuals selling falsified documents engaged in similar behavior characteristic of persons in the narcotics traffic. See, e.g., United States v. Richard, 994 F.2d 244, 248 (5th Cir.1993). These facts present no compelling reason to justify the failure of law enforcement officers to place the matter before a detached and neutral judicial officer.

The offense in issue here, although committed in an officer's presence, was not committed in public but in the privacy of Carranza's own home. The State argues that the principle in Payton v. New York is not applicable here, because that case did not specifically address the situation before this Court, namely, whether probable cause alone is enough to authorize a law enforcement officer to make a warrantless arrest in an individual's home in those instances where the probable cause arises from the commission of the offense in the officer's presence, notwithstanding the absence of exigent circumstances. ³ However, we are not persuaded by the State's argument that the principle in Payton v. New York is not applicable to offenses occurring in the privacy of a home where no exigent circumstances exist merely because the offense is committed in an officer's presence.

An examination of appellate opinions in Georgia supports our conclusion. These cases implicitly recognize that even where the offense is committed in the officer's presence while in the privacy of the accused's home, the officer is required to obtain an arrest warrant absent consent or exigent circumstances. See, e.g., Merriman v. State, 201 Ga.App. 817(1), 412 S.E.2d 598 (1991) (officers on adjacent property observed marijuana growing on Merriman's...