Carrasco v. M & T Bank
| Decision Date | 27 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. SAG-21-0532 |
| Parties | BRYCE CARRASCO, Plaintiff, v. M & T BANK, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Bryce Carrasco ("Plaintiff"), who is self-represented, filed a Complaint on March 2, 2021, against Defendant M&T Bank ("M&T"). ECF 1. The Complaint originally consisted of five counts, although Plaintiff has now voluntarily dismissed Counts Three, Four, and Five. ECF 30 at 3. Currently, Plaintiff alleges that M&T's actions with respect to his credit card account violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) (Count One), and two provisions of the Truth In Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1632(d)(1) and 1633 (Count Two). M&T has filed a Motion to Dismiss, ECF 22, which this Court has reviewed along with Plaintiff's opposition, ECF 30, and M&T's reply, ECF 31. No hearing is necessary to resolve the motion. See Local Rule 105.6 (2018). For the reasons that follow, M&T's motion to dismiss will be denied and a scheduling order will issue to permit discovery to begin.
The following facts are derived from the Complaint and are assumed to be true for purposes of this motion. On July 17, 2020, Plaintiff applied for and received an M&T Visa Credit Card with Rewards. ECF 1 ¶ 5. Three days later, Plaintiff emailed an M&T Branch Manager requesting to look at account documentation online. Id. ¶ 6. He was told that he would receive a letter "that comes separate from the card that has your approval information." Id. ¶ 7. On or about July 21, 2020, Plaintiff received his physical card, along with a letter providing certain information about the credit terms and "a generic-looking and undated pamphlet, which Defendant has represented as being the Credit Agreement."1 Id. ¶¶ 8-9.
Plaintiff opened the M&T credit card under an introductory offer providing a 0% introductory Annual Percentage Rate ("APR") for the first 12 months for purchases and balance transfers. Id. ¶ 11. Shortly after receiving the card, Plaintiff used the M&T card to pay off a credit card he held with another bank. Id. ¶ 12. As of August 3, 2020, then, Plaintiff had a balance of approximately $2,200 on his M&T account. Id. ¶ 13.
In September, 2020, Plaintiff temporarily moved from his Baltimore residence, which was his address on file with M&T, to his parents' home in Arnold, Maryland. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff did not return to his Baltimore home until December, 2020. Id. ¶ 15. During that time, he did not receive email or telephone correspondence from M&T. Id. ¶ 16. Upon his return, he discovered six letters in his mail from M&T, stating that he had a past-due debt on the account. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. One such letter, dated November 5, 2020, stated that M&T had "told a credit bureau about a late payment, missed payment, or other default on your account." Id. ¶ 18. The letter further warned, "This information may be reflected in your credit report." Id.
On December 17, 2020, Plaintiff called M&T and made full payment by telephone of the amount M&T claimed to be overdue. Id. ¶ 21. The M&T representative agreed to reverse the late fee charges on the account. Id. On December 30, 2020, Plaintiff emailed M&T to:
notify them that disputes had been submitted to Experian, Transunion and Equifax in regard to information reflected on Plaintiff's credit reports from all three agencies, based on information furnished by [M&T]. In addition to notifyingM&T of disputes with CRAs, Plaintiff also provided a formal statement describing why such furnished information was misleading and overall misrepresentative based on the underlying terms of credit.
Id. ¶ 22. M&T confirmed receipt of the email on December 31, 2020 and informed Plaintiff that it was investigating his concerns. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff continued to send correspondence to M&T about his disputes. Id. ¶¶ 24-26. However, after its investigation, M&T made no changes to its reporting to the credit reporting agencies ("CRAs"), instead verifying the account information without incorporating other comments. Id. ¶ 27. Specifically, M&T did not indicate to the CRAs that it was or had been investigating Plaintiff's dispute. Id. ¶¶ 27-28.
Plaintiff alleges that M&T "failed to post a written agreement pertaining specifically to open-end credit plans categorized as M&T Visa Credit Card with Rewards that are adjusted based on the promotional offers advertised." Id. ¶ 41. He further alleges that M&T issued "detailed and specific advertisements" for its credit card that did not "clearly and conspicuously set forth 'any minimum or fixed amount which could be imposed." Id. ¶ 42.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a defendant to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to dismiss. In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom., McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." See In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d at 92.
Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). That rule provides that a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendants with "fair notice" of the claims and the "grounds" for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
To survive a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) () (citation omitted); see also Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d 93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). But, a plaintiff need not include "detailed factual allegations" in order to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, federal pleading rules "do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted." Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (per curiam).
Nevertheless, the rule demands more than bald accusations or mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). If a complaint provides no more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," it is insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, to satisfy the minimal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint must set forth "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest" a cognizable cause of action, "even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint" and must "draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff." E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015); Kendall v. Balcerzak, 650 F.3d 515, 522 (4th Cir. 2011). But, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). "A court decides whether [the pleading] standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer" that the plaintiff is entitled to the legal remedy sought. A Soc'y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th. Cir. 2011).
Because Plaintiff is self-represented, his pleadings are "liberally construed" and "held to less stringent standards than [those filed] by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation omitted). "However, liberal construction does not absolve Plaintiff from pleading a plausible claim." Bey v. Shapiro Brown & Alt, LLP, 997 F. Supp. 2d 310, 314 (D. Md. 2014), aff'd, 584 F. App'x 135 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Coulibaly v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. DKC-10-3517, 2011 WL 3476994, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 8, 2011) (); aff'd 526 F. App'x 255 (4th Cir. 2013).
Moreover, a federal court may not act as an advocate for a self-represented litigant. See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 242-43 (4th Cir. 1996); Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). Therefore, the court cannot "conjure up questions never squarely presented," or fashion claims for a plaintiff because he is self-represented. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Maryland v. Sch. Bd., 560 F. App'x 199,203 n.4 (4th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) ().
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint in connection with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court ordinarily "may not consider any documents that are outside of the complaint, or not expressly incorporated therein." Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by ...
To continue reading
Request your trial