Carraway v. Comm'r of Corr.

• Decision Date: 21 July 2015
• Docket Number: No. 19347.,19347.
• Citation: 317 Conn. 594,119 A.3d 1153
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Wilton CARRAWAY v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

317 Conn. 594

119 A.3d 1153

Wilton CARRAWAY

v.COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

No. 19347.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 20, 2015.

Decided July 21, 2015.

Sarah Hanna, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Brian Preleski, state's attorney, and Jo Anne Sulik, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (respondent).

Dante R. Gallucci, assigned counsel, for the appellee (petitioner).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and ROBINSON, Js.

Opinion

ROGERS, C.J.

This certified appeal raises the question of whether a party is aggrieved and therefore has standing to appeal from a decision that the party is seeking to have affirmed. The Appellate Court reversed the habeas court's denial of relief to the petitioner, Wilton Carraway, after the Appellate Court held that the habeas court had improperly applied the prejudice standard enunciated in Copas v. Commissioner of Correction, 234 Conn. 139, 151, 157, 662 A.2d 718 (1995). Carraway v. Commissioner of Correction, 144 Conn.App. 461, 470–71, 72 A.3d 426 (2013). The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, claims on appeal that the judgment of the Appellate Court should be affirmed because Copas sets forth an improper standard for determining prejudice. Because we conclude that the respondent is not aggrieved by the judgment of the Appellate Court and because Copas has already been overruled sub silentio in subsequent decisions by this court, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The following facts and procedural background are relevant to the respondent's claim on appeal. On March 11, 2008, the petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of assault in the first degree.¹ Pursuant to a plea agreement, on May 8, 2008, the trial court sentenced the petitioner to fifteen years of incarceration, execution suspended after seven years, and five years of probation.

On June 3, 2011, the petitioner filed an amended habeas petition alleging that his trial counsel had “failed to provide sufficient information to enable [him] to make an informed decision about whether to plead nolo contendere or proceed to trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 467, 72 A.3d 426. After a trial, the habeas court rendered judgment denying the petition. Id., at 470, 72 A.3d 426. In doing so, the habeas court addressed only whether the petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's alleged errors.² Id., at 469, 72 A.3d 426. In determining that the petitioner had not been prejudiced by entering a nolo plea, the court relied on the prejudice standard enunciated in Copas v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 234 Conn. at 151, 662 A.2d 718. Carraway v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 144 Conn.App. at 469, 72 A.3d 426. In Copas, this court relied upon Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985), a case in which the United States Supreme Court discussed a modified prejudice standard first enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), for demonstrating that ineffective assistance of counsel tainted a guilty plea. The court interpreted Hill to require a petitioner to demonstrate both a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial, and “that evidence that had been undiscovered or the defenses he claims should have been introduced were likely to have been successfulat trial.” Copas v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, at 151, 662 A.2d 718. Consistent with the standard stated in Copas, the habeas court found that the petitioner failed to satisfy the prejudice prong because the petitioner failed to demonstrate that he would have had a more favorable outcome if he had gone to trial. Carraway v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, at 469–70, 72 A.3d 426.

Thereafter, the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming only that the habeas court had improperly applied the Copas standard to the facts, and not that the habeas court had applied the wrong prejudice standard. Id., at 470, 662 A.2d 718. The respondent asserted that the petitioner's claim failed under the Copas standard. The respondent also noted, however, in his appellate brief and at oral argument, that in a case that was pending before this court,³ his position was that the Copas standard for prejudice is incorrect. Id. Due to this representation, the Appellate Court reasoned that it could not “avoid the question of whether the [habeas] court applied the correct prejudice standard.” Id., at 470–71, 662 A.2d 718.

The Appellate Court concluded that the Copas standard that the habeas court applied was inconsistent with federal law concerning the prejudice prong as applied in Hill v. Lockhart, supra, 474 U.S. at 52, 106 S.Ct. 366. Carraway v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 144 Conn.App. at 471 and n. 9, 72 A.3d 426. Specifically, the Appellate Court stated that “[t]he bottom line issue that must be resolved is whether, but for counsel's allegedly deficient performance, the petitioner would have insisted on a trial”; id., at 476, 72 A.3d 426 ; and not that the outcome was likely to have been more successful at trial. See id., at 469, 72 A.3d 426. The Appellate Court recognized that the habeas court had applied the Copas standard and that the Appellate Court was bound by this court's precedent; nevertheless, on the basis of the clear language of Hill v. Lockhart, supra, at 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, and interpretations of the Hill standard by various federal Courts of Appeals,⁴ the Appellate Court decided to follow the United States Supreme Court. Carraway v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, at 471 n. 9, 72 A.3d 426. On March 10, 2015, the Appellate Court sua sponte issued a replacement page adding two sentences and three citations to footnote 9 of its July 30, 2013 Carraway opinion.⁵ The Appellate Court's addition modified its reasoning to reflect that its decision, although inconsistent with Copas, was also consistent with this court's more recent decisions enunciating the proper standard under Hill, which required only that a petitioner demonstrate that he would have insisted on going to trial.⁶ Id., citing Washington v. Commissioner of Correction,

287 Conn. 792, 833, 950 A.2d 1220 (2008), Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction, 285 Conn. 585, 598, 940 A.2d 789 (2008), and Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 285 Conn. 556, 576, 941 A.2d 248 (2008). Because the Appellate Court concluded that the habeas court applied an incorrect legal standard in assessing the petitioner's claims, it reversed the judgment of the habeas court and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Carraway v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, at 477, 72 A.3d 426. This certified appeal followed.⁷

On appeal, the respondent claims that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the habeas court applied an incorrect legal standard, because the habeas court was required to follow Copas, but also asks that we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court and clarify Copas to make it consistent with federal law under Hill v. Lockhart, supra, 474 U.S. at 52, 106 S.Ct. 366. In the alternative, the respondent requests that we remand this issue to the Appellate Court to apply the Copas standard.

Because both parties are arguing that the Appellate Court's judgment should be affirmed,⁸ we must first consider if the respondent has been aggrieved by that judgment, thereby giving him standing to pursue an appeal.⁹ Aggrievement is essential to jurisdiction and thus must be resolved as a threshold matter. State v. Long, 268 Conn. 508, 531–32, 847 A.2d 862, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 969, 125 S.Ct. 424, 160 L.Ed.2d 340 (2004) ; Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 804, 813, 786 A.2d 1091 (2002). To determine whether the parties have been classically aggrieved, we apply a well established two-pronged test. First, the allegedly aggrieved party must have a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision. Seymour v. Seymour, 262 Conn. 107, 110, 809 A.2d 1114 (2002). Second, this specific personal and legal interest must have been specially and injuriously affected by the decision. Id.; see also State v. T.D., 286 Conn. 353, 358, 944 A.2d 288 (2008).

Even if we were to assume that the respondent does have a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, he cannot show that this interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the Appellate Court's decision. Although the respondent claims that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the habeas court applied an incorrect legal standard because of the respondent's position that the Appellate Court was bound by and should have applied the legal standard set forth in Copas, the respondent seeks to have the judgment of the Appellate Court affirmed. Essentially, the respondent agrees with the reasoning and outcome of the Appellate Court's decision, if not the route the Appellate Court took to reach that decision. Such a disagreement is not enough to show an injury to the respondent's interest. At oral argument before this court, neither party could provide a reason, other than the desire to clarify or modify Copas, for this court to provide relief or even what relief we could grant.¹⁰ As the respondent cannot show that his assumed interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the Appellate Court's decision, the respondent is not aggrieved. We therefore dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The appeal is dismissed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 General Statutes § 53a–59(a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument....”

2 To prevail on ineffective...