Carrazco v. Fisher
| Decision Date | 31 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | 1:10-cv-0001392-MJS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | ROLANDO FELIX CARRAZCO, Petitioner, v. FISHER, Warden, Respondent. |
OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DECLINING
TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE OF
Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The parties have consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (ECF Nos. 3, 9.)
On August 22, 2008, Petitioner pled no contest to California Penal Code § 273.5, corporal injury to a spouse or cohabitant, California Vehicle Code, § 20001, Subd. (a), leaving the scene of an accident with an injury, Penal Code Section 12022(b)(1), the use of a deadly weapon, an automobile, and Penal Code Section 12022.7(e), causing great bodily injury to thevictim. According to the police report, Petitioner ran over his girlfriend and mother of his child with his vehicle. Petitioner subsequently fled the scene. People v. Carrazco, No. F056728, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. WL 2105277 at *4-6 (Cal. App. 5th Dist., July 17, 2009).
At the plea hearing the defendant was asked, "Have you given your attorney all the information you have about the case and been advised of the possible defenses you might have?" Petitioner replied "Yes." The court asked if Petitioner had enough time to speak with his attorney to which Petitioner answered "Yes." When asked if he was satisfied with this attorney's advice, Petitioner stated that he was satisfied. (Lodged Doc. 1, pp. 83-84.)
On October 20, 2008, Petitioner wrote a letter to the court requesting new counsel. A Marsden1 hearing was held the next day. A partial transcript of the hearing reads as follows:
(Lodged Doc. 6, Ex. C.)
The court then found a breakdown in communication and appointed Petitioner with new counsel. (Id.)
On October 28, 2008, Petitioner, through his newly appointed counsel, made an oral motion to withdraw the plea. Counsel explained:
[A]fter my discussions with Mr. Carrazco, is that while he was asked the question whether or not he was threatened in his transcript at the time he was taking the plea, he's indicating to me that he, indeed, was and it seems that the nature of the threat, as I was able to understand it, is that the lawyers, there was two of them, sort of confronted him with the fact that if he lost this case he'd be doing life in prison, which I think is the premeditated attempted murder charged . . . He took that as a threat. This was his first time ever, apparently, of being in any kind of serious trouble. . . So he's not accustomed to those procedures. He's not accustomed to hearing things like life in prison. And it just sort of really clouded his judgment, confused him. And so when they prepped him by scaring him, believing life in prison, and then they contrasted that with eight years, in his confusion he just sort of agreed to do this and was sort of robotically answering these questions, probably without really appreciating what he was actually saying.
The court denied the motion. On November 19, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced to eight years in state prison.
Petitioner directly appealed his sentence to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The appeal was denied on July 17, 2009. (Lodged Doc. 6, Ex. F.)
Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Tulare County Superior Court which was denied on June 10, 2009. (Lodged Doc. 4.)
On October 9, 2009, Petitioner then filed a writ in the Fifth Appellate District which was denied on December 10, 2009. (Lodged Doc. 7.)
Petitioner filed a similar writ with the California Supreme Court which was denied on June 17, 2010. (Lodged Doc. 8.)
On August 4, 2010, Petitioner filed the instant writ of habeas corpus.
Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution orlaws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner's claims involve those guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and arise from the Tulare County Superior Court of California, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); 2254(a). Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over the action.
On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions.
Under AEDPA, an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a state court may be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 375 n. 7 (2000). Federal habeas corpus relief is available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings if the state court's adjudication of the claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law if it "applies a rule that contradicts governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases" or "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court case, yet reaches a different result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The "clearly established Federal law" requirement "does not demand more than a 'principle' or 'general standard.'" Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 839 (2009). For a state decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court's prior decisions must provide a governing legal principle (or principles) to the issue before the state court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003). A state court decision will involve an "unreasonable application of "federal law only if it is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 75-76 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002). In Harrington v. Richter, the Court further stresses that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 410) (emphasis in original). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Id. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 653, 664 (2004)). Further, "[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reading outcomes in case-by-case determinations." Id.; Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1864 (2010). "It is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009) (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786).
"Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the claim rest on the same grounds." See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This is referred to as the "look through" presumption. Id. at 804; Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2006). Determining whether a state court's decision resulted from an unreasonable legal or factual conclusion, "does not require that there be an opinion from the state court explaining the statecourt's reasoning." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. "Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner's...
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