Carrico v. City

• Decision Date: 06 September 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09–17151.,09–17151.
• Citation: 656 F.3d 1002,2011 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13612,11 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11472
• Parties: Tim CARRICO, Plaintiff,andSmall Property Owners of San Francisco Institute; Mary Figone, Plaintiffs–Appellants,v.CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

656 F.3d 1002

11 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 11,472

2011 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,612

Tim CARRICO, Plaintiff,andSmall Property Owners of San Francisco Institute; Mary Figone, Plaintiffs–Appellants,

v.CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 09–17151.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 15, 2011.Filed Sept. 6, 2011.

Andrew M. Zacks and Paul F. Utrecht (argued), Zacks & Utrecht, P.C., San Francisco, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants.Tara M. Steeley, Deputy City Attorney, San Francisco, CA, for the defendant-appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, William H. Alsup, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 3:09–CV–00605–WHA.Before: JOHN T. NOONAN and N. RANDY SMITH, Circuit Judges, and FREDERIC BLOCK, District Judge.^*

OPINION

BLOCK, District Judge:

The Small Property Owners of San Francisco Institute (“SPOSFI”) and Mary Figone appeal the district court's judgment rejecting their facial First Amendment and vagueness challenges to portions of “Proposition M,” a popularly enacted amendment to the rent-stabilization ordinance of the City and County of San Francisco (“the City”). Because we conclude that both SPOSFI and Figone lack standing, we cannot reach the merits of their challenges. Instead, we vacate the district court's judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

I

San Francisco voters approved Proposition M in November 2008. As pertinent here, the proposition amended the City's rent-stabilization ordinance to prohibit residential landlords and their agents from attempting, “in bad faith,” to “coerce the tenant to vacate with offers of payments to vacate which are accompanied with threats or intimidation.” S.F. Admin. Code § 37.10B(a)(6).¹

SPOSFI is a nonprofit association of approximately 1,500 residential landlords in San Francisco. In February 2009, it filed suit in the district court, seeking declaratory relief and a permanent injunction barring enforcement of parts of Proposition M. The association was joined by Tim Carrico, an individual landlord who is not a party to this appeal. Figone, another individual landlord, joined the suit in May of that year.

As set forth in their amended complaint, the plaintiffs raised three federal constitutional challenges. First, they alleged that § 37.10B(a)(6) violated the Free Speech and Petition Clauses of the First Amendment, made applicable to the City by the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, they alleged that § 37.10B(a)(6) failed to provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Third, they argued that deficiencies in the presentation of Proposition M on the ballot violated substantive due process. They also raised several state-law challenges. Rather than claiming that the proposition was invalid only as applied to them, the plaintiffs argued that it was invalid on its face.

The City moved to dismiss the substantive due process challenge pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court agreed and dismissed that claim with prejudice. That ruling has not been appealed.

At the same time, the district court issued an order to show cause why the remaining federal claims—that is, the First Amendment and vagueness challenges—should not be dismissed as “moot or insubstantial.” After hearing argument and considering the parties' written responses to the show-cause order, the district court issued a twelve-page order dismissing the remaining federal claims.

The district court concluded that § 37.10B(a)(6) implicated only commercial speech, but not just commercial speech that was misleading or connected to unlawful activity. Accordingly, it applied the test announced in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980), and concluded that the City had carried its burden of showing that it “has a substantial interest in regulating the proscribed behavior and that the ordinance materially advances that goal in a narrowly tailored fashion.”

Turning to the vagueness challenge, the district court held that bad faith “enjoys such common usage as to overcome any vagueness concerns,” and that the other challenged terms threats, intimidation and offers of payment—“have meanings that a person of ordinary intelligence would understand.” Finally, the court held that plaintiffs could not make out a facial challenge to Proposition M as an unconstitutional burden on their right to petition because § 37.10(a)(6) could be applied in many cases that did not implicate that right.

Having dismissed all of the federal claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, which is discretionary, over the state-law challenges. This appeal followed.

Although the City did not challenge appellants' standing either in the district court or before us, we raised the issue nostra sponte at oral argument. See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1119 (9th Cir.2009) (“Questions of standing may be raised and considered for the first time on appeal, including sua sponte.”). At our invitation, both sides filed supplemental briefs addressing (1) whether the amended complaint adequately alleged standing, and if not, (2) whether we should grant appellants leave to amend to cure any deficiency.

II

To establish “the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,” a plaintiff invoking federal jurisdiction must establish “injury in fact, causation, and a likelihood that a favorable decision will redress the plaintiff's alleged injury.” Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 785 (9th Cir.2010) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). An injury in fact is “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal citations and quotations omitted). An association like SPOSFI may maintain an action in the absence of an injury to itself, but only if it can show that “at least one of its members would have standing to sue in his own right.” Fleck & Assocs. v. City of Phoenix, 471 F.3d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir.2006).²

Plaintiffs in First Amendment cases may satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement without actually engaging in claimed protected speech. See Arizona Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Bayless, 320 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir.2003). Such “pre-enforcement plaintiffs” must, however, demonstrate “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and ... a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.” Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979). By contrast, “[w]hen plaintiffs ‘do not claim that they have ever been threatened with prosecution, that a prosecution is likely, or even that a prosecution is remotely possible,’ they do not allege a dispute susceptible to resolution by a federal court.” Id. at 298–99, 99 S.Ct. 2301 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971)).

The same rules apply to plaintiffs bringing facial challenges and invoking the speech of others under the overbreadth doctrine. See Dream Palace v. County of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir.2004) (“[T]he overbreadth doctrine does not affect the rigid constitutional requirement that plaintiffs must demonstrate an injury in fact to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996, 1010 (9th Cir.2001) (“Under the overbreadth doctrine, ... prudential considerations have weighed in favor of allowing litigants to bring First Amendment challenges on behalf of those whose expression might be impermissibly chilled, so long as the plaintiff also suffers an injury in fact.” (emphasis added)). They also apply to plaintiffs asserting vagueness challenges. Cf. Hunt v. City of Los Angeles, 638 F.3d 703, 711 (9th Cir.2011) (finding standing where allegedly vague ordinance was actually enforced against plaintiff).

In concluding that particular “pre-enforcement plaintiffs” have failed to establish standing, we have relied on “three related inquiries”:

First, we have considered whether pre-enforcement plaintiffs have failed to show a reasonable likelihood that the government will enforce the challenged law against them. Second, we have considered whether the plaintiffs have failed to establish, with some degree of concrete detail, that they intend to violate the challenged law. We have also considered a third factor, whether the challenged law is inapplicable to the plaintiffs, either by its terms or as interpreted by the government. Such inapplicability weighs against both the plaintiffs' claims that they intend to violate the law, and also their claims that the government intends to enforce the law against them.

Lopez, 630 F.3d at 786.

A plaintiff must establish standing with the “manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Since this case was dismissed at the pleading stage, we base our analysis on the allegations of the amended complaint, which we accept as true. See Barnum Timber Co. v. EPA, 633 F.3d 894, 905 n. 3 (9th Cir.2011).

III

Appellants alleged, without further elaboration, that “Proposition M was intended to, and does, impact their operations as landlords.” This conclusory allegation is insufficient to establish standing. See Lopez, 630 F.3d at 787 (“Mere ‘[a]llegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.' ”) (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972)...