Carrier v. Salt Lake County
| Decision Date | 23 November 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 20020946.,20020946. |
| Parties | David Carrier and Save Our Canyons and its members, Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. Salt Lake County, Salt Lake County Planning Commission and Salt Lake County Board of Adjustment, Defendants and Appellants. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
This opinion is subject to revision before final publication in the Pacific Reporter.
Jennifer L. Crane, Jeffrey W. Appel, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.
David E. Yocom, Thomas L. Christensen, Salt Lake City, for defendants.
¶1 This appeal concerns the proposed expansion of a gravel pit in Parley's Canyon. The Salt Lake County Planning Commission ("Planning Commission") and Salt Lake County Board of Adjustments ("Board") approved the expansion after determining that (1) gravel pit operations constitute "mineral extraction and processing" for purposes of the Forestry and Recreation Zone ("FR-20 Zone"), and (2) the applicant petitioned for and presented sufficient evidence justifying the waiver of certain Foothills and Canyon Overlay Zone ("FCOZ") development standards. The district court subsequently reversed this decision, granting summary judgment to a citizens' group challenging the Board's approval.
¶2 The primary issue on appeal is whether the Board's approval of the requested gravel pit expansion violated the requirements of the FR-20 Zone and FCOZ. Because we conclude that a gravel pit operation does not qualify as "mineral extraction and processing" and is therefore not a permitted conditional use within the FR-20 Zone, it is unnecessary for us to determine whether the FCOZ waiver requirements for mineral extraction were also satisfied. We affirm the district court.
¶3 When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 23, ¶ 2, 70 P.3d 904. We recite the facts of this case accordingly.
¶4 This appeal arises out of an application to expand an existing gravel pit located in Parley's Canyon from 11.5 to approximately 62.2 acres.1 The operation of the pit first began in 1886 and continued intermittently for almost a century until the pit was permanently shut down in 1985 and the site was reclaimed between 1988 and 1991. The gravel pit was later reopened in 1992, when the Planning Commission granted the then-owner of the pit a one-year temporary conditional use permit to extract rock aggregate from a five-acre area. The Planning Commission later made the conditional use permit permanent, at which time the Planning Commission also granted an enlargement of the pit. Apparently, no one objected to or appealed from either the 1992 permit approval or any of the amendments made thereto.
¶5 In October 2000, Harper Contracting Inc. ("Harper"), the current owner of the gravel pit, submitted the aforementioned application to expand its gravel pit operations to approximately 62.2 acres. Like the previous applications prior owners had made for alteration of the use permit, Harper characterized its application as an "amendment" to its existing conditional use permit. On February 13, 2001, the Planning Commission approved the application, provided that Harper complied with certain staff recommendations and a proposed operation and remediation plan. In response, plaintiffs David Carrier and Save Our Canyons (collectively "SOC") appealed the Planning Commission's decision to the Board, arguing that the decision to allow gravel pit operations in the expanded area was contrary to the FR-20 and FCOZ zoning requirements.
¶6 The approved area of expansion is located within both of these zones. The purpose of the FR-20 Zone is to "permit the development of the foothill and canyon areas of the county for forestry, recreation, and other specified uses to the extent such development is compatible with the protection of the natural and scenic resources of these areas." Salt Lake County, Utah, Code § 19.12.010 (2001). Although "mineral extraction and processing" is listed as a permitted conditional use2 within the FR-20 Zone, neither gravel pits nor quarries are expressly authorized. See id. § 19.12.030. Due to this omission, SOC argued before the Board that the requested extraction of limestone (which SOC asserted is not a mineral) from Harper's gravel pit is not a permitted conditional use. As such, SOC claimed that the Planning Commission exceeded its authority in classifying Harper's request to expand its gravel pit as an acceptable use under the category of "mineral extraction and processing."
¶7 SOC also contested the validity of the Planning Commission's approval with respect to FCOZ, the purpose of which is "to preserve the natural character of the foothills and canyons by establishing standards for foothill and canyon development proposed in the unincorporated areas of [Salt Lake C]ounty." Id. § 19.72.010. To achieve this purpose, FCOZ requires all developments located within its boundaries to comply with certain development standards. See id. § 19.72.030. FCOZ provides a waiver and modification exception for mineral extraction and processing uses, however, if an individual seeking to waive all or part of the standards (1) petitions for such a waiver or modification; and (2) presents sufficient evidence in compliance with ten enumerated criteria, as deemed applicable by the Planning Commission. See id. § 19.72.060. SOC argued that the Planning Commission violated FCOZ's development standards when it approved Harper's request to expand the gravel pit because no waivers with respect to development on ridge lines or steep slopes were either requested by Harper or granted by the Planning Commission.
¶8 In response to SOC's arguments, Planning Commission staff submitted a statement on the Planning Commission's behalf explaining why approval of Harper's application was correct. As to the FR-20 Zone challenge, staff conceded that SOC was correct "with respect to the establishment of a new [gravel pit] in the FR zone," agreeing that "a newly-established quarry or gravel pit would not be permitted in the FR zone." However, staff noted that the particular land use at issue had been classified as a "mine" by the Utah Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining ("DOGM") when the conditional use permit was first requested in 1992. Because (1) the property had a "century-plus history of mining operations," (2) the conditional use permit was approved in reliance on the DOGM mining classification in 1992, and (3) the application and its subsequent amendments were all reviewed and approved for compliance with all ordinance requirements applicable at each relevant time, staff asserted that the Planning Commission made no error in either the interpretation or the administration of the FR-20 Zone requirements.
¶9 Regarding any potential FCOZ violation, staff argued that the Planning Commission and Harper had fully complied with all waiver procedures. Staff also argued that the Planning Commission was "apprized [sic] of [the ten FCOZ waiver] criteria and the exact nature of the proposal . . . and, it is presumed, acted in recognition of them at the time of their approval of [Harper's] conditional use permit amendment."
¶10 After hearing these arguments, the Board voted to uphold the Planning Commission's approval of Harper's application to expand its gravel pit operations, largely because "the original approval for [the pit] was granted in 1992 and was never appealed." However, in response to concerns that "the Planning Commission just glossed over many issues when they considered th[e] expansion," the Board remanded the application to the Planning Commission with suggestions for it to (1) "amend definitions . . . to [determine] what a gravel pit is as compared to what a mine is," (2) analyze whether FCOZ development waivers were required, and (3) "pay more attention [to] or specifically analyze conditions that would mitigate th[e] expanded conditional use."
¶11 On remand from the Board, the Planning Commission once again approved Harper's application. In so doing, the Planning Commission did not define the terms "gravel pit" and "mine," and determined that waiver of relevant FCOZ development standards was allowed based on evidence supporting only three of the ten enumerated criteria. Following this determination, SOC again appealed to the Board. Unlike the first appeal, the Board voted on this second appeal to uphold the Planning Commission's decision in its entirety. In response, SOC filed a complaint in district court against the Planning Commission, the Board, and Salt Lake County (collectively "the County"), petitioning for judicial review of the Board's decision.
¶12 In its complaint, SOC alleged that the Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and illegally in upholding the Planning Commission's decision. SOC asked the court to, among other things, (1) declare as a matter of law that the proposed expansion of the Harper's gravel pit is not allowed as a conditional use in the FR-20 Zone, and (2) declare the Planning Commission's approval of the application null and void for failure to follow necessary FCOZ requirements.
¶13 Following discovery, both parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The district court denied the County's motion and granted SOC's motion. In its ruling, the court began its analysis with the proposition that "[s]ince the Planning Commission is a creature of statute, any powers or duties it has are, of necessity, limited to those found in statute or county ordinance." From this premise, the district court reasoned that the County lacked the authority to amend an existing conditional use permit without going through the full permit process. According to the district court, the Planning Commission's powers "are specifically spelled out in statute and ordinance" and the "[m]ere absence of a prohibition" against approving amendm...
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