Carrigan v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission

• Citation: 19 Ill.2d 230,166 N.E.2d 574
• Decision Date: 31 March 1960
• Docket Number: No. 35153,35153
• Parties: William E. CARRIGAN, d/b/a Carrigan's Tavern, Appellee, v. ILLINOIS LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION et al., Appellants.
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Page 574

166 N.E.2d 574

19 Ill.2d 230

William E. CARRIGAN, d/b/a Carrigan's Tavern, Appellee, v. ILLINOIS LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION et al., Appellants.

No. 35153.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 31, 1960.

Rehearing Denied May 16, 1960.

Latham Castle and Grenville Beardsley, Attys. Gen., (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., and William P. Sheehan, City Atty., Springfield, of counsel), for appellants.

John W. Curren and Pree & Pree, Springfiled, for appellee.

DAVIS, Justice.

Petition for leave to appeal was granted in this cause to review a judgment of the Appellate Court which affirmed an order of the circuit court of Sangamon County holding that certain provisions of section 8a of article VII of the Illinois Liquor Control Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 43, par. 154), are mandatory rather than directory in nature. Appellee is William E. Carrigan, d/b/a Carrigan's Tavern. Appellants are the Illinois Liquor Control Commission and the mayor of the city of Springfield, acting as local liquor commissioner, whose administrative order to revoke Carrigan's retail liquor license was reversed by the courts.

Section, 8a, insofar as pertinent, provides that: 'Within twenty (20) days after the service of any rule, regulation, order or decision of said commission upon any party to the proceeding, such party may apply for a rehearing in respect to any matters determined by said commission. Said commission shall receive and consider such application for rehearing within twenty (20) days from the filing thereof with the secretary of the commission. In case such application for rehearing is granted the commission shall proceed as promptly as possible to consider the matters presented by such application. No action for the judicial review of any decision of said commission shall be allowed unless the party commencing such action has first filed an application for a rehearing and the commission has acted upon said application. Only one rehearing shall be granted by the commission on application of any one party.'

The record shows that Carrigan's license as a tavern operator was revoked by the local liquor commissioner on April 27, 1957. On April 30, 1957, he filed his appeal with the Illinois Liquor Commission which, after a hearing entered an order on June 11, 1957, sustaining the local commissioner and dismissing the appeal. A copy of this order was received by Carrigan on June 18, 1957. On July 5, 1957, he filed an application for rehearing which was denied on August 2, 1957.

He then filed a complaint in the circuit court under the provisions of the Administrative Review Act, wherein he contended that the order of the administrative agencies was contrary to the evidence; and that the Illinois Liquor Control Commission was without jurisdiction to enter the order denying the petition for rehearing. The court found that the facts sustained the findings of the administrative agencies that there had been a violation, but reversed the order of the commission and held that by its failure to pass upon the application for rehearing within 20 days, the commission lost jurisdiction of the controversy, which rendered all of its prior proceedings a nullity. The Appellate Court affirmed the order of the circuit court on the issue presented. Carrigan v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm., 19 Ill.App.2d 225, 153 N.E.2d 473.

The question presented is whether the language that the commission 'shall receive and consider such application for a rehearing within twenty (20) days from the filing thereof' was intended by the legislature to be mandatory or merely directory and whether the failure of the commission to pass upon the application within the prescribed time had the effect attributed to it by the trial and Appellate courts.

The problem is one of statutory construction. In determining the intent of the legislature consideration must be given to the entire statute, its nature, objects and the consequences which would result from construing it one way or another. Zbinden v. Bond County Community Unit School Dist., 2 Ill.2d 232, 117 N.E.2d 765; 34 I.L.P. Statutes, § 136, pp. 130-133; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, sec. 23, p. 46, secs. 25 and 26, pp. 48 and 49. Ordinarily a statute which specifies the time for the performance of an official duty will be considered directory only where the rights of the parties cannot be injuriously affected by failure to act within the time indicated. However, where such statute contains negative words, denying the exercise of the power after the time named, or where a disregard of its provisions would injuriously affect public interests or private rights, it is not directory but mandatory. People v. Jennigs, 3 Ill.2d 125, 119 N.E.2d 781; Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. Maltbie, 272 App.Div. 162, 71 N.Y.S.2d 326.

We have applied these principles in numerous cases. See, for example, People v. Gibbs, 413 Ill. 154, 163, 108 N.E.2d 446 (time for convening of grand jury); People ex rel. Little v. Collins, 386 Ill. 83, 99 and 100, 53 N.E.2d 853 (publication of assessments by Department of Revenue); People v. Donaldson, 255 Ill. 19, 26 and 27, 99 N.E. 62 (time for selection of grand jury; Whalin v. City of Macomb, 76 Ill. 49, 51 and 52 (publication of city ordinances within one year after incorporation and every five years thereafter).

The general rule announced in People v. Jennings, 3 Ill.2d 125, 127, 119 N.E.2d 781, 782, is applicable here: 'There are, undoubtedly, many statutory requisitions intended for the guide of officers in the conduct of business devolved upon them, which do not limit their power or render its exercise in disregard of the requisitions ineffectual. Such, generally, are regulations designed to secure order, system and dispatch in proceedings, and by a disregard of which the rights of the parties interested cannot be injuriously affected. Provisions of this character are not usually regarded as mandatory unless accompanied by negative words importing that the acts required...