Carrigan v. Purkhiser, No. 82-1266.

• Docket Nº: No. 82-1266.
• Citation: 466 A.2d 1243
• Case Date: September 29, 1983
• Court: Court of Appeals of Columbia District

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466 A.2d 1243 Delia CARRIGAN, Appellant,
v.
Donald A. PURKHISER, Appellee. No. 82-1266. District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Submitted August 24, 1983. Decided September 29, 1983.

Douglas R. Stevens, Washington, D.C., was on brief, for appellant.

Carolyn Goodman, Washington, D.C., was on brief, for appellee.

Before NEBEKER, MACK and TERRY, Associate Judges.

TERRY, Associate Judge:

This case demonstrates that man's best friend is not necessarily the best friend of man's neighbor. Appellant filed suit in the Small Claims Branch of the Superior Court alleging that her next-door neighbor's dogs constituted a nuisance because of their incessant barking and unpleasant smell. Appellant prayed for $750 in damages and any equitable relief which the court might deem proper. After considering appellant's evidence, which apparently consisted solely of her own testimony, the court granted judgment for appellee. We conclude, after reviewing the record, that the court misapplied the law; accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial.

I

"A private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979); accord, W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 89, at 591 (4th ed. 1971); B & W Management, Inc. v. Tasea Investment Co., 451 A.2d 879, 882 (D.C.1982). Unlike a trespass, which is "an invasion of the interest in the exclusive possession of land," a private nuisance is "an interference with the interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and does not require interference with the possession." RESTATEMENT, supra, § 821D, comment d; accord, W. PROSSER, supra at 595. Thus "not only the interests that a person may have in the actual present use of land for residential . . . and

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other purposes" are protected, but also "the pleasure, comfort and enjoyment that a person normally derives from the occupancy of land." RESTATEMENT, supra, § 821D, comment b.

The trial court's ruling in this case is deficient in two respects. First, it appears that the court confused the law applicable to the tort of trespass to land with that applicable to a claim of private nuisance. Second, the court's statement of proceedings and evidence¹ reflects a basic misunderstanding as to the degree of interference with the use and enjoyment of land which will support a nuisance action.

The court observed that there was "no suggestion that the defendant's dogs [were] permitted to run loose in the neighborhood or to go onto or enter the plaintiff's premises" and that the barking "occur[red] most frequently from inside the defendant's house . . . at times when the dogs [were] properly restrained." The fact that appellee's dogs were restrained on his premises and did not enter appellant's land would be significant if appellant's claim were for trespass. However, since appellant's claim was for a private nuisance, the trial court should have considered the extent to which the smell and noise of appellee's dogs interfered with appellant's reasonable use and enjoyment of her own land, not with her right to the exclusive possession of it.² Thus, to the extent that the court applied legal concepts relevant to the tort of trespass in rejecting appellant's claim for private nuisance, the court erred.

The court also noted with some emphasis that appellee's dogs were mere "household pets or watchdogs" and that there was no evidence that appellee "maintain[ed] dogs for...