Carrigan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 November 1997
• Citation: 949 P.2d 705,326 Or. 97
• Parties: Thomas CARRIGAN, Jr., Petitioner on Review, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation, Respondent on Review. CC 9409-06390; CA A87451, SC S43296.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 705

949 P.2d 705

326 Or. 97

Thomas CARRIGAN, Jr., Petitioner on Review, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation, Respondent on Review.

CC 9409-06390; CA A87451, SC S43296.

Supreme Court of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted Jan. 8, 1997.

Decided Nov. 28, 1997.

Charles A. Ringo, of Dahn & Ringo, Beaverton, argued the cause and filed the petition on behalf of petitioner on review.

Thomas W. Brown, of Cosgrave, Vergeer & Kester, L.L.P., Portland, argued the cause on behalf of respondent on review. With him on the brief was Wendy M. Margolis, Portland.

KULONGOSKI, Justice.

This declaratory judgment case presents two issues: (1) whether Oregon's automobile personal injury protection (PIP) statutes, which provide coverage for injuries "resulting from the use, occupancy or maintenance of any motor vehicle," ORS 742.520(2)(a), quoted infra, 326 Or. at 100, 949 P.2d at 706, may extend to an injury inflicted by gunshot; and (2) if PIP coverage may be available, whether it applies to the circumstances of this case, in which plaintiff (the insured) was shot by an assailant during the course of a "carjacking," ¹ when neither the assailant nor the plaintiff was inside the car at the time of the shooting.

For the reasons that follow, we hold that ORS 742.520 does not exclude from PIP coverage all injuries inflicted by gunshot and that the injury in this case is covered under ORS 742.520, because it resulted from the "use" of a motor vehicle. Therefore, we reverse the contrary decision of the Court of Appeals.

The historical facts are not in dispute. At approximately 3 a.m. on July 22, 1994, plaintiff left his place of employment and walked toward his car. Plaintiff was approached by a stranger named Henderson, who sought a ride in the direction that the insured was headed. Plaintiff agreed to give Henderson a ride.

En route, Henderson brandished a gun, aimed it at plaintiff, and told him where to proceed. When they arrived at a residential neighborhood, Henderson ordered plaintiff to pull over, turn off the engine, and get out of the car. Plaintiff complied. Henderson also got out of the car and ordered plaintiff to get into the trunk. Plaintiff attempted to do so, but was unable to fit. Henderson then ordered plaintiff to back away from the car and lie face down on the ground. Plaintiff backed away from the car; however, fearing that he would be shot, he refused to lie down and continued backing away. After plaintiff had backed away from the car approximately 30 feet, Henderson shot him in the chest. Henderson then drove away. Plaintiff survived, but he incurred substantial medical expenses for treatment of his gunshot wound.

Plaintiff filed a claim for PIP benefits under his automobile insurance policy with defendant. Defendant denied the claim. Plaintiff then brought this action, seeking a declaration that defendant was obligated to pay the claim pursuant to the minimum PIP coverage provided by statute. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant.

Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's award of summary judgment. Carrigan v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 140 Or.App. 359, 914 P.2d 1088 (1996). The Court of Appeals concluded that the injury did not result from the use of a motor vehicle but, rather, resulted from an intervening cause--the intentionally inflicted gunshot. 140 Or.App. at 366, 914 P.2d 1088.

At the outset, we note that the specific terms of defendant's policy are not at issue in this case. ² Plaintiff concedes that his complaint is not based on the terms of the policy, except to the extent that the policy agrees to "pay in accordance with the Personal Injury Protection Act." Therefore, we do not consider whether defendant's policy provided any greater coverage than that afforded by the statutory minimum protection of PIP. We consider only the scope of coverage under PIP.

The part of the PIP coverage at issue in this case is ORS 742.520(2), which provides in part:

"Personal injury protection benefits apply to a person's injury or death resulting:

"(a) * * * from the use, occupancy or maintenance of any motor vehicle[.]"

Plaintiff has not argued to this court that the injury resulted from the occupancy or maintenance of a motor vehicle. ³ Rather, plaintiff argues that the injury resulted from the use of a motor vehicle. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the injury resulted from a carjacking that commenced while he was using his car and that the eventual shooting, which occurred during the carjacking but after plaintiff had gotten out of the car, resulted from the use of the car. Defendant argues that the statute covers only injuries that result from a motor vehicle accident and that plaintiff's gunshot injuries did not result from a motor vehicle accident. In the alternative, defendant argues that the statute covers injuries normally associated with the use of a motor vehicle and that the discharge of a gun is not conduct normally associated with the use of a motor vehicle.

A. What is the General Scope of PIP Coverage?

In construing a statute, this court's task is to discern the intent of the legislature. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). To discern legislative intent, this court first looks to the text and context of the statute. Id. at 610-11, 859 P.2d 1143. If the intent of the legislature is clear from text and context, we proceed no further. Id. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143. If the text and context do not make the legislature's intent clear, we then inquire into legislative history. Id. at 611-12, 859 P.2d 1143. Finally, if the legislative history, coupled with text and context, still provides no clear answer, we then turn to legal maxims. Id. at 612, 859 P.2d 1143.

ORS 742.520(2) incorporates three elements that must be met before PIP coverage attaches. First, there must be an "injury or death." Second, the injury must "result[ ] * * * from the use" of a vehicle. Third, the vehicle must be a "motor vehicle." The parties agree that there was an injury in this case and that a motor vehicle was involved. The only dispute centers on whether the injury resulted from the use of the motor vehicle.

The terms "resulting" and "use" are not defined in the PIP statutes. They are, however, terms of common usage and, as such, typically are given their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning. PGE, 317 Or. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143. The ordinary meaning of "resulting" is "to proceed, spring, or arise as a consequence, effect, or conclusion." Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1937 (3d ed 1993). ⁴ The word "use" means "the act or practice of using something." Id. at 2523. In view of the definitions quoted above, the question becomes whether plaintiff's gunshot injury proceeds, springs, or arises as a consequence of plaintiff's use of his motor vehicle.

At least two plausible interpretations flow from those definitions. The first would require that the gunshot injury be the direct consequence of the use of the vehicle. Applying that interpretation, plaintiff's gunshot injury did not result from the use of a motor vehicle, because use of the motor vehicle was not the most direct cause of the injury. ⁵ We can imagine very few cases, if any, in which that interpretation would permit recovery for a gunshot injury.

A second, equally plausible, interpretation would permit coverage if the gunshot injury is the consequence or effect of any use of the vehicle. Under that interpretation, a gunshot injury results from the use of the vehicle if the injury is a consequence or effect to which any use of the vehicle leads. The injury in this case was inflicted by a gunshot that arose in the course of a carjacking. That injury may be viewed as a consequence or effect of the use of plaintiff's car as the object of a carjacking.

Both interpretations offered by the parties arguably require the insertion of terms that are not found in the text of ORS 742.520(2). The former interpretation construes the wording to limit coverage only to injuries that are inflicted directly by the use of a motor vehicle and during the operation of the vehicle. In contrast, the latter interpretation construes the wording of the statute to cover injuries that result indirectly from the use of a motor vehicle, as well as those that result directly from such use. The text alone provides no clear indication of which interpretation the legislature intended.

Defendant opposes the latter construction of the term "resulting," because it would permit coverage for gunshot injuries that occur only as an indirect consequence or effect of the actual operation of the vehicle. Based on the terms used by the legislature, we are not persuaded that defendant's narrower construction unambiguously is the only plausible one. The legislature used the term "resulting" by itself and did not modify that term with the adjective "direct" or any similar limiting term. If the legislature desires to restrict the scope of coverage that the statute contemplates, it does not lack the linguistic tools necessary to achieve that outcome.

Defendant also argues that context supports its narrow interpretation. Context includes former versions of the same statute. Owens v. Maass, 323 Or. 430, 435, 918 P.2d 808 (1996). ORS 742.520 originally was codified as ORS 743.800. Or Laws 1971, ch 523, § 2. ⁶ That statute provided coverage to insured persons "injured in a motor vehicle accident." (Emphasis added.) Defendant argues that the original PIP coverage was limited to injuries caused by, and during, a motor vehicle accident. Consequently, defendant argues that the present wording of the statute similarly should be interpreted to cover only injuries caused by, and during, a motor vehicle accident.

Assuming that defendant is correct, and that the 1971 provision limited PIP coverage to injuries caused by, and...