Carrigan v. State of Del.

• Decision Date: 18 February 1997
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 96-8-JJF.
• Citation: 957 F.Supp. 1376
• Parties: Dorothy CARRIGAN, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, by and through its agents, servants and employees, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

957 F.Supp. 1376

Dorothy CARRIGAN, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, by and through its agents, servants and employees, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 96-8-JJF.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

February 18, 1997.

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Martin C. Meltzer, Russ Carmichael, of Martin C. Meltzer, Wilmington, for Plaintiff.

Christopher J. Curtin, of Erisman & Curtin, Wilmington, Gregg E. Wilson, C. Drue Chichi, Deputy Attorneys General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FARNAN, Chief Judge.

Presently before the Court in this civil rights action are three motions: (1) Motion To Dismiss Of Defendants Taylor, Martin Baylor And Sines (collectively "the Administrative Defendants") (D.I. 14); (2) the Administrative Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff (D.I. 67) and (3) Defendant Peter Davis' Motion For Summary Judgment (D.I. 63). At this stage of the proceedings, the Court will deny the Administrative Defendants' Motion To Dismiss (D.I. 14) as moot and proceed to the merits of the summary judgment motions.¹

BACKGROUND

On January 10, 1996, Plaintiff Dorothy Carrigan filed a ten count Complaint alleging claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against the State of Delaware; the Delaware Department of Correction; Robert Watson, in his official and individual capacity; and several administrative officials of the Delaware Department of Correction in their official and individual capacities; and a former correctional officer, Peter Davis, in his official capacity and individual capacity.² On May 10, 1996, Plaintiff dismissed the State of Delaware, the Delaware Department of Correction and all defendants in their official capacities.

Essentially, Plaintiff's Complaint arises out of the alleged rape of Plaintiff by Correctional Officer Peter Davis, who at present, is no longer employed by the Department of Correction. Of the ten counts alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint, six counts are based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and are directed at the Administrative Defendants. The remaining four counts of the Complaint are based on state law or are directed at the other Defendants.

In summary, Count I alleges that the Administrative Defendants violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by acting in concert with Defendant Davis to commit the alleged rape, or by being deliberately indifferent to the alleged rape. Count II is directed solely at Defendant Davis and alleges that Defendant Davis violated Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, privileges and immunities and right to privacy, by compelling Plaintiff to expose her private areas and by having unconsented sexual intercourse with her. Count III alleges that the Administrative Defendants and Defendant Davis failed to provide Plaintiff with secure conditions under 10 Del.Code § 4001. Count IV alleges that the policies and customs of the Administrative Defendants contributed to and/or caused the alleged rape. Count V alleges that the Administrative Defendants violated Plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by transferring Plaintiff to protective custody following her allegation of rape. Count VI alleges that Defendants Baylor and Sines violated Plaintiff's Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights while interviewing Plaintiff regarding the alleged rape. Count VII alleges that deficiencies in policy, training, supervision, and prison conditions, which are in the control of the Administrative Defendants, caused the alleged rape. Count VIII alleges that the Administrative Defendants and Defendant Davis violated Plaintiff's rights under 10 Del.Code § 4001. Count IX alleges that the Administrative Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical care following the alleged rape. Finally, Count X alleges a claim solely against the State of Delaware under § 1983; however, this claim has been voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiff.

With this background in mind, the Court will turn to the underlying factual allegations which form the basis of Plaintiff's claims.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On March 6, 1995, while incarcerated at the Women's Correctional Institute ("WCI"), Plaintiff claims that she was raped by Defendant Davis. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Davis entered her room while she was taking an afternoon nap, woke her up, and told her to be quiet by placing his finger over her mouth. Then, Defendant Davis allegedly pulled Plaintiff to the end of the bed, and with a condom, engaged in intercourse with Plaintiff without her consent. After the incident, Defendant Davis allegedly tossed the condom on the bed, told Plaintiff to dispose of it and returned to his duties. Rather than disposing of the condom, Plaintiff stored the condom in a cigarette wrapper and placed it in a trash can located in Plaintiff's room.

Later the same day, Plaintiff reported the incident to another inmate, Eloise Slater. Slater assisted Plaintiff in bringing the matter to the attention of the prison administration. On March 9, 1996, Plaintiff was questioned by officers from the Internal Affairs Unit of the Correction Department, and an investigation into Plaintiff's charges followed. During the course of the investigation, Defendants Bailor and Sines conducted interviews of the parties and witnesses. Plaintiff contends that during an interview with her Defendant Bailor threatened her with additional jail time and with prosecution under the law prohibiting sex in prison. Sometime after her interviews, Defendants transferred Plaintiff to Unit 8, a maximum security unit. According to Plaintiff, this transfer was in direct retaliation for her complaints and statements against Defendant Davis.

Shortly after Plaintiff's allegations, the Administrative Defendants contacted the Delaware State Police and a criminal investigation of Defendant Davis was commenced. Defendant Davis admitted to having oral sex with Plaintiff, but claimed that Plaintiff seduced him and the act was consensual. Following his arrest on charges of engaging in sex in a detention facility, Defendant Davis resigned. Currently, the criminal charges against Defendant Davis are pending.

As a result of the alleged rape and ensuing events, Plaintiff claims that she became increasingly agitated. During the time following the alleged rape, Plaintiff was treated by a psychologist, Dudley W. Atkins, from Correctional Medical Services, and by a physician, Dr. Antonio Sacre.

On April 6, 1995, Plaintiff allegedly attempted suicide by jumping off of the second tier of Unit 8. Plaintiff was taken to Riverside Hospital where she was treated for a broken ankle. Upon her return to WCI, Plaintiff was then transferred to Gander Hill prison for suicide watch. Following an emergency motion by Plaintiff's attorney, a state court judge ordered Plaintiff to be transferred to the Delaware State Hospital. Later, Plaintiff was returned to WCI and placed in Unit 8.

In December 1995, Plaintiff was released from WCI. On January 10, 1996, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit based on the above described incidents. In September 1996, Plaintiff was returned to WCI on new charges. At the present time, Plaintiff is incarcerated in the maximum security unit of WCI.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that a party is entitled to summary judgment where "the pleadings depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the Court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the materials, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party is not required to negate the nonmovant's claim, but is only required to point out the lack of evidence supporting the nonmovant's claim. Country Floors, Inc. v. Partnership Composed of Gepner & Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1061 (3d Cir.1991). Once the moving party meets his or her burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to go beyond the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings and designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id.; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. In determining whether there is a triable dispute of material fact, the Court must construe all inferences from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir.1976) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S.Ct. 732, 50 L.Ed.2d 748 (1977). However, the mere existence of some evidence in support of the nonmovant will not be sufficient to support a denial of a motion for summary judgment; there must be enough evidence to enable a jury to reasonably find for the nonmovant on that issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Thus, if the evidence is "merely colorable, or is not significantly probative," summary judgment may be granted. Id.

DISCUSSION

In addressing the instant summary judgment motions, the Court will first discuss the Administrative Defendants' motion.

I. Administrative Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment

In their motion, the Administrative Defendants raise four arguments: (1) that Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the Administrative Defendants violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, (2) that Plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish a violation of her Fifth Amendment right, (3) that the Administrative Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and (4)...