Carrington v. Massachusetts

• Decision Date: 29 September 2020
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-11552-RGS
• Parties: Phillip CARRINGTON, Petitioner v. Commonwealth of MASSACHUSETTS, Respondent
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

490 F.Supp.3d 410

Phillip CARRINGTON, Petitioner

v.Commonwealth of MASSACHUSETTS, Respondent

CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-11552-RGS

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Filed September 29, 2020

ORDER ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

STEARNS, D.J.

I agree with Magistrate Judge Cabell's thorough and comprehensive Report, specifically: (1) that Ground one of the Petition, alleging a failure of the prosecution to present certain exculpatory evidence to the state grand jury is at best an error of state law that this court has no jurisdiction to correct; (2) that Ground two, even if deemed exhausted, is, as Magistrate Judge Cabell notes, foreclosed by Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) ; (3) that Ground three, alleging an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in admitting "prior bad acts" evidence was neither exhausted in the state court proceedings nor a cognizable issue on federal habeas review; and (4) that Ground four, the failure of the trial court to give a so-called Bowden instruction was neither exhausted nor cognizable on habeas review. Consequently, the Recommendation is ADOPTED, and the petition is DISMISSED with prejudice.¹ Any request for the issuance of a Certificate of Appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 is DENIED, the court seeing no meritorious or substantial basis supporting an appeal. The Clerk is instructed to enter the dismissal and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS HABEAS PETITION

CABELL, U.S.M.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Phillip Carrington is presently serving a term of incarceration at the Old Colony Correctional Center in Bridgewater, MA following his conviction on charges of second-degree murder. He challenges his conviction on several grounds and petitions pro se for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts as respondent moves to dismiss the petition and the matter has been referred to this court for a report and recommendation. For the reasons that follow, I recommend that the motion to dismiss be allowed.

II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

In 2016 Carrington was convicted in Suffolk Superior Court for the second-degree murder of Celestine Walker, and for violating an abuse prevention order. Carrington appealed his conviction on four grounds. On June 29, 2018, the Massachusetts Appeals Court (MAC) affirmed his conviction after rejecting all four arguments. Commonwealth v. Carrington , 93 Mass. App. Ct. 1117, 104 N.E.3d 686, rev. denied, 480 Mass. 1107, 111 N.E.3d 282 (2018).

First, Carrington argued that the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on the ground that the Commonwealth failed to present exculpatory information to the grand jury regarding a key witness’ prior inconsistent statements to the police. The MAC found that, although the prosecutor did not present certain evidence to the grand jury, it did not constitute withholding exculpatory evidence because the witness’ grand jury testimony was in fact consistent in material respects with the witness’ prior statements.

Carrington argued next that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress allegedly coerced inculpatory statements he made while being assaulted. The MAC found, however, that even if Carrington's mental state was affected by his being physically confronted and assaulted by the victim's children, it did not render his statements involuntary.

Carrington argued next that the court abused its discretion when it admitted prior bad acts of his that pertained to incidents of strangulation because their potential for undue prejudice outweighed their probative value. The MAC rejected this argument after noting that the court had limited the scope of the evidence, and the evidence was properly admitted in any event to show the hostile nature of Carrington's relationship with the victim, and his pattern of acting on that hostility.

Finally, Carrington argued that the court erred when it declined to give a Bowden¹ instruction because the absence of the instruction gave the jury the impression that inadequacies in the police investigation were no longer open issues for their consideration. The MAC found that there was no factual basis for this claim where Carrington was able to bring out any alleged inadequacies in his opening statement, in his closing argument, and through his examination of multiple witnesses. The MAC found that the judge accordingly did not err in not giving a Bowden instruction, because it was simply not required.

The Supreme Judicial Court denied further appellate review on September 13, 2018. Commonwealth v. Carrington , 93 Mass. App. Ct. 1117, 104 N.E.3d 686, rev. denied, 480 Mass. 1107, 111 N.E.3d 282 (2018).

On July 16, 2019, Carrington initiated the present action, raising the same four arguments he raised before the MAC and SJC. (D. 1). On December 16, 2019, the Commonwealth (following granted extensions of time) moved to dismiss on the ground that Carrington had failed to exhaust at least three of the claims. (D. 9, 11, 15).

On January 28, 2020, this court notified Carrington that he had failed to respond to the motion to dismiss. The court sua sponte set a deadline of February 14, 2020 and indicated it would treat the motion to dismiss as unopposed if no response were received by that date.

Carrington did not acknowledge the court's issuance or file a response by the extended deadline. Approximately four months later, on June 5, 2020, the court issued an order to Carrington to show cause why his petition should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (D. 22).

On June 18, 2020, the petitioner responded via a letter to the Clerk of Courts. He (for the first time) asked to have counsel appointed, and added, "I been locked in due to the coron [sic ] virus no one where I'm at could go to the Law burry [sic ] for anything. Could you please somehow give me a stay until I can get someone to help me." (D. 24).

Construing the letter as a motion for the appointment of counsel, this court issued an order denying the motion for counsel on the ground that Carrington had not shown "exceptional circumstances" required for the appointment of counsel in a habeas case. See DesRosiers v. Moran , 949 F.2d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 1991). (D. 25). But, in light of Carrington's claim of a lack of access to the law library, the court granted him an additional 30 days to file a response to the Commonwealth's motion. (D. 24).

By way of letter dated July 13, 2020, Carrington responded that he could not understand the court's most recent issuance because of a "mental illness" upon which he did not further elaborate. Carrington asserted that he was indigent and again asked for the appointment of counsel. He once again claimed to be unable to "get to the law library" because "we are still on lock down." (D. 27).

In light of the repeated complaint that he was being denied access to the library the court asked the Department of Correction (DOC) to explain what restrictions if any had been imposed on inmates’ access to the facility's law library as a result of the Coronavirus pandemic. (D. 28).

The DOC responded through a signed affidavit from Old Colony's Superintendent, Stephen Kennedy. (D. 30-1). In relevant part, Supt. Kennedy stated that inmates had not been allowed to be physically present in the law library for roughly only one week, between April 3 and 10, 2020, but were allowed to make requests for the delivery of legal materials to their cells, which were fulfilled within 24 hours. (Id. ¶8). Supt. Kennedy explained that inmates were allowed to physically be present in the library after April 10th in small groups during certain time slots throughout the day. He explained that they also always retained the ability to request materials to be brought to their cells. (Id. ¶9). He stated that Carrington never submitted any written requests for legal materials or filed any grievances related to access to legal materials. (Id. ¶ 12). The petitioner has not challenged or rebutted these assertions.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), a federal court may grant habeas relief on claims previously adjudicated on the merits only after the petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) ; see O'Sullivan v. Boerckel , 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999) (explaining that § 2254(b)(1)(A) requires that state prisoners give state courts a fair opportunity to review their claims and correct alleged constitutional violations before review by a federal court). A claim for habeas relief is not exhausted unless it has been "fairly and recognizably" presented in state court. Sanchez v. Roden , 753 F.3d 279, 294 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Casella v. Clemons , 207 F.3d 18, 20 (1st Cir. 2000) ). In other words, "a petitioner must have tendered his federal claim [in state court] in such a way as to make it probable that a reasonable jurist would have been alerted to the existence of the federal question." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Further, AEDPA permits habeas relief only if the previous adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Thus, to obtain habeas relief, "a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 103, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). The federal court is limited to deciding whether the...