Carris v. John R. Thomas and Associates, P.C.

• Decision Date: 04 April 1995
• Docket Number: No. 82952,82952
• Citation: Carris v. John R. Thomas and Associates, P.C., 896 P.2d 522, 1995 OK 33 (Okla. 1995)
• Parties: Karen CARRIS d/b/a Sunbelt Construction, Appellant, v. JOHN R. THOMAS AND ASSOCIATES, P.C., a/k/a Thomas, Davis Architects and Partners, P.C., an Oklahoma corporation, and J. Brad Thomas, an individual, Appellees.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 522

896 P.2d 522

1995 OK 33

Karen CARRIS d/b/a Sunbelt Construction, Appellant, v.JOHN R. THOMAS AND ASSOCIATES, P.C., a/k/a Thomas, Davis Architects and Partners, P.C., an Oklahoma corporation, and J. Brad Thomas, an individual, Appellees.

No. 82952.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

April 4, 1995.

Rehearing Denied June 15, 1995.

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals, Division No. 2;Leamon Freeman, Trial Judge.

The Oklahoma Municipal Power Authority (the power authority) hired the appellee, the architectural firm of John R. Thomas and Associates, P.C. (the firm) to design plans for a construction project.Through a separate agreement, the power authority also hired Karen Carris(the contractor) to perform construction work on the project.A dispute over the contractor/power authority contract arose and the contractor requested arbitration.After the arbitration proceeding, in which the firm did not participate, the contractor sued the firm and Brad Thomas(Thomas), an employee of the firm, for damages alleging that the plans for the project were negligently prepared, and that Thomas fraudulently represented himself to be a licensed architect.The firm and Thomas moved for summary judgment, arguing that the contractor had a single cause of action against all parties involved, and that she was precluded from bringing her present lawsuit because the arbitration award satisfied and settled her claim for damages.The trial judge, Honorable Leamon Freeman, granted summary judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed.We find that under the facts presented, the cause is not precluded by the doctrines of claim or issue preclusion.

CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT REVERSED.

G. Babette Patton, Shelia D. Tims, R. Brown Wallace, Oklahoma City, for appellant.

Hugh Baysinger, Steven Daniels, Oklahoma City, for appellees.

KAUGER, Vice Chief Justice:

The only question addressed ¹ is whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment when it found that the contractor, who arbitrated and recovered partial damages from the power authority, was precluded from bringing negligence and fraud claims against third-persons who were not parties to the arbitration proceedings.We find that under the facts presented, the cause is not precluded by the doctrines of claim or issue preclusion.

FACTS

Oklahoma Municipal Power Authority (the power authority) hired the architectural firm of John R. Thomas and Associates, P.C. (the firm) to design plans for a construction project.On May 14, 1992, through a separate agreement, the power authority hired Karen Carris(the contractor) to perform construction work on the project.The contractor's contract required that the construction work be done according to the designs and specifications which were prepared by the firm.

After the contractor began working on the project, a dispute arose over the construction of a wheel chair ramp.At this juncture, the firm and the contractor differ on the facts.The contractor's version is that Brad Thomas(Thomas), an employee of the firm who is not a licensed architect, designed the plans for the project and represented himself to be an architect.She insists that she discussed the problem with the plans for the ramp with Thomas, and that he instructed her to continue the construction of the ramp.The firm and Thomas contend that Thomas neither represented himself to be an architect nor designed the plans.Rather, that the plans were designed by John R. Thomas who was an architect.It is undisputed that the contractor built the ramp, and that it did not comply with the plans and specifications prepared by the firm.As a result, the power authority insisted that the contractor reconstruct the ramp at her expense.She did not.Subsequently, the power authority hired someone else to reconstruct the ramp, and it refused to pay the contractor for any of her work on the project.

The contractor, invoking an arbitration clause in her contract with the power authority, requested arbitration.She alleged that the power authority breached the contract and she sought to recover the entire amount of the contract.The power authority counterclaimed for damages which arose as a result of the construction delays.In the arbitration proceeding, the contractor maintained that she could not have built the ramp according to the plans which were prepared by the firm and Thomas.On March 31, 1993, the arbitrator awarded the contractor a portion of the money due her under the contract.The arbitrator also awarded the power authority partial damages on its counterclaim.Although the firm and Thomas participated as witnesses in the arbitration proceeding, they were neither parties to the contractor/power authority contract nor to the arbitration proceedings.

On July 27, 1993, the contractor filed a lawsuit against the firm and Thomas, alleging that the plans for the project were negligently prepared, and that Thomas fraudulently represented himself to be a licensed architect.The firm and Thomas denied the allegations and moved for summary judgment.The trial court granted summary judgment to the firm and Thomas on December 29, 1993.It found that: 1) the contractor could not split her previously arbitrated breach of contract claim against the power authority from her negligence and fraud claims against the firm and Thomas; 2) the arbitrator determined what damages the contractor was entitled to receive; and 3) the arbitration award which had been paid and satisfied determined all of the issues in the negligence and fraud suits.The contractor appealed.On June 28, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the contractor was estopped from litigating damages against the firm and Thomas because she had a full opportunity to litigate the issue of damages in the arbitration proceeding.We granted certiorari on October 3, 1994.

UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED, THE CAUSE IS NOT PRECLUDED BY THE

DOCTRINES OF CLAIM OR ISSUE PRECLUSION.

The contractor argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because: 1) she had multiple claims against two different defendants; 2) she could not resolve her tort claims against the firm and Thomas through arbitration because they were not parties to the contract and they did not agree to arbitration; and 3) neither claim nor issue preclusion should apply to the present case.The firm and Thomas counter that: 1) only one controversy exists which would allow the contractor to recover damages; and 2) the contractor's previous attempt to recover damages through arbitration precludes her lawsuit against them because the arbitration award satisfied her damages and released all of her claims against others.

Thomas and the firm cite Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, 756 P.2d 1232, 1234(Okla.1988);Powell v. Powell, 370 P.2d 909, 913(Okla.1962);City of Wetumka v. Cromwell-Franklin Oil Co., 171 Okla. 565, 43 P.2d 434, 436(1935);andCain v. Quannah Light & Ice Co., 131 Okla. 25, 267 P. 641, 644(1928), for the propositions that satisfaction of a judgment rendered in a prior action bars subsequent suits for damages, and that satisfaction of the arbitration award released the contractor's claims against them.However, we find these cases distinguishable on their facts from the instant case and not controlling here.

Cain, City of Wetumka, Powell, and Brigance all involved plaintiffs who were attempting to recover damages which resulted from injuries caused by joint tort-feasors.In these cases, we recognized that because an injury caused by a joint tort gives rise to one cause of action, a plaintiff who brings a suit sounding in tort to recover damages which results in a final judgment is barred from bringing a second action against another tort-feasor who was jointly and severally liable for the same damages.In the instant case, the contractor alleged injury by two separate defendants asserting that each is independently liable to her because she was not paid for the completed construction project.The contractor's claims against the power authority for refusing to pay her pursuant to the construction contract are contractual.²The contractor's claim of fraud against the firm and Thomas for depriving her from full compensation for the completed construction project sound in tort.³Although the contractor's injuries may have arisen from the same set of facts, the power authority and the firm and Thomas were not joint tort-feasors.⁴

The determinative issue is whether either claim or issue preclusion prevent the contractor from bringing her lawsuit against the firm and Thomas.The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, operates to bar the relitigation of issues by the parties or their privies which were or could have been litigated in an action which resulted in a final judgment on the merits.⁵The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is activated when an ultimate issue has been determined by a valid and final judgment--that question cannot be relitigated by parties, or their privies, to the prior adjudication in any future lawsuit.⁶

a.

claim preclusion

An arbitration award has the same force and effect as a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction for claim preclusion purposes.⁷However, the elements of claim preclusion/res judicata must be met in order for the doctrine to bar a lawsuit brought subsequent to arbitration.The elements are: 1) an identity of subject matter, of the parties or their privies, of the capacity of the parties and of the cause of action; ⁸ 2) the court which heard the original action must have been one of competent jurisdiction; ⁹ and 3) the judgment rendered must have been a judgment on the merits of the case and not upon purely technical grounds.¹⁰Here, the elements of claim preclusion are not met.In Erwin v. Frazier, 786 P.2d 61, 64(Okla.1989), we recently held that where the causes of action differ and the...