Carroll v. Diaz
| Decision Date | 27 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:12-cv-2736 TLN GGH P,2:12-cv-2736 TLN GGH P |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | JAMES E. CARROLL, Petitioner, v. DIAZ Warden, Respondent. |
Petitioner, James Carroll was first charged with the crimes at issue on September 9, 2009. Just before trial started, the charges were superseded in an information dated February 3, 2010. On February 11, 2010, petitioner was convicted of first degree residential burglary (Cal. Penal Code § 459), assault with a deadly weapon (Cal. Penal Code § 245 (a)(1)), and personal use of a knife in the commission of a burglary (Cal. Penal Code § 12022(b)). Petitioner was also found to have incurred two prior "strikes" as well as prior serious felony convictions (Cal. Penal Code §§1170.12, 667(a)). Petitioner received an indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life for the residential burglary (three strikes sentence), a one year enhancement for use of a knife, and anadditional five years for each of the prior serious, felony convictions—total of 36 years to life imprisonment.1
On appeal, petitioner only attacked aspects of his sentence: his 1978 federal conviction for bank robbery should not have counted as a strike; failure to "strike a strike" so that he would not be eligible for three strikes was error. The petition for review in the California Supreme Court on these issues was denied on July 27, 2011.
Petitioner then turned to the Superior Court on January 19, 2012 with a petition for habeas corpus with a broadened attack on his conviction.2 He claimed ineffective assistance of counsel in several respects, primarily an alleged failure of his counsel to investigate exonerating witnesses, and attorney conflict of interest. He also attacked his sentence on ex post facto and double jeopardy grounds. This petition was denied in a reasoned decision on procedural and substantive grounds.
The Superior Court decided on February 6, 2012 that "[f]irst and foremost, petitioner failed to raise these issues in his appeal" citing to In re Drew, 188 Cal. 717 (1922). The Superior Court then went on to decide the issues on their merits.3 With respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel issues and the alleged conflict of interest, the Superior Court found that petitioner's presentation was entirely conclusory, i.e., no evidentiary submittal was made with respect to the exonerating witnesses, and evidence regarding the conflict of interest was lacking. With respect to the sentencing issues, the court found that no law required that petitioner be advised of the future use of [past] convictions when those convictions were incurred. Moreover, the use of prior convictions to enhance a present sentence was not a violation of double jeopardy or ex post facto protections in the Constitution.
The follow-up petitions to the appellate court and state supreme court were denied without comment. Therefore, the higher courts are presumed to have adopted the last explained decision, in this case, of the Superior Court. Plascencia v. Alameda, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2006).
On November 1, 2012, the federal petition was filed in the Eastern District of California. An answer and traverse were filed as well as an opposed request for an evidentiary hearing. For the reasons set forth below, the request for evidentiary hearing is denied, and the petition should be denied in its entirety.
Because only sentencing issues were raised before the appellate court on direct review, the statement of facts was much truncated.
Defendant began beating on the door of an acquaintance' s apartment one afternoon and yelling he was going to kill the man. When the acquaintance refused to open the door, defendant broke the apartment's front window, jumped through it, and started trying to stab the man while the victim put up his hands and tried to defend himself. Officers followed a blood trail and ultimately located defendant running away from law enforcement officers.
People v. Carroll, 2011 WL 1907504 *1 (Cal. App. 2011).
However, because of the addition of trial issues to this habeas proceeding, especially petitioner's protestations that his attorney did not uncover the facts which would have exculpated him, the undersigned will delve further into the record. These facts were one-sided in unequivocally implicating petitioner in the burglary and stabbing crime.
Susan Cross was an acquaintance of the petitioner; he came to her house on the date of the crime.
(RT 106.)
Trudy Tripp lived downstairs from the victim. She testified to what happened on the morning of the attack. She called 911.
A. Uhmm, well, I live—on the bottom, and the staircase goes up—upstairs, and when someone is going up the stairs, it just—it sounds like they're beating alongside the house. And somebody was running up the stairs and, uhmm, hollering, uhmm, I'm going to F-ing kill you; I'm going to—open this door; open this door; I'm going to kill you, and that's all I heard. I heard banging, I heard glass breaking.
(RT 176.)
Afterwards she saw petitioner leave the house in a bloodied state.
Genaro Maravilla was the victim of this crime. He had a criminal history himself, and was on parole abscond status at the time of the crime. He was initially a reluctant witness. He testified at first to being stabbed in the hand, but he did not know who did it. Ultimately, thecourt permitted the prosecutor to ask leading questions as the witness was being evasive.
(RT 199.)
He continued to testify that the glass in the window was broken, and the knife came in and stuck him in the hand. He did not call the police because he was in abscond status from parole. However, under prodding by the district attorney, he did relate that he told the detective on the scene that petitioner was the person who stabbed him. (RT 205.) He also told the detective that petitioner was beating on the door.
(RT 209.)
Petitioner did not testify, and the defense case was very short—simply attempted impeachment of the prosecution witnesses.
The undersigned will respond to the issues in the petition in the order presented by Respondent's answer. Those issues are:
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (failure to investigate and present exonerating witnesses) (Claim 1)
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (conflict of interest public defender's office had represented the victim and one of the witnesses in other proceedings; trial counsel subsequently received a job in the district attorney's office (Claim 4)
Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Claims (Claims 2 and 3) The undersigned will also discuss the evidentiary hearing issues in connection with Claims 1 and 4.
The statutory limitations of federal courts' power to issue habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The text of § 2254(d) states:
As a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court has recently held and reconfirmed "that § 2254(d) does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been 'adjudicated on the merits.'" Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011).
Rather, "when a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Id. at 784-785, citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265, 109 S. Ct. 1038 (1989) (). "The presumption may be overcome when there is reason to think some other explanation for the state court's decision is more likely." Id. at 785.
The Supreme Court has set forth the operative standard for federal habeas review of state court decisions under AEDPA as follows: "For...
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