Carroll v. Hammett

• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: SEE, Justice.
• Citation: Carroll v. Hammett, 744 So. 2d 906 (Ala. 1999)
• Decision Date: 01 October 1999
• Parties: Dusty Vernon Voyless CARROLL, Jr., a minor, by and through his mother and next friend, Sheila Darlene SLAUGHT v. David HAMMETT, individually and as assistant principal of Pleasant Valley High School, and Calhoun County Board of Education.

744 So.2d 906

Dusty Vernon Voyless CARROLL, Jr., a minor, by and through his mother and next friend, Sheila Darlene SLAUGHT v. David HAMMETT, individually and as assistant principal of Pleasant Valley High School, and Calhoun County Board of Education.

1971563.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

October 1, 1999.

Jake B. Mathews, Jr., of Merrill, Merrill, Mathews & Allen, Anniston, for appellant.

Mark S. Boardman and Clay R. Carr of Boardman & Tyra, P.C., Birmingham; and Robin W. Andrews, Calhoun County Bd. of Educ., Anniston, for appellees.

SEE, Justice.

Dusty Vernon Voyless Carroll, Jr., a minor, acting by and through his mother and next friend, Sheila Darlene Slaught,¹ filed a complaint against David Hammett and the Calhoun County Board of Education (the "Board"), alleging tort claims of negligent or wanton supervision and a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hammett was sued individually and as assistant principal of Pleasant Valley High School. Carroll sought compensatory and punitive damages based on injuries he suffered, while a student at Pleasant Valley High School, as the result of being assaulted and severely battered by another student, Matt Stone. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Hammett and the Board. Carroll appeals the summary judgment, but he challenges it only as it relates to the tort claims against Hammett.² The sole issue presented on appeal is whether Hammett is entitled to discretionary-function immunity as to the actions on which Carroll's tort claims against him are based. Because we hold that Hammett is entitled to discretionary-function immunity, we affirm the summary judgment in favor of Hammett on the tort claims.

I.

Our standard for reviewing a summary judgment is well established. "In reviewing the disposition of a motion for summary judgment, we utilize the same standard as that of the trial court in determining whether the evidence before [it] made out a genuine issue of material fact" and whether the movant was "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 862 (Ala.1988); Rule 56(c) Ala. R. Civ. P. When the movant makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present substantial evidence creating such an issue. See Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794, 797-98 (Ala.1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12. Evidence is "substantial" if it is of "such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). In determining whether the nonmovant presented substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact, this Court must review the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. See Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So.2d 412, 413 (Ala.1990).

II.

The evidence in the record, viewed in a light most favorable to Carroll, indicates the following facts. At the time of the incident, Carroll was 15 years old and was a 9th-grade student at Pleasant Valley High School. Carroll testified by deposition that on January 16, 1996, during lunch, another student, Dustin McCreless, told Carroll that Matt Stone has said he wanted to fight Carroll. Carroll replied by stating that he did not want to fight Stone. Approximately a week earlier, Stone had given Carroll a note in which Stone stated that he was going to "whip [Carroll's] ass" because, he said, Carroll had called Stone's girlfriend "a bitch." Carroll denies he made such a statement.

During his fifth-period class, which came after lunch, Carroll was told by another student, Justin Veasey, who was Stone's friend, that Carroll "need[ed][his] butt whipped." Stone overheard Veasey's statement and said to Veasey, "Don't worry, I'm going to get him next period." Following this threat, Carroll asked the teacher for permission to go to the principal's office. Carroll went directly to Assistant Principal Hammett's office. Carroll told Hammett that Stone had threatened to beat him up and that he was "scared." Hammett called Matt Stone to his office. Stone admitted to Hammett that he had threatened Carroll. Hammett next called Veasey to his office. Veasey denied making the statement to Carroll. Hammett warned Stone and Veasey that he would not tolerate any fighting in school and that they would be punished if they did fight at school. Hammett also told the boys that he would telephone the sheriff's department if they carried out the threat. Stone asked Hammett what the punishment for fighting would be, and Hammett informed him that the punishment would be suspension for two days. After Hammett explained to the boys the punishment for fighting, Stone assured Hammett that he would not fight Carroll. Hammett then sent Stone and Veasey back to class. After sending Stone and Veasey back to class, Hammett called McCreless to his office. McCreless confirmed that during lunch Stone had made the statements that McCreless had earlier told Carroll about, and, for fear that Stone would attack him as well, asked Hammett not to disclose that he had reported those statements. Hammett then sent McCreless back to class. Carroll remained with Hammett. Hammett told Carroll not to worry and to tell him if anything else happened. Hammett testified by deposition that Carroll appeared comfortable with the resolution of the situation. Hammett then sent Carroll back to class. Because Hammett had been involved in a parent conference when Carroll came to him, he did not inform any teachers about the situation.

At the end of Carroll's sixth-period class, as he was walking to a patio break area in the school, Stone ambushed him from behind a door. Stone punched Carroll in the face, knocking him to the ground, and he repeatedly kicked Carroll about the face and head. Carroll suffered severe injuries as a result of Stone's assault and battery, including a broken nose, a cracked jaw, and a shattered nasal passage. After the attack, Stone was taken to Hammett's office. Hammett notified the sheriffs department, and Stone was suspended from school pending a Board hearing.

In January 1997, Carroll, acting through his mother, filed this action against Hammett and the Board, alleging negligence and wantonness and making a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hammett and the Board moved jointly for a summary judgment on all claims. The court, in entering the summary judgment on all claims, ruled:

"Well established case law mandates the entry of summary judgment for the defendants. Immunity, arising from the Alabama Constitution, discretionary function immunity, and federal qualified immunity prevent the claims advanced in the Complaint from being successfully prosecuted against the defendants.

"Mr. Hammett was faced with a situation between two students which appeared, according to the plaintiff and Mr. Hammett, to have been successfully defused. Nevertheless, the other student virtually ambushed the minor plaintiff, severely injuring the plaintiff. The special concurring opinion in B.M. v. Crosby, [581 So.2d 842 (Ala.1991),] appears applicable here:

"`Presiding Judge Charles R. Crowder, in his order entering the summary judgment for the defendant teacher, Ms. Dorothy Crosby, wrote:

"`"Shorn of their historic authority, often intimidated by unruly and violent elements, including their students, teachers in this state and country, in the opinion of this Court, are under siege. To hold them under the specter of lawsuits, as the result of unforeseen acts of violence or unforeseen accidents to students while under their care, would only unduly add to the evergrowing woes of many of the already harassed teachers of this country."'"

"B.M. v. Crosby, 581 So.2d 842, [843] (Ala.1991) (Houston, J., concurring specially)."

(Citations in first paragraph omitted.)

III.

Carroll contends that the trial court erred in entering the summary judgment in favor of Hammett on the tort claims. Specifically, Carroll argues that Hammett is not entitled to discretionary-function immunity because, he argues, under Ala. Code 1975, § 16-1-24.1(b), Hammett was required to notify law-enforcement officials and to suspend Stone when he learned that Stone had threatened Carroll, and, thus, Carroll contends, Hammett was engaged in the performance of a ministerial function. Carroll also argues that Hammett is not entitled to discretionary-function immunity because he acted in bad faith and beyond his authority.³ We disagree with both arguments.

County boards of education are deemed to be local agencies of the State for purposes of applying the State's sovereign immunity under Art. I, § 14, of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901. See L.S.B. v. Howard, 659 So.2d 43, 44 (Ala. 1995) (citing Hutt v. Etowah County Bd. of Educ., 454 So.2d 973, 974 (Ala.1984)). Thus, a person who acts as an agent of a county board of education shares in the State's sovereign immunity if the act complained of was committed while that person was performing a discretionary act. See id. (citing Nance v. Matthews, 622 So.2d 297 (Ala.1993)). Discretionary-function immunity protects an employee of a county board of education employee from liability not only for negligent conduct but also for wanton conduct; however, it does not protect school officials sued in their individual capacities based on acts committed in bad faith, or school officials sued in their official capacities based on acts committed beyond their authority. See Nance, 622 So.2d at 302; Hill v. Allen, 495 So.2d 32, 34 (Ala.1986). "Whether a particular defendant is engaged in a discretionary function, and is thereby immune from liability, is a question of law to be decided by the trial court." Louviere v. Mobile County Bd. of Educ., 670 So.2d 873, 877 (Ala.1995).

This Court has previously explained the...