Carroll v. Industrial Com'n of Colo.
Decision Date | 06 December 1920 |
Docket Number | 9731. |
Citation | 195 P. 1097,69 Colo. 473 |
Parties | CARROLL et al. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF COLORADO et al. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
On Motion for Rehearing, March 7, 1921.
Error to District Court, City and County of Denver; Francis E Bouck, Judge.
Action by Bessie Carroll and others against the Industrial Commission of Colorado and others to set aside an order of the Commission denying compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act for the death of Joseph Carroll. The order of the Commission was affirmed by the district court, and plaintiffs bring error.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
On Motion for Rehearing.
Chas H. Sherrick, of Denver, for plaintiffs in error.
Victor E. Keyes, Atty. Gen., John S. Fine, Asst. Atty. Gen. (H. E Curran, of Denver, of counsel), for defendant in error Industrial Commission.
Dena Blount & Silverstein, of Denver, for other defendants in error.
The plaintiffs in error, as widow and minor children of Joseph Carroll, filed a claim for compensation with the Industrial Commission under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Laws 1919, c. 210. Joseph Carroll died while an employé and working as such. The plaintiffs in error filed their claim as his dependents. After a hearing, the Commission found, as a conclusion based upon the facts, that the death of Joseph Carroll 'was not the proximate result of an accident sustained' by him.
The claimants filed an action in the District Court to set aside the order denying compensation. That court affirmed the order of the Commission, and claimants now bring the cause to this court for review.
One of the questions presented by the record is whether the Commission's finding, which in the instant case is one of law, can be sustained.
The following facts are not disputed: Joseph Carroll was employed in an alfalfa meal mill. On November 1, 1917, he was found dead, his body lying in the hay shed of the mill, where he had been pitching alfalfa hay. His work was hard physical labor. His place of employment was in an inclosed building. The air therein was dust-laden as the result of handling hay, alfalfa meal, and machinery. The decedent had organic heart trouble. The evidence shows that the strenuous work of pitching alfalfa hay in an inclosed building, combined with breathing dust-laden air, brought on an attack of heart trouble, causing instant death, and that, if Joseph Carrol had been doing his work in the open air, the work would not have brought on a heart attack.
The proximate cause of the death of Joseph Carroll was the condition of the air in his place of employment, or the fact that it was dust-laden. The question to be determined now takes this form: Under the foregoing facts, must it be held, as a matter of law, that the death was 'accidentally sustained' or resulted from an 'injury proximately caused by accident'?
The dust-laden condition of the air was the 'proximate cause' of the death because had it not been for such condition the death would not have occurred at the time. Such condition of the air which decedent was required to breathe brought on an attack of heart trouble, resulting in death. The dust-laden condition of the air was the cause, and the fatal attack of heart failure was the result. The result was unexpected and unintended, and therefore an 'accident.' The term 'accident' is often used 'to denote any unintended and unexpected loss or hurt apart from its cause.' 1 C.J. 395.
Our statute uses the expressions 'personal injury or death accidentally sustained' and 'injury proximately caused by accident' in providing for what injuries or deaths compensation shall be allowed. By the term 'injury' is meant, not only an injury the means or cause of which is an accident, but also an injury which is itself an accident. The expressions above quoted are the equivalent of 'injury by accident,' which is frequently used in the decisions. The word 'by' may mean 'through the means, act, or instrumentality of.' 9 C.J. 1109. Therefore 'injury by accident' and 'injury caused by accident' are terms or expressions which can be used interchangeably. In a discussion of the former it is said in 25 Harvard Law Review, 340:
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