Carroll v. State

• Decision Date: 14 July 2022
• Docket Number: 2:18-cv-01832-SVW-JC
• Parties: TREMAINE CARROLL, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

TREMAINE CARROLL, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:18-cv-01832-SVW-JC

United States District Court, C.D. California

July 14, 2022

ORDER (1) DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND (2) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; AND (3) DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO RESPOND TO ORDER

HONORABLE STEPHEN V. WILSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

On or about February 27, 2018, Tremaine Carroll (“plaintiff”), who is in custody, is proceeding pro se, and has been granted leave to proceed without prepayment of filing fees (“IFP”), submitted a document entitled “Petition for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, Temporary Restraining Order, Civil Action U.S. 1983, Appointment of Counsel,” which is liberally construed as a Civil Rights Complaint (“Complaint” or “Comp.”) filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq.^[1] (Docket No. 1). The Complaint sues the following unnamed defendants in their individual and official capacities: (1) the State of California (Doe 1); (2) the Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) (Doe 2); (3) the Secretary of the CDCR (Doe 3); (4) the Chief Medical Officer of the CDCR (Doe 4); (5) the “Contract/Signer of Contract” for the CDCR (Doe 5); (6) the Warden of the California State Prison - Los Angeles County (“CSP-LAC”) (Doe 6); (7) the “CMO” (Doe 7); (8) the “CDCR Mental Health CMO” (Doe 8); (9) the Mental Health Supervisor (Doe 9); and (10) the CSP-LAC Nursing Supervisor (Doe 10). (Comp. at 3). Although far from clear, the Complaint appears to claim that defendants violated plaintiff's rights under the ADA and the United States Constitution by retaliating against him for submitting complaints and by failing to accommodate plaintiff's disabilities, to protect him from harm, and to provide adequate medical care, among other violations.^[2](See Comp. at 1-3). Within the Complaint, plaintiff also requests a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction to have plaintiff removed from CDCR custody and placed in a “federal medical facility” because there is “nowhere safe for him to go in CDCR” due to his “medical/mental health impairments and CDCR's constant retaliation for [plaintiff] reporting being the victim of employee sexual misconduct.” (See Comp. at 1-2).

For the reasons explained below, the Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend, and plaintiff's request for a TRO and preliminary injunction is denied without prejudice.

II. THE COMPLAINT

A. Allegations

The Complaint, liberally construed, alleges the following:

Plaintiff suffers from mental and physical disabilities, including mobility and hearing impairments, for which he is designated by CDCR at the “EOP” (Enhanced Outpatient) level of care. (Comp. at 1). The CDCR assertedly does not heed the requirements of the ADA or federal and state laws regarding such disabilities. (Comp. at 2).

At CSP-LAC, where plaintiff was previously housed, the California Inspector General deemed the facilities non-compliant with ADA accessibility guidelines due to the lack of ramps, railings, and other accommodations in the showers, cells, restrooms, paths of travel, and all other areas accessed by inmates and staff who rely on mobility assistance devices. (Comp. at 2). When plaintiff arrived at CSP-LAC, he submitted several administrative complaints and reasonable accommodation requests noting that his placement at the prison violates his ADA rights, but he received no response. (Comp. at 2).

Plaintiff was severely injured while falling in his wheelchair, and he continues to suffer due to a lack of adequate medical treatment following the incident. (Comp. at 2). However, plaintiff's health care requests and grievances have been ignored, denied, lost, rejected, or cancelled, in an effort by CDCR to deprive plaintiff of due process and prevent him from exhausting his administrative remedies regarding issues that place him in “clear imminent danger” of physical injury or death. (Comp. at 2-3).

Plaintiff has also been subject to “CDCR's constant retaliation for [plaintiff] reporting being the victim of employee sexual misconduct.” (Comp. at 2).

Plaintiff seeks damages for defendants' “failure to protect” him from “physical/mental injury,” and for “participating/supervising [and] authorizing cover-ups, code-of-silence, etc.” (Comp. at 3).

B. Pertinent Law

1. The Screening Requirement

As plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding IFP on a civil rights complaint against governmental defendants, the Court must screen the Complaint, and is required to dismiss the case at any time it concludes the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); Byrd v. Phoenix Police Dep't, 885 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted).

When screening a complaint to determine whether it states any claim that is viable, the Court applies the same standard as it would when evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Rule 12(b)(6), in turn, is read in conjunction with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Zixiang Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2013). Under Rule 8, each complaint filed in federal court must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, at a minimum a complaint must allege enough specific facts to provide both “fair notice” of the particular claim being asserted and “the grounds upon which [that claim] rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 & n.3 (2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (Rule 8 pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

To avoid dismissal on screening, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Byrd, 885 F.3d at 642 (citations omitted); see also Johnson v. City of Shelby, Mississippi, 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam) (Twombly and Iqbal instruct that plaintiff “must plead facts sufficient to show that [plaintiff's] claim has substantive plausibility”). A claim is “plausible” when the facts alleged in the complaint would support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff is entitled to relief from a specific defendant for specific misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted); see also Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1242 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[A] [Section 1983] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676); Gauvin v. Trombatore, 682 F.Supp. 1067, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (complaint “must allege the basis of [plaintiff's] claim against each defendant” to satisfy Rule 8 requirements) (emphasis added). Allegations that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, or reflect only “the mere possibility of misconduct” do not “show[] that the pleader is entitled to relief” (as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)), and thus are insufficient to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

At this preliminary stage, “well-pleaded factual allegations” in a complaint are assumed true, while “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action” and “legal conclusions] couched as a factual allegation” are not. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted); Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763 (9th Cir. 2014) (“mere legal conclusions ‘are not entitled to the assumption of truth'”) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1077 (2015). In addition, the Court is “not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint,” Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted), and “need not [] accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit,” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.), amended on denial of reh'g, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

In general, civil rights complaints are interpreted liberally in order to give pro se plaintiffs “the benefit of any doubt.” Byrd, 885 F.3d at 642 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, a pro se plaintiff must still follow the rules of procedure that govern all litigants in federal court, including the Rule 8 requirement that a complaint minimally state a short and plain statement of a claim that is plausible on its face. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“Although we construe pleadings liberally in their favor, pro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 838 (1995); see also Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“[A] liberal interpretation of a . . . civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of [a] claim that were not initially pled.”) (quoting Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992)) (quotation marks omitted; ellipses in original).

If a pro se complaint is dismissed because it does not state a viable claim, the...