Carroll v. State
| Decision Date | 23 June 1885 |
| Citation | 3 A. 29,63 Md. 551 |
| Parties | CARROLL v. STATE. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
The appellant, who was a licensed dealer in spirituous liquors was indicted for unlawfully selling liquor to one William Miller, a minor, under the age of 21 years. At the trial two exceptions were taken, which are intended to present the same question, and the only question, in fact, which is involved. The sale was made by appellant's bar-tender, out of the presence of the appellant, and without his knowledge of this particular sale. This was proved by the purchaser, who also proved he was a minor. In addition to these facts, the appellant offered to prove by the bar-tender that the appellant had given him instructions not to sell to minors and these instructions were understood by the bar-tender to be bona fide, and that he would not intentionally have violated them. He also offered to testify himself that he had given these instructions to his bar-keeper in good faith, and intended them to be obeyed, and that he had no idea of their violation in this or any other case. Both offers, on objection of the state, were refused, and the traverser excepted. A principal is prima facie liable for the acts of his agent done in the general course of business authorized by him, and a vendor of spirituous liquors is indictable for the unlawful sale by his agent employed in his business, because all concerned are principals, This is conceded by appellant's counsel, and it is also conceded that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the authority to do the thing complained of may be inferred from the relations of the parties. If there be no authority express or implied, of course the party indicted ought to be acquitted. The question here is whether, when the agency for the transaction of the business of selling liquors generally is established and admitted, and in the conduct of that business a prohibited sale is made by the agent to a minor the principal may shield himself from liability on the ground that his agent violated his general instructions, and did not inquire or was deceived by the purchaser as to his age. The question is whether, while deriving the profit from the sale, the principal can delegate his duty to know that a purchaser is a lawful one, to the determination of an agent, and be excused by the agent's negligence or error.
The law, for the violation of which this appellant has been indicted, is a police regulation of a very stringent character. It is in these words: "If any person shall sell any spirituous or fermented liquors, or lager beer, to any person who is a minor, under twenty-one years of age, he shall, on conviction, pay a fine of not less than fifty dollars, nor more than two hundred dollars, together with the costs of prosecution, and, upon failure to pay the same, shall be committed to jail, and confined therein until such fine and costs are paid, or for the period of forty days, whichever shall first occur; and it shall be the duty of the court before whom said person shall be convicted to suppress his license." For the violation of a statute of this nature, it is not necessary to allege the scienter in the indictment, because it is not made an ingredient by the statute that the thing shall be knowingly and willfully done, to make the violation of the statute an offense. As ignorance of the existence of such law will not excuse, so, also, ignorance of a fact necessary to be known to avoid a violation of the law will not excuse. 3 Greenl. Ev. §§ 20, 21. Where an act, if done knowingly, would be malum in se, an ignorance which excludes the idea of intentional wrong, it would seem, will excuse; but Mr.
Greenleaf says, in section 21 of volume 3 of his work on Evidence "Where a statute commands that an act be done or omitted, which, in the absence of such statute, might have been done or omitted without culpability, ignorance of the fact or state of things contemplated by the statute, it seems, will not excuse its violation." He adds: "Such is the case in regard to fiscal and police regulations for the violation of which, irrespective of the motives or knowledge of the party, certain penalties are enacted; for the law, in those cases, seems to bind the party to know the facts, and to obey the law at his peril." In the note to this section instances are given where such rule applies; and it is said to apply to the sale of any article, the sale of which is prohibited; and it has been held to be no excuse that the vendor did not know it was the prohibited article. 3 Greenl. Ev. § 21, note. The sale of spirituous liquors, where prohibited, is specially mentioned as within this rule; as also the allowance of minors to play billiards where that is prohibited. This doctrine is maintained in Com. v. Emmons, 98 Mass. 6; McCutcheon v. People, 69 Ill. 606; Barnes v. State, 19 Conn. 398; State v. Hartfiel, 24 Wis. 60; Ulrich v. Com., 6 Bush, (Ky.) 400; and in very many other cases in Massachusetts and other states. It is upon the ground that intention is not an essential ingredient of the offense that the principal is held bound for the act of his agent in violation of law while he is pursuing his ordinary business as such agent. Being engaged in business where it is lawful to sell to all persons except such as are by law excepted, it...
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