Carroll v. State
| Decision Date | 07 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 64757.,64757. |
| Citation | 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 23,371 P.3d 1023 |
| Parties | Deangelo R. CARROLL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Mario D. Valencia, Henderson, for Appellant.
Adam Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and Marc P. DiGiacomo and Jonathan E. VanBoskerck, Chief Deputy District Attorneys, Clark County, for Respondent.
Before PARRAGUIRRE, C.J., DOUGLAS and CHERRY, JJ.
, J.:
In this opinion, we focus on whether the district court erred when it admitted Deangelo Carroll's inculpatory statements to the police. Carroll was not advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)
, and he claims he was subject to a custodial interrogation. The State of Nevada claims that Miranda warnings were not necessary because Carroll spoke with the police voluntarily. We conclude that the district court erred in denying Carroll's motion to suppress his statements to police because police subjected Carroll to a custodial interrogation without advising him of his Miranda rights. Nonetheless, we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, so we decline to reverse these convictions.
On May 19, 2005, police discovered Timothy J. Hadland's body on Northshore Road near Lake Mead. Along with Hadland's body, police found advertisements for the Palomino Club. Hadland was fired from his job at the Palomino Club a week before his death. Palomino Club management recruited Carroll to “knock[ ] off” Hadland because Hadland was spreading negative rumors about the club.
Carroll was also an employee at the Palomino Club. Carroll used the club's van to promote the club by handing out flyers to cab drivers and tourists. On the night of Hadland's murder, Carroll drove the club's van with two other men, Rontae Zone and Jayson Taoipu, who occasionally assisted him. Carroll recruited Kenneth Counts for this assignment because Carroll knew Counts would “take care of” someone for money.
Carroll, Zone, Taoipu, and Counts went to an area near Lake Mead, and Carroll called Hadland. When Hadland noticed the Palomino Club's van, Hadland parked his car in front of the van and walked to the driver's side window where Carroll was sitting. As Hadland and Carroll talked, Counts exited the van through the side door, snuck around to the front, and fired two shots into Hadland's head. Counts then jumped back into the van and ordered Carroll to return to town.
Carroll drove directly to the Palomino Club and told club management what occurred. Louis Hidalgo, Jr., the general manager of the club, directed other employees to give Carroll $6,000 in cash to pay Counts. Carroll gave the money to Counts, who then left in a cab. The next morning, at Hidalgo's direction, Carroll bought new tires for the van and disposed of the old tires at two separate locations.
The evening after Hadland's murder, homicide detectives contacted Carroll at the Palomino Club, as Carroll's phone number was the last phone number on Hadland's phone. When the detectives asked to speak with Carroll, he agreed, and the detectives drove Carroll to the homicide office for questioning. Carroll sat in a small room at a table with his back to the wall, while the detectives sat between him and the exit. The detectives did not give Carroll Miranda warnings before questioning him, but they informed Carroll that he was speaking with them voluntarily. Eventually, Carroll implicated himself, Palomino Club management, and Counts in Hadland's murder.
Carroll then volunteered to wear a recording device to corroborate his story by speaking with the Palomino Club management. The detectives strategized with Carroll before he spoke with the management each time. The information on these recordings allowed the State to charge three members of Palomino Club management for their roles in Hadland's murder.
After the detectives finished obtaining information and evidence from Carroll, they arrested him. The State's information charged Carroll with conspiracy to commit murder and murder with use of a deadly weapon.
After seven days of trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all charges. The jury subsequently returned its penalty verdict and recommended a sentence of life with the possibility of parole. The district court ultimately sentenced Carroll to 36–120 months on the conspiracy conviction, life with the possibility of parole after 20 years for the first-degree murder conviction, and life with the possibility of parole after 20 years, consecutive, for the deadly weapon enhancement.
On appeal, Carroll argues that: (1) the wire recordings should not have been admitted against him at trial because they were not relevant, were prejudicial, consisted of inadmissible hearsay, and violated his right against self-incrimination; (2) the district court erred when it admitted his statements to the detectives because the detectives violated Miranda and coerced his statement; (3) there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions for conspiracy to commit murder, first-degree murder, and the deadly weapon enhancement; and (4) cumulative error warrants reversal.
Wire recordings
Whether the relevance of the recordings was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice
Carroll argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting wire tape recordings because they were not relevant to his guilt or innocence and were unfairly prejudicial.
1 He explains he was playing a role fed to him by detectives, so a juror could not discern which statements Carroll fabricated and which statements the detectives fed him.
Carroll did not object based on relevance or prejudice; thus, this court reviews for plain error. Baltazar–Monterrosa v. State, 122 Nev. 606, 614, 137 P.3d 1137, 1142 (2006)
. Under the plain error standard, this court only reverses a decision if the error affects the appellant's substantial rights. Rimer v. State, 131 Nev. ––––, ––––, 351 P.3d 697, 715 (2015).
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” NRS 48.015
. Evidence that is not relevant is simply inadmissible. NRS 48.025. Even if relevant, evidence “is not admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues or of misleading the jury.” NRS 48.035.
Here, Carroll's argument that the recordings were not relevant is without merit. Even under Carroll's account of the facts, the purpose of the recordings was to get the managers of the Palomino Club to corroborate Carroll's claim that he was supposed to beat up Hadland, not kill him. If the recordings accomplished exactly what Carroll wanted, they would have made it less probable that Carroll intended for Hadland to die. Unfortunately for Carroll, there was evidence on the tapes to support both his position that this was never meant to be a killing, and the State's position, that it was.
Carroll's argument that the tapes' probative value was substantially outweighed by their unfairly prejudicial effect also fails. The central issue of this case was Carroll's intent before and during the shooting. Any evidence allowing the jurors to ascertain his intent is extremely probative. Further, the jury heard the proper context for Carroll's statements—that the tapes were made as part of the investigation, Carroll wore the wire to get incriminating information from the other players, and his statements were fabrications. Because the probative value was great, and the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion was mostly, if not completely, explained away, we conclude that the district court did not commit plain error when it admitted the tapes.
Because Carroll is unable to demonstrate plain error, we conclude that the district court did not plainly err when it admitted the recordings at trial. We so conclude because relevancy is a very broad standard and the tapes could prove Carroll's intent. Also, because Carroll's intent was the primary issue at trial, the probative value is not substantially outweighed by the unfairly prejudicial effect.
Whether Carroll's statements were inadmissible hearsay
Carroll argues his statements on the recordings were not his own but those of a state actor. He further argues that it would be absurd for the police to feed a person lines, then use those lines against that person at trial. The issue before us is whether the wire recordings were inadmissible hearsay.
Carroll did not object at trial based on hearsay, thus, this court reviews only for plain error. Baltazar–Monterrosa, 122 Nev. at 614, 137 P.3d at 1142
.
Hearsay is any out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. NRS 51.035
. Hearsay is generally inadmissible, unless there is a statutory exception. NRS 51.065(1). A party's own statement offered against that party is not hearsay. NRS 51.035(3)(a). Also, a party's statement offered to provide context to another person's statement, rather than for its own truth, is not hearsay. Wade v. State, 114 Nev. 914, 917–18, 966 P.2d 160, 162–63 (1998), opinion modified on denial of reh'g, 115 Nev. 290, 986 P.2d 438 (1999).
Carroll's argument that his statements were inadmissible hearsay is not supported by the evidence. The State offered the statements to provide context to those of the Palomino Club managers. Further, had the State offered Carroll's statements for their truth, they would still be admissible as statements of a party pursuant to NRS 51.035(3)(a)
. Carroll claims the detectives told him what to say, but the evidence at his trial showed the detectives simply assisted with general subject matter; Carroll decided what to say and how to say it. Carroll's Recording...
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