Carroll v. the City of East St. Louis.

Decision Date30 June 1873
Citation16 Am.Rep. 632,1873 WL 8262,67 Ill. 568
PartiesJOHN B. CARROLLv.THE CITY OF EAST ST. LOUIS.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. JOSEPH GILLESPIE, Judge, presiding. Mr. CHARLES CONLON, and Messrs. JOHN M. & JOHN MAYO PALMER, for the appellant.

Mr. WM. H. UNDERWOOD, Mr. C. C. WHITTLESEY, and Messrs. GLOVER & SHEPLEY, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was an action of ejectment, brought by appellee, in the circuit court of St. Clair county, against appellant, to recover a number of lots in East St. Louis. A declaration in the usual form was filed, and defendant interposed the general issue. The case was submitted to the court for trial, without a jury, by consent of the parties, and the issue was found for plaintiff, and a judgment was rendered in its favor.

The parties stipulated, on the trial in the circuit court, that, in September, 1869, the fee of the premises in dispute was in Samuel S. M. Barlow and others, and that they conveyed the lands in dispute to the “Connecticut Land Company;” that it was a body corporate, created by the general assembly of the State of Connecticut, by act of the 27th of July, 1860. Their charter shows that Joseph Alsop, Wm. M. McFarland, Samuel S. M. Barlow and Wm. H. Aspinwall were created a corporation, with a capital stock of $200,000, with the privilege to increase it to half a million.

They are empowered by their charter to adopt by-laws, provided they do not conflict with their charter, or the laws of Connecticut. The body is empowered to receive, grant, convey, dispose of and transfer real estate, and to take the management and charge of the same, as well as such personal property as they may deem necessary to carry on their business transactions, and sell and exchange the same for other property as they may deem to the interest of the corporation. They are also authorized to make, execute and deliver all necessary instruments, either with or without the seal of the corporation. The charter provides that the affairs of the company shall be managed by not less than seven directors, one of whom shall be president. The office of the company is, by the charter, located at Hartford, in that State.

It appears, from the stipulation, that the company purchased the property of Barlow and others, and took possession and held it until they conveyed to the city. It is also agreed that, after the sale was made to the city, defendant entered into possession of the lots and still holds them; that the company holds these and other lands in and near the city of East St. Louis, in the purchase of which their capital of $500,000 has been expended. And it was finally stipulated that the points to be decided were: “Had the Connecticut Land Company power under their charter to hold the lands in fee simple under the deed from Barlow and others? Had the company power to convey the title in fee to the city?”

Can a corporation, created in another State for the sole purpose of buying and selling lands, come here and prosecute the business for which it was created, by purchasing and holding lands in this State?

Owing to the interests involved in the case under consideration, and the results which may flow from the answer which may be given to this question, it is supposed to assume more than ordinary importance. Whether there are other sales similar to this, the record fails to disclose; and if there be any others, whether many or few, that fact could not change the law nor the decision of the case, and hence we shall disregard that portion of the argument which insists that other conveyances are endangered. We shall endeavor to decide the case on the record, as made and presented to the court.

All persons in the profession, we presume, will admit that a corporation, created in one State, can not exercise its functions in another State or a different sovereignty without permission. This is the doctrine announced in The Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Peters, 589, O. & M. R. R. v. Wheeler, 1 Black, 297, Ducat v. The City of Chicago, 48 Ill. 172, and Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wallace, 168. And if the proposition were not so fully understood and so firmly established, numerous other cases might be cited as confirming the rule.

The all important question, then, in this case is, to determine whether consent can be inferred from the course of legislation as indicating the general policy of this State. If such consent exists, it can be gathered alone from implication, as there is no direct legislation on the subject. In the case of The Bank of Augusta v. Earle, supra, it was said that the comity between States, so far as it relates to corporations, depends for its exercise upon the laws of the sovereignty in which the power is to be exercised, and a corporation can make no valid contract without their sanction, expressed or implied. The comity thus extended to other nations is no impeachment of sovereignty. It is the voluntary act of the nation by which it is offered, and is inadmissible when contrary to its policy or prejudicial to its interests. It is also said in the same case that, in the absence of any positive law affirming, denying or restraining the operation of a foreign law, courts of justice presume the tacit adoption of them by their own government, unless they are repugnant to its policy or prejudicial to its interests. It must be conceded that each State has the power, uncontrolled by another, to establish rules regulating the tenure of the lands lying within its limits, and the manner of buying and selling property by persons under its jurisdiction.

If, then, as there is no direct legislation on the subject, this purchase by the Connecticut Land Company is repugnant to the policy of the State, or it is prejudicial to its interests, the sale we have seen would be void. In this investigation, it must be remembered that the law-making power of the State where the authority is proposed to be exercised, is alone invested with the authority, and must determine its public policy. With this power the courts have not been intrusted. It is for them to ascertain and apply the law and the legislative policy, and not to inaugura??e it. The public policy of the State may be ascertained by reference to the general course of legislation, either by prohibitory or enabling acts, or by its general course of legislation on a given subject.

Our general assembly have, in a variety of modes, and on a very large number of occasions, manifested, in unmistakable terms, a determination that perpetuities in real estate shall not exist in this State. To prevent it, and to keep the tenures of the lands in the State free, at an early period in the legislation of the State, the common law allowing entails was abolished, and such conveyances rendered inoperative to create such an estate. And, inasmuch as such tenures create a perpetuity in particular families, it tends to give to them special privileges not enjoyed by all. It is the foundation upon which aristocracies are built and sustained. It takes real estate out of market and prevents its acquisition by the citizens generally, and prevents its distribution even in families by devise or descent. These, and it may be other considerations, have induced, it is believed, every State in the Union to abolish estates tail, because they, by creating perpetuities, are not in harmony with the principles upon which our government is based, and are prejudicial to the general welfare and prosperity of our people.

The policy of the legislation in this country, ever since the establishment of our form of government, has been with a view to leave all free to acquire property, and to protect and foster no class by conferring special privileges, or placing, or even permitting wealth to be placed, in the hands of a portion, to be held in perpetuity. In fact, its pernicious effects were so clearly seen and felt in Great Britain, that perpetuities have been discountenanced in their jurisprudence. The theory of our government is, that not only the laws must protect all alike, but that every citizen must be left equally free in the pursuit and acquisition of property. When feudalism prevailed throughout Europe, the care of the governments was for the lords and the privileged classes, and entails and perpetuities of tenures in their families, or particular portions of them, was adopted as the best means to secure their continued wealth and influence. But as trade and commerce advanced, and the principles of free government became better understood, it was found that the public welfare was retarded by restrictions upon the tenures to their landed property, and for centuries the fetters that have trammeled it have been gradually and constantly relaxing and being removed, until many of the inconveniences attending the system have disappeared.

Of the same nature as the feudal system were monasteries and religious houses, that acquired large bodies of lands and held them in perpetuity. The prejudicial effects of this policy were, at an early day, felt, as it took real estate out of the commerce of the country, and was found to be a serious impediment to national prosperity if not to advancing civilization. This was, perhaps, the strongest motive that led to the enactment of the laws of mortmain in Great Britain. There were, no doubt, other considerations, such as, that it curtailed the power and influence of the feudal lords, and their loss of revenues, by being deprived of their escheats, wardships, reliefs and the like. Hence, these laws of mortmain were adopted, allowing the lord immediate to declare a forfeiture of the estate sold to a corporation, and on his failing to do so, then the lord mediate might, and on his failure to do so, then the king.

Thus it will be observed that these statutes do not prevent corporations from taking title by conveyance, but only enabled...

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