Carson, Pirie, Scott & Co. v. Chicago Rys. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 October 1923
• Docket Number: No. 15399.,15399.
• Citation: 141 N.E. 172,309 Ill. 346
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: CARSON, PIRIE, SCOTT & CO. v. CHICAGO RYS. CO. et al.

309 Ill. 346

141 N.E. 172

CARSON, PIRIE, SCOTT & CO.

v.CHICAGO RYS. CO. et al.

No. 15399.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 20, 1923.

Action by Carson, Pirie, Scott & Co., against the Chicago Railways Company and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appealed, and defendants assigned cross-errors to the trial court's ruling, holding Workmen's Compensation Act constitutional, whereupon the Appellate Court transferred the cause to the Supreme Court.

Judgment affirmed.Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; F. J. Stransky, judge.

Moses, Rosenthal & Kennedy, of Chicago (Hirsch E. Soble and Millard C. Eiseman, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Charles Le Roy Brown, of Chicago (John R. Guilliams, Franklin B. Hussey, and Frank L. Kriete, all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

CARTWRIGHT, J.

Charles E. Martin, while driving a horse-drawn truck as an employee of the appellant, Carson, Pirie, Scott & Co., was killed on October 15, 1919, as the result of a collision of the truck with a street car of the appellees. Catherine Martin, his widow, was awarded by the Industrial Commission $3,418.35 as compensation for his death, as provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended by Laws 1919, p. 538 (Hurd's Rev. St. 1921, c. 48, §§ 126-152i). This suit was brought in the circuit court of Cook county by the appellant under section 29 of that act to recover the amount awarded, upon the ground that the death of Martin was caused by negligence of the appellees. Upon the trial there was a verdict for appellees, and judgment was entered on the verdict, from which appellant appealed to the Appellate Court for the First District, and assigned errors in that court on rulings in the course of the trial, and because the judgment was alleged to be contrary to the weight of the evidence. Before entering upon the trial the appellees insisted to the court that the action could not be maintained, because the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1919 was unconstitutional, being in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, a similar provision of section 2 of article 2 of the Constitution of this state, and other constitutional provisions. The court held the act constitutional, and in the Appellate Court the appellees assigned cross-errors on that ruling. The Appellate Court thereupon transferred the cause to this court.

Counsel understand that it was decided in Otis Elevator Co. v. Industrial Com., 302 Ill. 90, 134 N. E. 19, that the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1919 was unconstitutional and void, because of the provisions that the decision of the Industrial Commission, in the absence of fraud, should be conclusive, unless reviewed as therein provided, and that the circuit court should by writ of certiorari have power to review questions of law presented by the record. Upon looking at the opinion in that case, it will be observed that the question whether a statute making findings of fact by an administrative body creating a liability under a law enacted by virtue of the police power conclusive, and not subject to judicial review, was not involved, considered, or decided.

The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1921 (Laws 1921, p. 446) provided that the circuit court should by writ of certiorari have power to review all questions of law and fact presented by the record, but findings of fact made by the commission should not be set aside, unless contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The decision was that the legislative department had no power to prescribe a rule governing judicial action; that, on submission to a judicial tribunal, due process of law requires independent judgment, both as to the law and the facts, according to settled rules governing judicial action; that the Legislature could not direct the courts what rule should govern their decisions; and that the limitation was an attemptedusurpation of judicial power. All that was held was that the limitation attempted to be imposed upon the exercise of the judicial power of review given by the act was void, and not that other provisions of the act were void, and the cause was remanded, with directions to review all questions of law and fact presented by the record.

The statute was regarded as valid without the void limitation, but if it had been otherwise, and the necessary effect of the decision had been that the act of 1919 was unconstitutional and void, it would have availed nothing to the defendants in this case, because the widow of Charles E. Martin had a right of action, under the law, for his death occasioned by negligence of the defendants while he was in the exercise of due care, and that right of action was transferred to the appellant as employer. The only relation that the Workmen's Compensation Act had to the cause of action was the right of the plaintiff to bring the suit, with a limitation of the amount of the recovery. But for the Compensation Act the right of action would have been for the recovery of all damages within the statutory limitation, and the Compensation Act merely imposed a limitation to the advantage of the defendants, and of the validity of that limitation they could not complain. The court did not err in ruling on the objection.

Roosevelt road (formerly Twelfth street) runs east and west in the city of Chicago. On October 15, 1919, Charles E. Martin was driving a team of appellant drawing a truck west on that street with a light load. There is a bridge over the Chicago river about 220 feet long, and near the west end of the bridge Lumber street connects with and extends from Roosevelt road in a southeasterly direction toward the river. The truck was a five-ton open-stake truck, on which there was a single seat for the driver, about 8 1/2 feet from the ground, with a foot board lower than the seat, for his use. It was shortly after 5 o'clock in the afternoon of a clear day, and there was no obstruction to the view of either Martin or a motorman operating a street car. Martin drove across the bridge and upon the road in the north or west-bound street car track. When he reached Lumber street he turned south across the east-bound street car track. A street car heavily loaded with passengers was approaching from the west on that track, and the truck did not get entirely across until it was reached by the street car. The car struck the right hind wheel of the truck with sufficient force, so that Martin was thrown to the ground from his seat and killed.

The issues submitted to the jury were whether Martin was in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety, and whether the motorman was guilty...