Carson v. American Brands, Inc.
Decision Date | 02 June 1977 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 75-0553-R. |
Citation | 446 F. Supp. 780 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Parties | Frank L. CARSON et al. v. AMERICAN BRANDS, INC., et al. |
John W. Scott, Jr., Hill, Tucker & Marsh, Fredericksburg, Va., Jack Greenberg, Barry Goldstein, New York City, for plaintiffs.
Henry T. Wickham, Bradfute W. Davenport, Jr., John F. Kay, Jr., Kenneth V. Farino, Jay J. Levit, Richmond, Va., for defendants.
Plaintiffs brought this class action against the abovenamed defendants under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Fourteenth Amendment. Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4).
Negotiations in an attempt to settle the issues raised by the complaint have resulted in a proposed Consent Decree which the parties requested the Court to enter at the final pretrial conference on 1 April 1977. At that conference, the Court expressed concern that certain provisions of the Decree might be violative of the law and that provisions of the Decree would affect parties other than those before the Court. The Court noted that the parties were jointly seeking entry of the Decree and to that extent were no longer in an adversary posture. The Court requested counsel to brief the issues of concern. The briefs having been filed the Court must now decide whether or not it is just and proper and in accordance with the law to enter the Decree.
Plaintiffs have included a statement of facts in their brief in support of the proposed Consent Decree. For this purpose only, we accept these facts to be true as follows:
The defendant American Brands, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as the "Company"), operates the Richmond Leaf Department of the American Tobacco Company in Richmond, Virginia, for the purpose of processing and storing leaf tobacco. The defendant Local 182 Tobacco Workers International Union has exclusive bargaining rights for the establishment of wage rates and other terms and conditions of employment for all hourly paid production unit positions at the Richmond Leaf Department. The defendant Tobacco Workers International Union is a national organization consisting of local unions, including Local 182.
The plaintiffs are present and former black seasonal employees at the Richmond Leaf Department and held jobs under the jurisdiction of Local 182, TWIU, during their employment. As seasonal employees, the plaintiffs all worked at the Richmond Leaf Plant an average of six months each year. Regular employees worked at this same facility all year.
The Company employs approximately 150 seasonal employees, all of whom at the present time are black, and approximately 100 regular employees, of whom 66% are black. Plaintiffs are not aware of any white individuals who have ever been employed as seasonal employees at the Company's Richmond Leaf Plant.
Prior to September 1963, the regular job classifications of truck driver, watchman, maintenance, storage, and boiler operator at the Leaf Plant were reserved for whites only. As of 15 February 1976 these positions were staffed as follows:
Position Whites Blacks Truck Drivers 5 4 Watchmen 15 1 Maintenance Storage 1 0 Boiler Operators 0 3
Regular employees have the right to obtain any permanent position for which the TWIU has bargaining rights within the Richmond Leaf Department. Seasonal employees have the right to obtain any seasonal position for which the TWIU has bargaining rights within the Richmond Leaf Plant. Seasonal employees may transfer to positions in regular classifications only when no regular employee desires that position. Should the seasonal employee transfer to a regular position, he loses all of his seniority and is treated as a new hire for seniority purposes. Separate seniority rosters are maintained for regular and for seasonal employees.
When a seasonal employee transfers to a regular position he is placed at the bottom of the regular seniority roster irrespective of the number of years he has worked as a seasonal employee with the Company. This loss of seniority affects his status for promotions, demotions, lay-offs, recalls and vacations, and, in short, the principal terms and conditions of his employment.
Since 1971, the vast majority of applicants and new hires at all of the Company's locations in the Richmond area have been black, as indicated by the following chart:
YEAR APPLICANTS NEW HIRES BLACKS WHITES BLACKS WHITES 1971 97 1 88 1 1972 118 5 97 2 1973 94 4 93 1 1974 71 7 64 2 1975 77 3 22 2
The racial composition of the production unit at the Richmond Leaf Department is as follows:
REGULAR SEASONAL YEAR EMPLOYEES EMPLOYEES WHITES BLACKS WHITES BLACKS 1968 41 52 - 116 1970 40 59 - 175 1973 40 56 - 176 1976 37 57 - 135
Of the 35 supervisory positions at the Company's Richmond Leaf Department as of 5 April 1976, seven, or 20%, were filled by blacks. Of the 229 persons in hourly paid production unit jobs at the Richmond Leaf Department in that same year, 192, or 84% were black.
In the proposed Consent Decree defendants "expressly deny any violation of . . any . . . equal employment law, regulation, or order." Plaintiffs conversely state that "consent to this Decree does not constitute a finding or admission that any of the employment practices of . . . defendants are lawful." The proposed Decree further states that "the Court finds from the evidence previously filed in the form of answers to interrogatories that there are no discriminatory hiring practices at the Richmond Leaf Department."
In light of the facts outlined above, the foregoing provisions, and the applicable law, the Court questioned the propriety of the following provisions of the proposed Consent Decree:
Before discussing these provisions specifically, a general discussion of what this Court perceives to be the controlling law is appropriate.
Plaintiffs based this suit on Title VII, Section 1981 and the Fourteenth Amendment. As defendants herein are private parties, the Court does not find the precepts of the Fourteenth Amendment to be applicable per se. But the guarantees of the Equal Protection clause against State action by the Fourteenth Amendment nevertheless are afforded plaintiffs by Title VII and Section 1981 which, with respect to private parties defendant, have their underpinnings in the Thirteenth Amendment. This Court is also cognizant that the Supreme Court of the United States has read the guarantees of the Equal Protection clause into the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment protecting against arbitrary and capricious1 federal action.
Thus, the Fifth Amendment may well protect citizens against arbitrary and capricious federal action in the form of a federal court Consent Decree that would place a federal stamp of approval, with the full force and effect of contempt proceedings, to what would otherwise be a mere agreement between private parties. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1947). In sum, we opine that the mandates of the United States Constitution as well as the statutes invoked by plaintiffs require us to insure that this Court plays no role in perpetuating, promulgating or acquiescing in improper discrimination on the basis of race.
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