Carson v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 04 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 1:13-cv-00128 JLT (PC) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | SUZAN CARSON Plaintiff, v. D. K. JOHNSON, Defendant. |
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND
(Doc. 1).
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's complaint filed on April 29, 2011. (Doc. 1). As is required, the Court now screens the complaint and for the reasons set forth below, the Court ORDERS the matter be DISMISSED with leave to amend.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss a case in which the plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis if the court determines that the case "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted" or is "frivolous." A claim is frivolous "when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992).
General rules for pleading complaints are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A pleading stating a claim for relief must include a statement affirming the court's jurisdiction, "a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief; and . . . a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, and pro se pleadings are held to "less stringent standards" than pleadings by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521-21 (1972).
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citations omitted). When factual allegations are well-pled, a court should assume their truth and determine whether the facts would make the plaintiff entitled to relief; conclusions in the pleading are not entitled to the same assumption of truth. Id. The Court may grant leave to amend a complaint to the extent that deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by an amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
In order to sustain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show (i) that he suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, and (ii) that the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). The causation requirement of § 1983 is satisfied only if a plaintiff demonstrates that a defendant did an affirmative act, participated in another's affirmative act, or omitted to perform an act which he was legally required to do that caused the deprivation complained of. Arnold v. IBM, 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978)).
Section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code does not confer substantive rights; but instead provides "a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). Section 1983 states in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to state a claim pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts that support that (1) he was deprived of a right afforded to him by federal law, and (2) the deprivation was committed by someone acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988); Williams v. Gorton, 529 F.2d 668, 670 (9th Cir. 1976). Additionally, a plaintiff is required to allege a specific injury suffered, as well as show a causal relationship between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered by the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (). Section 1983 does not recognize respondeat superior liability. Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Accordingly, a supervisor may not be held liable merely because a subordinate the plaintiff's constitutional. Id. "A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if thesupervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them." Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).
Lastly, similar to any other complaint, conclusory allegations that lack supporting facts are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983. Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1977).
Plaintiff complains that the officials at the Central California Women's Facility (CCWF) where she is housed are "violating recent court rulings," because they are placing too many inmates in one cell. (Doc. 1 at 2-3). She alleges that CCWF is not excluded from the judicial mandates regarding the number of inmates per cell. (Doc. 1 at 2).
To the extent Plaintiff filed her current Complaint in an effort to enforce a court order issued in another case, Plaintiff is advised that she may not pursue a claim in this action based on the alleged failure of CCWF officials to comply with the Plata settlement agreement. Remedial orders issued in the Plata case do not provide Plaintiff with an independent cause of action under section 1983 because the orders do not have the effect of creating or expanding Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Cagle v. Sutherland, 334 F.3d 980, 986-87 (9th Cir.2003) (); Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1123 (5th Cir.1986) ().
Likewise, if Plaintiff contends she is a member of the plaintiff class in Plata, she cannot proceed with an individual claim separate and apart from the class. A plaintiff cannot bring an individual suit seeking injunctive and equitable relief from alleged unconstitutional prison conditionsthat is within the boundaries of an existing class action. Fleming v. Schwarzenegger, No. 08-05011 CW, 2010 WL 3069349 * 2 (N.D.Cal. Aug.4, 2010); see also McNeil v. Guthrie, 945 F.2d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir.1991); Long v. Collins, 917 F.2d 3, 4-5 (5th Cir.1990); Goff v. Menke, 672 F.2d 702 (8th Cir.1987); Groseclose v. Dutton, 829 F.2d 581, 584 (6th Cir.1987). Allowing such suits would interfere with the ongoing class action. McNeil, 945 F.2d at 1165. Claims for equitable relief must proceed through the class representative until the class action is terminated or the consent decree is modified. McNeil, 945 F.2d at 1166.
Accordingly, the Court analyzes Plaintiff's claims under the requisite constitutional standards without reference to Plata.
Allegations of overcrowding, alone, as Plaintiff has alleged here, are insufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981); Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 869 F.2d 461, 471 (9th Cir.1989). Plaintiff's claim is cognizable where it is alleged that crowding has caused an increase in violence or has reduced the provision of other constitutionally required services, or has reached a level where the institution is no longer fit for human habitation. See Balla, 869 F.2d at 471. Here, plaintiff has not alleged specific injuries she has suffered due to the overcrowding.
Additionally, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of 'entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic...
To continue reading
Request your trial