Carson v. Pierce

Decision Date25 October 1983
Docket NumberNo. 82-2077,82-2077
Citation719 F.2d 931
PartiesJames CARSON and Bertha Carson, individually and on behalf of their minor children; Ruthie Royster, individually and on behalf of her minor children; and on behalf of all others similarly situated and Greater St. Louis Committee for Freedom of Residence, Inc., a not-for-profit Missouri corporation, Appellants, v. Samuel R. PIERCE, Jr. in his official capacity as Secy of Housing & Urban Development; Harry Sharrott, in his official capacity as Acting Reg. Admin. of Housing & Urban Development; Johnny Bullock, Jr. in his official capacity as Area Mgr for St. Louis Area of Region VII of Dept. of HUD; Department of Housing & Urban Development, an executive agency of the U.S., Spanish Lake Associates, a Michigan co-partnership and its partners; Stephen P. Hayman, individually and in his capacity as mgr. partner of Spanish Lake Assoc.; Alan J. Hayman, individually and in his capacity as mgr. partner of Spanish Lake Assoc.; and Hayman Management Company, a Michigan corporation, Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

David L. Lambert, James B. Morales, National Center for Youth Law, San Francisco, Cal., Jim Eggleston, Oakland, Cal., David Howard, Adrienne Volenik, Howard & Volenik, St. Louis, Mo., for appellants.

Gary L. Vincent, St. Louis, Mo., for appellees.

Before JOHN R. GIBSON and FAGG, Circuit Judges, and WOODS, * District Judge.

FAGG, Circuit Judge.

The owners and managers of a federally insured apartment complex provide in their leases that no more than two children shall reside in any one of their apartments. Plaintiffs brought this action to declare illegal and enjoin the enforcement of this policy, claiming that it discriminates unlawfully against families with children. The district court, 546 F.Supp. 80, dismissed the claim against the apartment owners and managers. Without reaching the issues decided by the district court, we affirm the dismissal because the plaintiffs' claims are now moot.

In August 1979 individual plaintiffs James and Bertha Carson and their three minor children moved into a three-bedroom apartment pursuant to a one-year lease. The apartment was owned by Spanish Lake Associates and managed by Hayman Management Company. The owners and managers of the apartments shall be referred to collectively as the private defendants. In July 1980 the Carsons received notice that their lease would not be renewed because of the private defendants' policy to deny occupancy to families with more than two children. Plaintiff Ruthie Royster and her three children also moved into a three-bedroom apartment owned and managed by the private defendants in August 1979 under a one-year lease. Like the Carsons, Royster was informed in July 1980 that her lease would not be renewed due to the policy limiting the number of children residing in each apartment to two.

Plaintiffs brought this action in federal district court for themselves, their minor children, and all others similarly situated. The class certification request was never ruled upon by the district court. Joined as a plaintiff is Greater St. Louis Committee for Freedom of Residence, Inc., a non-profit association that seeks to prevent discrimination in housing. Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the private defendants had breached the terms of a regulatory agreement between HUD and the private defendants, which proscribed discrimination against families with children in the selection of tenants for apartments. Plaintiffs sued in their alleged capacity as intended third-party beneficiaries of that agreement. Plaintiffs also alleged that the private defendants had violated certain provisions of the National Housing Act prohibiting discrimination against families with children in federally insured housing developments. Additionally, plaintiffs sued HUD and various HUD officials for failing to comply with their duty of enforcing the non-discrimination provisions of the National Housing Act.

The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims against the private defendants, holding that (1) plaintiffs were not intended beneficiaries of the non-discrimination provision of the regulatory agreement between HUD and defendants, and thus could not sue to enforce that provision; and (2) there was no private right of action under the National Housing Act. The district court denied the motion to dismiss the claim against the federal defendants. Plaintiffs appeal the district court's dismissal of their claim against the private defendants.

We do not reach the merits of the district court decision. The plaintiffs have moved out of the apartments owned and managed by the private defendants and have found other housing. Because none of the individual plaintiffs are now living at the private defendants' apartments, we hold that their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are now moot. We also hold that the associational plaintiff, Freedom of Residence, does not have standing to sue the private defendants because it has not demonstrated that any of its individual members would have standing to sue in their own right.

The judicial power of the federal courts is restricted by Article III of the Constitution to cases and controversies. See United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 1208, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1949, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). The controversy requirement of the Declaratory Judgment Act is synonymous with that of Article III of the Constitution. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-40, 57 S.Ct. 461, 463, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1974); Cass County v. United States, 570 F.2d 737, 739 (8th Cir.1978). "[F]ederal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them." North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S.Ct. 402, 404, 30 L.Ed.2d 413 (1971). The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. Additionally, the controversy must be one for which the court can grant specific and conclusive relief. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, supra, 300 U.S. at 240-41, 57 S.Ct. at 463-64; Backus v. Baptist Medical Center, 671 F.2d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir.1982); Cass County v. United States, 570 F.2d at 740. Existence of a case or controversy must appear at every stage of the litigation. Allen v. Likins, 517 F.2d 532, 534 (8th Cir.1975). A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer "live" or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1950, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969).

In this case, there is no doubt that a live controversy existed at the time plaintiffs filed suit. The value of the relief which plaintiffs sought from the private defendants, however, was dependent upon either the plaintiffs' continued residence or desire to reside in the private defendants' apartments. Plaintiffs no longer...

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