Carswell v. Camp

• Decision Date: 30 November 2022
• Docket Number: 21-10171
• Parties: Gwendolyn CARSWELL, individually and as dependent administrator of and on behalf of the Estate of Gary Valdez Lynch III and Gary Valdez Lynch III's Heirs at Law, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. George A. CAMP; Jana R. Campbell; Helen M. Landers; Kenneth R. Marriott; Kolbee A. Perdue; Teri J. Robinson; Vi N. Wells; Scotty D. York, Defendants—Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

54 F.4th 307

Gwendolyn CARSWELL, individually and as dependent administrator of and on behalf of the Estate of Gary Valdez Lynch III and Gary Valdez Lynch III's Heirs at Law, Plaintiff—Appellee,

v.George A. CAMP; Jana R. Campbell; Helen M. Landers; Kenneth R. Marriott; Kolbee A. Perdue; Teri J. Robinson; Vi N. Wells; Scotty D. York, Defendants—Appellants.

No. 21-10171

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED November 30, 2022

Bruce K. Thomas, Law Office of Bruce K. Thomas, Dallas, TX, Thomas Dean Malone, Law Offices of Dean Malone, P.C., Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff—Appellee.

Thomas Phillip Brandt, John David Husted, Laura Dahl O'Leary, Fanning Harper Martinson Brandt & Kutchin, P.C., Dallas, TX, for Defendants—Appellants.

Randall Lee Kallinen, Esq., Kallinen Law, P.L.L.C., Houston, TX, Pro Se.

Before Barksdale, Engelhardt, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge:

The petition for panel rehearing is DENIED. Because no member of the panel or judge in regular active service requested that the court be polled on rehearing en banc, the petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED. On our own motion, we withdraw our prior opinion, 37 F.4th 1062, and issue the following in its place.

The question presented is whether a district court can deny a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity through a boilerplate scheduling order. We hold no.

I.

Gary Lynch was arrested on an outstanding warrant and booked into the Hunt County, Texas jail on February 12, 2019. Seven days later, because of a gas leak, the jail staff evacuated all prisoners from the facility and temporarily housed them elsewhere. Jail staff held Lynch in the Tarrant County jail while repairs occurred and returned him to the Hunt County facility on the evening of February 22. The next morning, Lynch was discovered dead in his cell. Following an autopsy, a doctor concluded Lynch died from aortic valve endocarditis

with myocardial abscess.

Plaintiff-Appellee Gwendolyn Carswell is Lynch's mother. She sued Hunt County and numerous county employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). She alleged the individual defendants knew Lynch was suffering from a heart condition but failed to treat him. The individual defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting qualified immunity. On January 25, 2021, the district court denied that motion and entered its "standard QI scheduling order." That order is the subject of this appeal. It provided, in relevant part:

Any pending motions to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity are denied without prejudice. See Shultea [Schultea] v. Wood , 47 F.3d 1427, 1431–34 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (qualified immunity must be raised by filing answer). Any defendant desiring to assert qualified immunity who has not already done so by way of answer must file an answer asserting qualified immunity within 14 days of the date of this Order. Except as set forth below, all party discovery is stayed as to any defendant who asserts qualified immunity. Discovery is not stayed as to a defendant asserting qualified immunity as to that person's capacity as a witness to the extent that there is any other defendant not asserting qualified immunity.

The individual defendants complied with the order and filed answers and affirmative defenses. But they also noticed an immediate appeal of the scheduling order. Carswell moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the scheduling order was not an appealable collateral order because the district court had not ruled on qualified immunity. We carried that motion with the case.

In the meantime, back in district court, the individual defendants moved to stay all discovery and all proceedings. They argued that "[a]ll discovery in this matter should be stayed against all Defendants, including Hunt County, and all proceedings in this case should be stayed, pending resolution of the Individual Defendants' assertions of qualified immunity."

The district court denied defendants' motion. In its October 8 order, the court "address[ed] the motion at greater length than it customarily would devote to what is essentially a motion to stay." In so doing, it explained how (in its view) the January 25 scheduling order "attempts to follow the choreography of the Fifth Circuit's QI dance." Specifically:

[The scheduling order] requires any defendant wanting to assert QI to do so by answer, rather than by motion to dismiss; ... it requires the plaintiff to file a rule 7 reply to any assertion of qualified immunity. If defendants believe QI can be resolved based on the pleadings, there is a deadline for filing a motion for summary judgment on that basis; if the plaintiff believes discovery is necessary to resolve the QI defense, he or she may raise that issue by way of a Rule 56(d) motion for discovery in response to the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Significantly, unless the Court allows narrowly tailored discovery on QI, party discovery as to the QI defendants is stayed.

On October 13, in district court, Carswell filed an "advisory to the court concerning depositions" indicating that, on the Monell claim, she wished to depose all eight of the individual defendants asserting qualified immunity. She reminded the court that she had previously served all eight with deposition notices. She explained she wished "to notice these depositions again and proceed consistent with the Court's October 8, 2021, Order." Appellants moved in this court to stay discovery pending appeal. We granted the stay and subsequently heard oral argument.

II.

"Jurisdiction is always first." Arulnanthy v. Garland , 17 F.4th 586, 592 (5th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). Under the collateral order doctrine, we have jurisdiction to review orders denying qualified immunity. See Backe v. LeBlanc , 691 F.3d 645, 647–49 (5th Cir. 2012) ; Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511, 526–27, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). Likewise for district court orders "declin[ing] or refus[ing] to rule on a motion to dismiss based on a government officer's defense of qualified immunity." Zapata v. Melson , 750 F.3d 481, 484 (5th Cir. 2014). Such orders are "tantamount to ... order[s] denying the defendants qualified immunity." Ibid.

The collateral order doctrine permits immediate appeals of these orders because a defendant's entitlement to qualified immunity must be determined "at the earliest possible stage of the litigation." Ramirez v. Guadarrama , 3 F.4th 129, 133 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). That's because qualified immunity is more than "a mere defense to liability." Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 237, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quotation omitted). It's also "an immunity from suit." Ibid. (quotation omitted). And one of the most important benefits of the qualified immunity defense is "protection from pretrial discovery, which is costly, time-consuming, and intrusive." Backe , 691 F.3d at 648 ; see also Helton v. Clements , 787 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (a "refusal to rule on a claim of immunity" deprives a defendant of his "entitlement under immunity doctrine to be free from suit and the burden of avoidable pretrial matters").

We have jurisdiction over the scheduling order here because the district court refused to rule on qualified immunity "at the earliest possible stage of the litigation." Ramirez , 3 F.4th at 133. Defendants asserted qualified immunity in their motion to dismiss. That motion was the earliest possible opportunity for the district court to resolve the immunity question. It declined to do so. Instead, it required defendants to assert their qualified immunity defense by way of answer. And it postponed ruling on the immunity issue until summary judgment. That "effectively ... denied [defendants] the benefits of the qualified immunity defense" and "vest[ed] this court with the requisite jurisdiction to review the discovery order."

Wicks v. Miss. State Emp. Servs. , 41 F.3d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1995).

III.

We review the scheduling order for abuse of discretion. Backe , 691 F.3d at 649. We hold the district court abused its discretion by deferring its ruling on qualified immunity and subjecting the immunity-asserting defendants to discovery in the meantime. See ibid. Where public officials assert qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss, a district court must rule on the motion. It may not permit discovery against the immunity-asserting defendants before it rules on their defense. See id. at 648 (It is "precisely the point of qualified immunity ... to protect public officials from expensive, intrusive discovery until and unless the requisite showing overcoming immunity is made." (second emphasis added)).

It is true that to ensure qualified immunity can be decided at the earliest possible time, we have authorized "discovery narrowly tailored to rule on [defendants'] immunity claims." Backe , 691 F.3d at 649 ; see also Lion Boulos v. Wilson , 834 F.2d 504, 508–09 (5th Cir. 1987) (first articulating this limited-discovery procedure). We've described that limited-discovery process as "a careful procedure," which permits a district court to "defer its qualified immunity ruling if further factual development is necessary to ascertain the availability of that defense." Zapata , 750 F.3d at 485 (quoting Backe , 691 F.3d at 648 ). The district court must first find that the plaintiff has pleaded "facts which, if true, would overcome the defense of qualified immunity." Ibid. (quotation omitted). If it still finds itself "unable to rule on the immunity defense without further clarification of the facts," ibid. (quotation omitted), then we allow the district court to order discovery "narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim," Wicks , 41 F.3d at 994 (quoting Lion Boulos , 834 F.2d at 507–08 ).

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