Carswell v. Share House, Inc.

• Decision Date: 04 August 1986
• Docket Number: Docket No. 81547
• Citation: 151 Mich.App. 392,390 N.W.2d 252
• Parties: Elizabeth CARSWELL, Claimant-Appellant, v. SHARE HOUSE, INC., and Michigan Employment Security Commission, Respondent-Appellees. 151 Mich.App. 392, 390 N.W.2d 252
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 252

390 N.W.2d 252

Elizabeth CARSWELL, Claimant-Appellant, v. SHARE HOUSE, INC., and Michigan Employment Security Commission, Respondent-Appellees.

Docket No. 81547.

151 Mich.App. 392, 390 N.W.2d 252

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Oct. 15, 1985.

Decided May 5, 1986.

Released for Publication Aug. 4, 1986.

[151 MICHAPP 393] Legal Services of Southeastern Michigan by D. Reingold, Ann Arbor, for Elizabeth Carswell.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., and Patricia L. Sherrod, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Employment Sec. Comn.

Before V.J. BRENNAN, P.J., and BEASLEY and NOECKER ^*, JJ.

NOECKER, Judge.

Claimant appeals as of right from an order of the Washtenaw County Circuit Court denying her unemployment compensation benefits.

Claimant worked as a secretary for respondent [151 MICHAPP 394] Share House, Inc. On several occasions she expressed dissatisfaction with her wages. She was informed that due to budgetary restrictions she would not be given a wage increase. On or about April 18, 1983, she again expressed her dissatisfaction with her wages and informed her employer that she intended to search for another job. On the morning of April 22, 1983, her superior, Norman Lawson, gave her a letter stating, "I have decided to accept your offer to voluntarily quit * * * ". The letter went on to say that Lawson would be interviewing applicants for her position until May 6, 1983, and that he intended to start her replacement on May 9, 1983. On the same day, April 22, 1983, claimant delivered a letter to Lawson stating that she was resigning her position effective immediately, that two weeks notice was "impossible".

Claimant's application for unemployment compensation was denied by the MESC on the ground that she voluntarily left her employment without good cause attributable to her employer. M.C.L. Sec. 421.29(1)(a); M.S.A. Sec. 17.531(1)(a). At the hearing before the referee, claimant testified she would not have left her employment but for the notice of termination; she would not have left until she found other employment. The referee found that claimant's failure to work "for the period of the two-week notice" constituted a voluntary leaving and affirmed. The decision of the MESC and referee were affirmed by the Board of Review and the Washtenaw County Circuit Court.

M.C.L. Sec. 421.29(1)(a); M.S.A. Sec. 17.531(1)(a) provides:

"An individual shall be disqualified for benefits in the following cases in which the individual:

"(a) Left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer or employing unit."

A reviewing court may reverse decisions of the [151 MICHAPP 395] MESC only if the MESC decision is contrary to law or if it is not supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record. M.C.L. Sec. 421.38; M.S.A. Sec. 17.540; Butler v. City of Newaygo, 115 Mich.App. 445, 448, 320 N.W.2d 401 (1982).

First, claimant claims that she is entitled to a remand to the circuit court because the court erred in failing to adopt the referee's findings of fact, since those findings were supported by competent, material and substantial evidence. The factual basis for the court's judgment of affirmance is unclear. However, a remand to the court is not necessary. If the court reached the right result, we will not disturb the result attained even though other reasons should have been assigned. See Queen Ins. Co. v. Hammond, 374 Mich. 655, 658-659, 132 N.W.2d 792 (1965).

Claimant next claims that the referee's conclusion that she voluntarily left her employment is contrary to law. Specifically, she claims that, because it was the employer who initiated the termination, her separation from the job was involuntary, even though she could have worked for a few more days. Our review necessarily requires that we resolve two issues: (1) whether she left voluntarily; and (2) whether she left without good cause attributable to her employer.

Under existing precedent, we find that there is little doubt that claimant left her employment voluntarily. Although she had an opportunity to continue her employment for two weeks, she tendered her resignation effective immediately. She was not under any legal, economic, or physical compulsion to leave her job, nor is there any evidence in the lower court record indicating that she did so unintentionally. See, e.g., Wickey v. Employment Security Comm., 369 Mich. 487, 120 [151 MICHAPP 396] N.W.2d 181 (1963); Copper Range Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm., 320 Mich. 460, 31 N.W.2d 692 (1948).

M.C.L. Sec. 421.29(1)(a); M.S.A. Sec. 17.531(1)(a) states unambiguously that persons leaving voluntarily, unless they leave with good cause attributable to the employer, are disqualified from receiving benefits. The real question presented to us is whether claimant's leaving of her job was "without good cause attributable to the employer". The latter is a matter of first impression in this state.

"Good cause" as used in M.C.L. Sec. 421.29(1)(a); M.S.A. Sec. 17.531(1)(a), has not been defined. However, in the context of M.C.L. Sec. 421.29(1)(e); M.S.A. Sec. 17.531(1)(e), which provides for disqualification for refusing to accept proffered employment without good cause, "good cause" has been defined as nothing more than a good reason, a substantial reason; a cause personal to the employee can be "good cause" when it would be deemed by reasonable men valid and not indicative of an unwillingness to work. Dueweke v. Morang Drive Greenhouses, Inc., 411 Mich. 670, 678-679, 311 N.W.2d 712 (1981). We note that that definition is the one generally used nationwide for statutes denying benefits for voluntary leaving without good cause attributable to an employer. See Anno: Unemployment compensation: harassment or other mistreatment by employer or supervisor as "good cause"...