Cartagena-Cordero v. Five Star Cars, LLC
| Decision Date | 06 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:19-cv-1728 (SRU),3:19-cv-1728 (SRU) |
| Parties | EMMANUEL CARTAGENA-CORDERO, Plaintiff, v. FIVE STAR CARS, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
This is a case about a fraudulent used car sale. In December 2018, Emmanuel Cartagena-Cordero bought a used 2008 Ford Super Duty F-250 SRW (the "Truck" or the "Vehicle") from Five Star Cars, LLC ("Five Star"), a used car dealership in Meriden, Connecticut. Connected with that sale, Cartagena-Cordero alleges that Five Star violated (1) the Truth in Lending Act (the "TILA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq. and 12 C.F.R. § 226, (2) the Federal Odometer Act (the "FOA"), 49 U.S.C. § 32701, et seq., and (3) the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (the "CUTPA"), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110a, et seq.; breached (4) the implied warranty of merchantability, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42a-2-314; and committed (5) civil forgery.1 Cartagena-Cordero makes a motion for entry of a default judgment against Five Star2 and seeks $55,298.84 in actual, statutory, and punitive damages. Cartagena-Cordero's motion, doc. no. 26, is granted in part and denied in part. Cartagena-Cordero may recover $14,762.04.
"Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes a two-step process for obtaining a default judgment." Bennett v. United States, 2017 WL 6993407, at *1 (D. Conn. Dec. 18, 2017) (citing New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005)). "First, a plaintiff must acquire an entry of default against the defendant in question." Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)). "Second, after the default is entered, a plaintiff must either request a default judgment from the clerk or move the court for a default judgment." Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)). When the amount sought is neither a sum certain nor a sum that can be made certain by computation, the plaintiff must request a default from the court, rather than the clerk. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). The decision whether to enter a default judgment is entrusted to the "sound discretion of a district court." ALV Events Int'l v. Johnson, 821 F. Supp. 2d 489, 493 (D. Conn. 2010) (quoting Shah v. New York State Dep't of Civil Serv., 168 F.3d 610, 615 (2d Cir. 1999)) (cleaned up).
In deciding whether to enter default judgment, courts in this Circuit typically focus on three factors: (1) whether the default was willful, (2) whether denying the application for default would prejudice the movant, and (3) whether a meritorious defense exists. See Atl. Recording Corp. v. Brennan, 534 F. Supp. 2d 278, 280 (D. Conn. 2008) (); Palmieri v. Town of Babylon, 277 F. App'x 72, 74 (2d Cir. 2008); Pecarsky v. Galaxiworld.com Ltd., 249 F. 3d 167, 171-74 (2d Cir. 2001) (). Before entering a default judgment, a district court should also "determine whether the plaintiff's allegations establish the defendant's liability as a matter of law." City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 137 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2009)) (cleaned up). "[A] defendant who defaults thereby admits all 'well-pleaded' factual allegations contained in the complaint."Id. (citing Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 2004)). The court should also draw "all reasonable inferences from the evidence offered" in favor of the moving party. Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1981).
Although "a party's default is deemed to constitute a concession of all well pleaded allegations of liability, it is not considered an admission of damages." Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992). "In deciding the extent of damages to be awarded in a default judgment, the court must consider several factors, including (1) the monetary award requested; (2) the prejudice suffered by the plaintiff; (3) whether or not the default is clearly established and (4) the nature of the plaintiff's claims against the defendant." Rodsongs v. D & S Entm't, LLC, 2005 WL 589321, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 11, 2005). Regarding "the scope of damage recovery pursuant to a default judgment," the Second Circuit has explained:
The outer bounds of recovery allowable are of course measured by the principle of proximate cause. The default judgment did not give plaintiff a blank check to recover from defendant any losses it had ever suffered from whatever source. It could only recover those damages arising from the acts and injuries pleaded . . . .
Greyhound Exhibitgroup, 973 F.2d at 158-59 (cleaned up).
Upon entry of a default judgment, to determine the amount of damages to award, a district court "may conduct a hearing or it may make such a finding on the basis of documentary evidence if damages are ascertainable with reasonable certainty." Hernandez v. Apple Auto Wholesalers of Waterbury LLC, 2020 WL 2543785, at *6 (D. Conn. May 18, 2020) (quoting Chance v. Karmacharya, 2017 WL 5515951, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 20, 2017)). "A court may not just accept a plaintiff's statement of the damages, even in a default judgment." Id. (citing Karmacharya, 2017 WL 5515951, at *2; Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp. Div. of Ace Young, Inc., 109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1997)) (cleaned up).
On November 4, 2019, Cartagena-Cordero filed this complaint against Five Star and Westlake Services, LLC d/b/a Westlake Financial Services ("Westlake"). On November 9, Cartagena-Cordero had Five Star served with the complaint. See Executed Summons, Doc. No. 8. Thus, Five Star's responsive pleading was due by November 30, but Five Star did not file anything by then. On December 10, 2019, Cartagena-Cordero made a motion for an entry of default against Five Star pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). See Mot. for Default Entry, Doc. No. 10. On December 11, I granted that motion. See Order, Doc. No. 11. On December 17, Cartagena-Cordero made a motion for an extension of time to file a motion for a default judgment against Five Star. See Mot. for Ext. of Time, Doc. No. 12. More specifically, Cartagena-Cordero asked for an extension of time until Cartagena-Cordero either filed a dispositive motion against Westlake or until the time of trial against Westlake. See id. On December 18, I granted Cartagena-Cordero's motion for an extension of time. See Order, Doc. No. 13.
On February 28, 2020, Cartagena-Cordero made a motion for entry of a default judgment against Five Star. See Mot. for J. and/or to Enforce Settlement Agreement, Doc. No. 14. The same motion asked me to enforce a purported settlement agreement against Westlake, or, in the alternative, to enter a default judgment against Westlake, which also had not responded to Cartagena-Cordero's complaint. See id. On March 5, 2020, I granted in part and denied in part Cartagena-Cordero's motion. See Order, Doc. No. 16. With respect to Five Star, I took Cartagena-Cordero's motion under advisement. See id. With respect to Westlake, I denied without prejudice Cartagena-Cordero's motion because (1) Cartagena-Cordero's complaint didnot allege a breach of contract claim against Westlake and (2) Cartagena-Cordero had not made a motion for a default entry against Westlake. See id. On March 20, Cartagena-Cordero filed an amended complaint that included a breach of contract claim against Westlake. See Am. Compl., Doc. No. 18. On the same day, Cartagena-Cordero renewed his motion for enforcement of a settlement agreement and/or a default judgment against Westlake. See Renewed Mot. for J. and/or to Enforce Settlement Agreement, Doc. No. 19. On May 18, 2020, I denied that renewed motion without prejudice because Cartagena-Cordero had not yet served Westlake with the amended complaint. See Order, Doc. No. 20. Cartagena-Cordero then had Westlake properly served. See Acknowledgments of Service, Doc. Nos. 21 and 22.
On June 19, 2020, Cartagena-Cordero renewed his motion for default judgment against Five Star and explained that he had "reached an agreement with Westlake . . . to settle his claims against it." Second Renewed Mot. for J., Doc. No. 23, at 1. On June 24, Cartagena-Cordero dismissed his claims against Westlake with prejudice. See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Doc. No. 24. On July 21, 2020, I entered an order that explained I would treat Cartagena-Cordero's motion for judgment against Five Star as a motion for an entry of default against Five Star pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), and I granted that motion. See Order, Doc. No. 25.3 On August 4, 2020, Cartagena-Cordero once more renewed his motion for a default judgment against Five Star. See Third Renewed Mot. for J., Doc. No. 26.
On December 5, 2018, Cartagena-Cordero, a New Britain, Connecticut resident, visited Five Star, a used car dealership in Meriden, Connecticut. See Compl., Doc. No. 1, at ¶¶ 2-3, 9. Cartagena-Cordero visited Five Star because he was interested in the Truck, which he had seen advertised on cargurus.com. See id. at ¶ 9. Cartagena-Cordero alleges that he learned that the Truck was advertised for $15,999 when he got to the Five Star dealership.5 Cartagena-Cordero alleges that that price did not disclose a dealer conveyance fee. See id. at ¶ 10. When Cartagena-Cordero arrived at Five Star on December 5, a representative told Cartagena-Cordero that other customers were also interested in the Truck but that Five Star would hold the Truck if Cartagena-Cordero paid a $200 deposit. See id. at ¶ 11. Cartagena-Cordero agreed to buy the Truck for $15,999 and paid the $200 deposit. See id. at ¶ 13. Cartagena-Cordero planned to return the next day to "complete the transaction." Id. Before agreeing to purchase the Truck, Cartagena-Cordero was "unable to test drive the Vehicle, because Five Star told him that the drive shaft required replacement." Id. at ¶ 12...
To continue reading
Request your trial