Carter v. Bradshaw
| Decision Date | 26 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 08–4377.,08–4377. |
| Citation | 644 F.3d 329 |
| Parties | Sean CARTER, Petitioner–Appellee,v.Margaret BRADSHAW, Respondent–Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
ARGUED: Charles L. Wille, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Linda E. Prucha, Ohio Public Defender's Office, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Charles L. Wille, Holly E. LeClair, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Linda E. Prucha, Rachel Troutman, Ohio Public Defender's Office, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.Before: MARTIN, COLE, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.MARTIN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which COLE, J., joined. ROGERS, J. (pp. 337–42), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
In this habeas action where petitioner Sean Carter is facing the death penalty according to his Ohio conviction, the district court found that Carter is incompetent, dismissed his petition without prejudice, and equitably tolled the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act statute of limitations prospectively until he is competent to proceed. Respondent Warden Margaret Bradshaw appeals that decision. For the following reasons, we AMEND the district court's judgment and REMAND the case to the district court for proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
For a full description of the facts of this case, we point to the thorough order of the district court. We detail here only the facts necessary for our discussion. After Carter exhausted the Ohio state review processes for his conviction, he was housed in a facility for prisoners with severe mental illnesses. His attorneys attempted to meet with him there to discuss avenues for collateral appeal, but he refused to see them. Worried that their client was incompetent and choosing to forego further appeals of his conviction and sentence, the attorneys filed Carter's habeas petition and a motion for a pre-petition competency hearing.
The district court held a competency hearing on May 1, 2006 at which experts for both parties agreed that Carter suffered from schizophrenia, personality disorder, and hallucinations. They also agreed that he was not able to fully and articulately communicate with his counsel, but they disagreed as to how well he could assist his counsel in his case. Carter's first expert, Dr. Robert Stinson, opined that Carter lacked a factual understanding of the proceedings. He explained that Carter could not provide details or elaboration, or engage in dialogue. Additionally, he explained that Carter did not believe he could be executed unless he volunteered, and that Carter could not accurately identify his attorneys, instead thinking that Bradshaw's expert, Dr. Phillip Resnick, was his attorney. Carter also called Dr. Michael Gelbort, a clinical neuropsychologist, who testified that Carter could not accurately describe historical events from his case and could not learn and retain new information. On the other hand, Resnick testified that Carter could provide basic details to his counsel, albeit without much elaboration. He also believed, based upon the opinion of a social worker who had worked with Carter and not upon his own clinical examination, that Carter had accepted that he would be executed if he lost his appeals.
Approximately two years later, Stinson provided the court with an updated description of Carter's condition. Stinson opined that Carter's condition had become “progressively worse, and despite treatment, he appears to have significant psychosis and functional limitations even when he is at his expected baseline.” Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing and Stinson's update, the court concluded that Carter was incompetent to understand his current position or to assist his habeas counsel. As a result, the court dismissed the habeas petition without prejudice and prospectively tolled the AEDPA statute of limitations until Carter regained competency.
A. The Right to Competence in the Habeas Context
Federal habeas petitioners facing the death penalty for state criminal convictions do not enjoy a constitutional right to competence. However, the Supreme Court held long ago that they do have a statutory right to competence in certain situations. In Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 313–14, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966), a habeas petitioner facing death row petitioned the Court for a writ of certiorari, but subsequently “directed his counsel to withdraw the petition and forgo any further legal proceedings.” To the Court, “[w]hether or not [the defendant] shall be allowed in these circumstances to withdraw his certiorari petition is a question which it is ultimately the responsibility of this Court to determine, in the resolution of which Rees' mental competence is of prime importance.” Id. at 313, 86 S.Ct. 1505. The Court ordered the district court to “make a judicial determination as to Rees' mental competence and render a report on the matter” in order to “aid ... the proper exercise of th[e] Court's certiorari jurisdiction.” Id. at 313–14, 86 S.Ct. 1505. To accomplish this goal, the Court directed the district court to apply 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244–4245, which has been recodified as 18 U.S.C. § 4241. Id. at 314, 86 S.Ct. 1505.
Section 4241 states that a district court may hold a competency hearing “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2006) (emphasis added). If, according to this standard, the district court concludes that a defendant is mentally incompetent, the court:
shall commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General. The Attorney General shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a suitable facility—
(1) for such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months, as is necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward; and
(2) for an additional reasonable period of time until—
(A) his mental condition is so improved that trial may proceed, if the court finds that there is a substantial probability that within such additional period of time he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward; or
(B) the pending charges against him are disposed of according to law;
whichever is earlier.
Id. § 4241(d). Additionally, section 4241(d) explains that if the defendant's mental condition does not improve, he may be institutionalized for a longer period of time according to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4246, 4248. Id.
By applying section 4241 to habeas actions, Rees addresses the situation where a habeas petitioner awaiting the death penalty may seek to forego any collateral attacks on his conviction or sentence, and defines a statutory right for the petitioner to be competent enough to (1) understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him, and (2) assist properly in his defense.
Furthermore, we have relied on Rees and held that federal habeas courts may conduct preliminary hearings to determine “whether there was ‘reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent’ to waive his right to further appeals.” Harper v. Parker, 177 F.3d 567, 571 (6th Cir.1999) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4241). A district court's determination whether there was “reasonable cause” is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. at 571–72.
In Harper, a psychiatrist had diagnosed a habeas petitioner as schizophrenic and opined that he was incompetent to assist in his defense. Id. at 568. The petitioner's counsel moved for a pre-petition competency hearing because the petitioner wanted to waive all his remaining post-conviction proceedings. Id. at 568. We held that the district court properly conducted a section 4241 hearing to determine whether the petitioner was competent to proceed. Id. at 571. We also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the petitioner was competent to proceed based upon the evidence presented and the petitioner's participation in the hearing. Id. at 572.
Rees and Harper anticipate any situation where a capital habeas petitioner chooses to forego seeking his habeas relief. They do not cabin the application of section 4241 to only scenarios where a petitioner chooses to terminate an appeal, or begin, pause, or delay one for that matter. Anytime a capital habeas petitioner affirmatively seeks to forego his habeas petition, whether by action or inaction, Rees and Harper hold that a district court may employ section 4241. Additionally, Rees and Harper are clear that this is a one-way street. Only the petitioner's indication to forego his appeal may trigger section 4241's application. The state cannot forcibly activate section 4241.
Based on Rees and Harper, the district court did not abuse its discretion in conducting a section 4241 competency hearing. Carter had refused to meet with his attorneys to discuss collateral attacks on his conviction, worrying them that he might not pursue his habeas petition. Carter's attorneys also claimed that Carter could not understand the proceedings or assist counsel in his defense. At the hearing, the court heard expert testimony from both parties that Carter suffered from multiple psychological disorders affecting his abilities to relay facts to his counsel and communicate in detail. Carter's experts believed that any discourse that Carter could engage in with his attorneys would be meaningless because of his complete lack of detailed communication. Furthermore, Carter's experts testified that he was...
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