Carter v. Bradshaw, No. 3:02CV524.

Decision Date29 September 2008
Docket NumberNo. 3:02CV524.
Citation583 F.Supp.2d 872
PartiesSean CARTER, Petitioner, v. Margaret BRADSHAW, Warden, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

Linda E. Prucha, Melissa J. Callais, Office of the Public Defender, Columbus, OH, for Petitioner.

Holly E. LeClair, Charles L. Wille, Office of the Attorney General-Capital Crimes Section, Columbus, OH, for Respondent.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

PETER C. ECONOMUS, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court upon Petitioner, Sean Carter's ("Carter") Motion for Competency Determination and to Stay Proceedings, (Dkt.# 132)("Motion for Competency Determination"). After conducting an evidentiary hearing and reviewing several experts' reports, the Court finds Carter to be incompetent and therefore unable to litigate grounds for relief one, two, five, and six raised in the petition. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the instant action WITHOUT PREJDICE. The Court prospectively tolls the statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Carter was convicted and sentenced to death in a Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas for the aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and rape of Veader Prince. After exhausting his state court appeals, he initiated the instant federal habeas corpus proceeding on March 19, 2002. Also on that date, Carter filed a Suggestion of Incompetence. (Dkt.# 1). Carter obtained permission to depose trial counsel on December 17, 2003. (Dkt.# 99). After filing an initial petition and two amended petitions, Carter sought and received permission to obtain psychological and neurological experts to examine him.

He thereafter filed a third amended petition on October 3, 2005, (Dkt.# 129), to which the Respondent filed an amended return of writ. (Dkt.# 138). In this petition Carter asserted, inter alia, that his right to a fair trial was violated when he was removed from it because of his disruptive behavior. He also contended that defense counsel did not pursue the competency issue diligently and that they failed to investigate and present adequate mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of trial.

Concurrent with the third amended petition, Carter filed a Motion for Competency Determination and to Stay Proceedings. (Dkt.# 132). On November 29, 2005, the Court granted the Motion for Competency Determination, staying the proceedings pending a competency determination, and setting a competency hearing date for December 16, 2005. (Dkt.# 139). After two continuances, the Court held a competency hearing on May 1, 2006. (Dkt.# 169-70). It thereafter issued an Order granting the parties' joint request for post-hearing briefing. Additionally, it ordered Carter's counsel to arrange for the Respondent's experts to observe Carter's interaction with habeas counsel. (Dkt # 171).

Carter filed an Objection with the Court, asserting that permitting the State's experts to observe his interaction with counsel would violate the attorneyclient privilege. (Dkt.# 173). After the Court denied the Objection, Carter filed a Motion for Certification of Appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), asking the Court to stay the habeas proceeding and notifying the Court that it would seek a writ of mandamus if the Court were to deny the Motion. (Dkt.# 179). The Court denied the Motion on February 1, 2007. (Dkt.# 184).

Carter sought mandamus relief in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals from the Court's Order on February 28, 2007. (Dkt.# 185). After accepting briefs on this issue, the Sixth Circuit granted Carter mandamus relief on November 5, 2007. (Dkt.# 186).

Thereafter, Carter filed a Motion for Records, requesting that the Court permit him to procure from the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction his medical records produced since the May 1, 2006, evidentiary hearing. (Dkt.# 190). The Court granted the motion, allowing both parties to review the records and submit supplemental briefs by September 5, 2008.

II. EVIDENTIARY HEARING & POST-HEARING

As noted above, the Court held an evidentiary hearing regarding Carter's competency to proceed with his habeas litigation on May 1, 2006. On that date, Carter called Dr. Robert Stinson to testify on his behalf. Dr. Stinson first testified about Carter's childhood and mental health history. He stated that Carter's mother was diagnosed with schizophrenia prior to his birth. Children's Services removed Carter from her custody at age two when he was discovered tied to a couch and suffering from malnutrition.

After being placed in foster care, Carter was adopted. That adoption ended abruptly when Children's Services became aware of verbal and physical abuse in the home. Carter thereafter was adopted by the Carter family. He lived with them until age 16 when he was placed in the custody of the Department of Youth Services. Records from as far back as age two indicate that Carter's intellectual functioning placed him in the mild mental retardation range. By age six, one report indicated that Carter was schizoid-prone and at high risk of becoming detached from reality.

Based on these records and his examinations of Carter, Dr. Stinson diagnosed Carter with schizophrenia, undifferentiated type, continuous course with prominent negative symptoms, as well as depressive disorder not specified, a personality disorder, and substance dependence that is in remission. He stated that Carter experiences hallucinations that lead to problems in perception. The schizophrenia also distorts his inferential thinking. Dr. Stinson concluded that deficits in Carter's behavioral monitoring manifests in poor physical hygiene, spontaneous laughter, and unpredictable agitation.

Most significantly, Dr. Stinson observed, were the disease's affect on his language and communication abilities. When speaking to Carter, Dr. Stinson observed that, "[Carter] lacks spontaneity, lacks elaboration. His discussion is void of detail. He doesn't engage in dialogue and provides a lot of empty responses." (Dkt. # 172, at 17).

Dr. Stinson opined that Carter does not have a factual understanding of the proceedings. For example, Dr. Stinson testified, Carter held the false belief that he could not be executed unless he volunteered. Additionally, when Dr. Stinson asked Carter to supply him with the name of one of his habeas attorneys, Carter responded with the name of one of his trial attorneys and Dr. Phillip Resnick, the examining psychiatrist for the State. His prognosis for Carter's return to lucidity was poor. Upon observing that, even with powerful anti-psychotic medication Carter still experienced several symptoms of schizophrenia, Dr. Stinson concluded that Carter likely will continue to experience severe symptoms of schizophrenia unless and/or until a new medication arrives that could more aggressively arrest his disease. Id. at 30.

On cross-examination, the Respondent first queried on what standard Dr. Stinson based his opinion. Dr. Stinson replied that he used the standard set forth in Rohan v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803 (9th Cir.2003), when assessing whether Carter understood the nature of the proceedings against him. Specifically, he questioned whether Carter knew he had been sentenced to death, whether he understood he could be executed, whether he understood the appeals process, and whether he knew who his attorneys were and what their goals were. (Dkt. # 172, at 45).

The Respondent also questioned Dr. Stinson about Carter's belief that he could not be executed without volunteering. She queried whether this false belief derived from Carter's being housed near a deathrow inmate who previously had waived all further appeals and was thereafter executed. After explaining that this was Carter's only contact with a fellow inmate who was executed, she questioned whether Carter's belief was rational and based on observances he made.

Dr. Stinson replied that Carter's inability to comprehend that he could be executed was referred to in psychological terms as a "fixed false belief," i.e., an inaccurate perception that does not change even after attempts to educate the individual to the contrary. (Dkt. # 172, at 74). Consequently, Dr. Stinson determined, Carter would continue to internalize the belief that he could not be executed without volunteering regardless of how many occasions others attempted to dissuade him from this belief. Dr. Stinson concluded that, based in part on this false belief, Carter does not truly understand the adversarial nature of the proceedings. Id. at 89. Although Dr. Stinson conceded on cross-examination that Carter could communicate with his attorneys, he concluded that the severity of his schizophrenia renders him an "unreliable historian," requiring collateral records to corroborate his responses. Id. at 98.

Carter next called Dr. Michael M. Gelbort, a clinical neuropsychologist, to testify. After examining Carter, Dr. Gelbort stated that Carter's thinking skills are fragmented and distracted, primarily due to his distraction from internal stimuli. He noted that in instances other than receiving straightforward, concrete information, Carter would have trouble responding. Dr. Gelbort opined that Carter's capacity to learn new information and retain it was poor. When asked whether Carter could assist his attorney, Dr. Gelbort responded as follows:

Will he be able to provide anything other than a seemingly basic assistance, to be able to consider what you present to him if it's other than very basic questions? While he may do so in many ways, it's not worth a whole lot of time or effort on his attorneys' part because his cognitive capabilities are so limited based on the test results, that what he will produce or give back to you is going to be of limited benefit....

I know from my experience trying to elicit history, he is judged to be a very, very poor historian. Not that he's unwilling, but just simply to ask him questions does not elicit information from him that if he does...

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